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Rich conversation Monday evening, and below, with more hopefully to come.  I too was struck by the issue of "as a scientific audience, [we] are more likely to question her personal account because we don't want to give her the credibility of being a neuroscientist if she presents her information as a layperson" (Vidya)" and "I imagine that as repulsive as we find the integration of emotion into science, we find the incorporation of religion about a hundred times worse" (David).   Perhaps, indeed, neurobiology (among other things) is bringing us to a point where, as David says, "emotion should not be kept so strictly distinct from science."   And perhaps as neurobiologists we need to find ways to admit as legitimate observations religious/spiritual experiences as well?

Along these lines, one of the things that particularly struck me was the relation between this conversation and several earlier ones about subjectivity and the possibility that not all brain activity is "calibrateable," ie interpretable in terms of shared subjectivities.  What all of this suggests (to me at least) is that neurobiological observations might over time lead to the conclusion that there is in all people an irreducible, non-categorizable, non-calibrateable, distinctive individuality/subjectivity.  Might experience with that residual distinctive subjectivity, unique to each individual, be related to/the origin of, what in religious discourse is referred to as the "soul" or "spirit"?  I'm intrigued by the possibility that a number of terms common in religious/spiritual discourse may actually have parallels in brain function, so that a more active exchange between "scientific" and "religious/spiritual" discourse communities might prove productive for both.  And, of course, by the idea that not only is emotion a necessary element in any program of brain research and hence emotional experiences must be treated as admissable observations but that there are likely to be new ways of thinking about brains that would arise from a more serious engagement with emotional experience. 

Among the other themes that intrigued me and I want to think more about is the distinction between "repairing" the brain and being aware of the ongoing processes of development and adaptation that are inherent in the brain and its function.  The idea that the brain is continuing to explore ways to achieve particular functions rather than that the brain has particular ways to achieve particular functions seems to me relevant in a variety of rehabilitation contexts (as well as in educational and other life adaptation contexts).  Contemporary research on the ability of the brain to use signals to control robotic devices seems to me of particular significance in this light. 

Finally, I found very interesting Taylor's reports of her immediate stroke experiences, and our discussions of the validity of those first person reports.  The latter highlights some of the problems and potentials of making neurobiology (and science generally?) more open to subjective experience as legitimate observations.  And the former, it seems to me, helped us to think more about the issue of consciousness.  Yes, there is a state that not only doesn't involve language but involve "chatter" or an "inner voice".  And perhaps no "self/other distinction" either.  Its worth thinking more about what that involves.  If not a "left brain, right brain" distinction then .... ?  Perhaps a distinction between conscious experiences more directly related to the unconscious and those more elaborated within consciousness?