Neurobiology and Behavior, Week 4

I, like Max, and am also intrigued by the evolution of the nervous system.  On a cellular and microorganismal level, as Max alludes to with viruses and microbes, it is indeed true that there is an order and pattern by which these organisms behave.  One might argue that viruses and microbes 'think.'  

I think neuroscientists (e.g. Dr. Grobstein) might take issue with such a statement though, because it seems that an understanding of the brain presumes that differentiating between life that 'thinks' and life that does not is the difference between cognitive (i.e. processing of data) abilities.

As one who spent this summer studying microbes and their absurd ways of making a living, I do agree that their activity with their neighbors as well as with their environment does neccessitate a better definition of what defines life and, more specifically, thought.

I realize that this doesn't provide immediate insight into "boxes within boxes" or the "I-function," but I've been wondering lately about the evolution of the nervous system. Perhaps we can't track exactly when or how the first "nervous system" arose, but doesn't anyone else wonder why?

I was thinking about single cells, replete structures that can survive and interact with their environment alone. Clearly they do receive and process data. It may not be considered "consciousness," but receptor proteins along the cell membrane are always relaying outside information, even if this is only a rise in hormones. Is this not analagous to a "nervous system?"

Is it simply that when single cells started bundling together for increased surival rates and mutual protection, there had to evolve specialized cells - neurons - to serve as more a sophisticated means of regulating environmental/inner data with the more complicated structure? 

Perhaps I'm just devolving into petty mysticism, but where does one begin to sanctify life as complex and conscious? Cells (eukaryotes at least) have their own attendent organs (organelles, yes?) and are the foundation from which all large, "complex" organisms arise. But cells do behave, yes? They work together to form societal like structures and some will sacrifice themselves for the common good. Cancer is a cell gone haywire, a cell that no longer recognizes its surroundings due to faulty receptors and behaves inappropriately, reproducing itself and the corrupted genetic material it houses. 

What about viruses? Is anything without a true "nervous system" simply diffusing and operating under "random" gradients and pressures? Is "behavior" only a meaningful distinction when applied to large organisms with systems of interconnected neuron cells? 

It has been established that the I-function allows one to act willfully and to carry out an intention. In the case of Christopher Reeves, it is interesting to think that he lost this function of being able to will anything to happen to him below his head. However, in some sense he did not lose the I function because he is aware of his surroundings, and still retains the ability to say I. With the I function is there a line drawn between the physicial and "other" connection? What accounts for the ability for Christoper Reeves to still retain self awareness? I agree with others that the case of Christopher Reeves supports Descartes model. There has to be something else that accounts for the ability to say I, even if one cannot experience it.

To think in terms of pain is also interesting. If pain is a pattern of activity in the I function, how come one cannot control the intensity of pain, or if they can control the intensity of pain, it is exceedingly difficult. Is pain housed in a separate compartment of the I function that is less accessible? In this way it would seem that pain is just a state of mind, but I would hardly agree with that.

Although we were first exposed to our new vocabulary, “I-function,” I think we have earlier thought about it or even have known of this before. Integrating what we know with our observations made in class is not so easy.   Since we have agreed on our newly made observation in which our brain is different because our neurons are arranged in different ways, I think I can integrate it with the “I-function” being different among others based on different pattern of neurons, individual’s different value/belief carved in one’s neuron, and different degree/pattern of self-actualization. 

 I think “I-function” is similar to self-actualization in psychology.  Self-actualization implies the attainment of the basic needs of physiological, security, love/belongingness, and self-esteem.  Human by nature has a desire to fulfill these elements. For example, if someone likes music, s/he would have more I-function to initiate playing the piano.

Also, we have social expectation that we need to follow.  The behaviors caused by “I-function” are sometimes trivial like deciding to wait at the yellow traffic light while driving a car.  But, because the person has a predispositioned value or belief (on safety and responsibility required for his family or his own motto), he has acted in certain way in his life.  And I think his pattern of action based on his values/belief has been recorded in his neurons (like saving a favorite website address so that you don’t need to type it out next time), which ultimately help perform“I-function,” in his own way. 

Since we have these motivations (desire of self-actualization and social expectation, etc), our neurons arranged differently depending on individual would cause “I-function” in different ways resulting in different behaviors, and different internal experiences such as the initiation of willful action. 

The “I- function” makes me wonder more about what is essential to human individuality. We all have the same building blocks but the patterns of behavior are different. In Reeves we saw that we can cut the cables that give our brain access to the rest of our body but Reeves was still there. His, what shall I call it, identity, his self awareness was located above his neck. This makes me wonder how much more cables we can cut without losing the presence of a person. When does the “I-function” lose it’s function? When is our identity destroyed? When are there too little connections for us to function? Not just our physically being alive I mean but for us to be ourselves. Which part of our body is truly essential to our individuality? And also, is there such a part? In a way this leads back to the start of our discussion between Dickinson and Descartes about the human ‘soul’ and weather it is a material part of our body or an immaterial part outside of it.

Leading further into this train of thought it makes me wonder about the consequences of this information for the future. If we find a part of the body, a physical part, that is essential to us (to us being there, our individuality etc.) will we be able to predict the behavior of that individual and maybe even alter it?

It was interesting to hear about the concept of pain being explained as a simple pattern of activity in one of the boxes of our nervous system. In our diagram of the system I would have thought it to be an input. After all, a person can percive pain without using their I-function. when a person burns their hand they withdraw the hand at the first feeling of pain, before the brain has time to register it. Does pain only be labeled pain if it is a part of the I-function? What about hose who can not feel pain? I know there are some individuals who are born without the ability to feel pain (http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Health/story?id=1386322) but still have an I-function. What does this do to inform us of pain and how it interacts with the I-function? Is some pain limited to a reflex arc within the sensory nerves and the spinal cord? I would like to learn more about the sensroy process of how a person feels and reacts to pain. 

When we learned about the "I-function" this week, one of the first questions that came to mind was: Isn't the "I-function" same as consciousness?

It seemed to me that the ability to think about oneself and one's actions and thoughts pretty much defined consciousness. Doesn't being conscious mean that you are aware of your surroundings and yourself, which is what the "I-function" is? However, after thinking about it again, I've come to think that maybe consciousness is simply being able to take in all the input signals from the environment and being able to potentially react to them. While the I-function is a part of consciousness--the part that focuses on thinking about how the "I" is going to interact with the environment. Perhaps the "I-function" fits under the larger umbrella term of "consciousness". 

More interestingly, I've been looking at a book called "The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force" which discusses the work of Jeffrey M. Schwartz, who has done work helping OCD patients break their compulsive behaviors. In his book, Schwartz discusses how having patients simply think about behaviors that could replace their compulsive habits decreased the incidents of the patients engaging in their compulsive behaviors. Simple willpower of the brain could change the neurostructures of the brain to break the loop that caused the repetitive compulsive behaviors in OCD patients. This shows that the "I function" could influence consciousness by changing how we respond to our environment (in OCD patients, not responding to compulsion-provoking stimuli with compulsions). So even if the "I function" may be a subset of consciousness, awareness and control of the self are powerful enough to shape the way we perceive and respond to our environments.

From the discussion in class it seems like the I-function is what we consider "self." Differences in the I-function maybe responsible for each person's unique perspective. To me it makes sense that some actions require the I-function, while other more basic actions, like walking or breathing, do not need the I-function. Everyone pretty much breathes and walks in the same way, using the same muscles. The I-functions can account for differences between individuals. Maybe passing through the I-function box causes people to respond differently to the same stimuli. 

If the I-function is our "self" then it must be able fluid to change. As individuals learn/ are influenced by their culture and experiences, the I-function must also change. Also,I don't think the I-function exists as a single palpable area of the brain but a much more complex pattern of activity across the brain. To me, the term I-function is a convenient way a labeling a pattern of activity that is responsible for our sense of self.

In class last week, I asked whether or not the "I-Function" is something used among neurobiologists or if the term/concept is just for the convenience of the class. While this may have seemed to be a trivial concern, I think it is important to understand where our class conversations intersect with the larger conversations that neurobiologists are having- especially given that part of the purpose of this online forum is to open our discussion to people outside the classroom. At some point, I hope that the two conversations can merge, and we can feel as though we are all pondering the same questions. I do wonder what the purpose is of developing terminology/concepts that continue to separate us from larger field. Is the aim to propose a new theory? To put complex science into layman's terms?

If we think about the I-function as what's responsible for a sense of causing and experiencing action, I'm curious as to whether dreams are part of it. Do dreams pass through the I-function?I cannot claim to have caused the experience in the dream because it's not an experience I ever really have- and I often don't have control/will-power in my dreams. Additionally, I act in a dream, but do not really act in terms of my physical environment- so is running in a dream an action I can claim to have experienced/caused? We discussed the fact that the I-function is related to, but not the same as, the conscious/unconscious distinction, but I'm interested in learning more about where these two concepts overlap. In other words, if dreams are part of the unconscious, can they also be part of the I-function? 

I found the I-function particularly interesting today because, as we were discussing the "where is Christopher Reeves" phenomenon, I thought about several other applicable cases.  Could it be that, because in individuals with autism (who some experts have attributed to having problems with sensory functions), also be placed in the "where is this individual with autism located?"  Could it be that autism is an anomaly, like the Reeves anomaly, of the I-function where somehow, some cords got tangled/cut/rearranged and they exist solely on inputs that are only really half-received?  Perhaps these individuals can "think" all they want that they enjoy the sensation of being touched, but that "thought" has nowhere to go, or somehow gets lost along the way through the I-function.  Or, when they are touched, the output gets lost among the cords and, because their nervous system doesn't know how to process the information, the I-function goes a bit haywire?  There are many interesting analogies that I think could come from this.