Reply to comment

It has been established that the I-function allows one to act willfully and to carry out an intention. In the case of Christopher Reeves, it is interesting to think that he lost this function of being able to will anything to happen to him below his head. However, in some sense he did not lose the I function because he is aware of his surroundings, and still retains the ability to say I. With the I function is there a line drawn between the physicial and "other" connection? What accounts for the ability for Christoper Reeves to still retain self awareness? I agree with others that the case of Christopher Reeves supports Descartes model. There has to be something else that accounts for the ability to say I, even if one cannot experience it.

To think in terms of pain is also interesting. If pain is a pattern of activity in the I function, how come one cannot control the intensity of pain, or if they can control the intensity of pain, it is exceedingly difficult. Is pain housed in a separate compartment of the I function that is less accessible? In this way it would seem that pain is just a state of mind, but I would hardly agree with that.