Reply to comment

Answering the question of whether or not language is necessary for consciousness is a task amenable to scientific inquiry. Importantly, what one concludes in either direction is dependent on how consciousness if defined. For example, consider observations of split-brain patients, who are unable to report seeing an object in their left field of vision, but who are able to select that object from among a row of objects significantly more than chance would predict (among other behaviors indicative of some type of awareness of the object such as drawing it). If consciousness is defined in terms of reportability, which constitutes an indication of introspective awareness, one would here conclude that the split-brain patients were not conscious of the object. However, if one defines consciousness in terms of some indication of awareness of that object such as an ability to select or draw that object, despite being incapable of reporting an awareness of it, than these patients would be considered conscious of the object.

With this anecdote in mind, it becomes apparent that while one can scientifically investigate the nature of consciousness, however, one does need to define consciousness before interpreting the results of empirical investigations of consciousness, as how one defines consciousness will pose important implications for the interpretation of results.

Further, I think this further illustrates point touched on in class, that consciousness is composed of various layers. For this reason, it seems that descriptions of consciousness should avoid seeking to define a single or principle criterion for defining what is “conscious” and instead set out to describe the various layers of consciousness and how these layers contribute to the processes of the others.