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Hmmm. LauraC and I have been back on forth on this one for a while, without my quite understanding what's on her mind. This morning I think I get it, and think it relates to Paul's concern as well. Let me take a crack at both ...

Descartes' dualism (or at least what was subsequently made of Descartes' writing) invoked two distinct realms, one of matter and the other of spirit. And, in this context, the story that all human experiences are "constructed" might be (sometimes is?) heard as asserting that everything is "spirit," ie that there is no "matter." I suspect in fact that in my effort to emphasize the importance of "construction," I may contribute to that way of hearing the story. Mea culpa.

The story should perhaps emphasize more that all human experience is a construction by the brain, which is itself organized matter, and hence experiences (and stories) too are organizations of matter. The story of the constructedness of human experience should not be heard as asserting that story (or spirit?) is all there is, nor that story (or spirit) exist in a realm parallel to that of matter, but rather that story (and spirit?) are forms of organized matter (just as culture is forms of organized individuals).

What follows from this is that properties of matter are not irrevant to thinking about human experiences/construction/stories (and spirits?). While they don't determine any of these things, they do influence them. Yes, I am likely to get into trouble if my story doesn't include the likelihood of failing on my fanny if I try and sit down without a chair there. And my story is particularly problematic if everyone other than me has a story that acknowledges that. Equally importantly, since my story is itself organized matter it can readily play a causal role in reorganizing matter. If there is no chair here, I can reorganize matter to allow me to sit down (by going and getting a chair, or even making one).

That all of human experience is a construction of the brain is not a classic "idealist" position (Berkeley: there is no matter but only ideas). Nor is it a classic materialist position (everything follows necessarily from the properties of matter). Nor is it a classic dualist position in which matter and spirit/ideas each have their own independent existence. It is instead a story in which there is both matter and ideas/spirit, because the latter are forms of the former. One can have BOTH matter and ideas (and bidirectional causal relationships between the two), just as science can be BOTH objective and subjective because objectivity is created out of subjectivity.

Is there something "out there"? "outside of us/our brain"? There certainly seems to be, and there seems to be something in here that makes up us/our brains as well. We can and do productively tell, compare, and revise stories about that (those?) somethings. What we can't do is to compare those stories to what is "really" out there/in here. That's too bad if a completed description of "reality" is one's goal. But maybe "reality" is actually less interesting than what one can make of it? In that case, one can actually take pleasure in the inability to provide a definitive description of it, and in the play of alternative realities that leaves open for humans to create.