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Upon reflection, I do not think that the apparent consensus regarding depression as a "reaction" or a "symptom" rather than an illness is one that i can accept.  I am having trouble with discussions driven by metaphor and references to theory.  While I am not uninterested in philosophical discussions, they alone are not sufficient to prompt a radical shift in clinical thinking.  It is ironic to attempt to do so in the context of Grobstein's (insightful) implication that we should not really view mental illness differently than other forms of illness.  Worse still, I think that the character of these philosophical discussions has completely muddied the epistemological waters.  Either we can use words in a fashion to clearly convey meaning, say, as the medical establishment and our society have come to use "illness", or words are ephemeral floating things as per previous talks*.  If they are to be both at once, we should at least separate our discussion to avoid this confusion.

Perhaps there is a body of data supporting Professor Grobstein's theory.  I cannot understate my interest in seeing it!  Without stronger empirical backing, however, I feel manipulated.

*this is not to deny obvious controversy regarding the use of a number of words and concepts. Please accept the simplification.