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The Christopher Reeves example used in class helped to distinguish (for me) those actions controlled by the brain, and reflexes controlled by the stimulation of nerves. It helped me understand that for a neuron to fire, causing a nerve to send signals to muscles, no pre-approval from the brain is needed; it is simply a reflex. This is much the same way someone can be in a vegetative state yet they continue to breathe and their heart continues to beat. However, why is it that if I want to move my toe, I can, without the need of any external, physical stimulus? This is where the I-function comes into play. In class, the I-function was vaguely defined as a 'box' within the brain that can send inputs to different parts of the body, thus controlling the output. (Example, I 'tell' myself that I want to move my toe and then I move my toe). However, in order for the I-function to work, it must be connected to the rest of the nervous system, I think these cables are found in or near the brain stem. I would not be able to move my toe, if I was not connected to the rest of my body, such as Christopher Reeves.

This all seems fairly easy to understand, but I still do not understand why we seem to equate the I-function with the "Self." From a biological perspective, are they necessarily the same thing? Dogs for example, are classified as not aware of the "Self," so do they not have an I-function? Could a dog not move it's paw because it wanted to do so? In class, I felt we were using the I-function and the Self as synonymous terms when they might not have to be. Perhaps a better example is young children, babies are also classified as not being self-aware, yet I am quite certain a 12 month old child will perform certain actions simply because he/she wants to. So, do we always have an I-function through which the "self" eventually develops, or are they two different things ? To conclude, perhaps our definitions of the I-function and of the 'self' are yet too limited to portray the reality behind the terms.