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I think we might be starting to get somewhere with the whole “I-function” box this week. This box is supposed to represent our experience, and furthermore our ability to constantly integrate that experience into our behavior. Some inputs go through this “I-function” box and then become outputs and some inputs simply go straight to outputs. We loosely related these connections to conscious and unconscious behaviors respectively. I want to explore the relationship between the “I-function” box and conscious experience.

First, I want to solidify the connection between consciousness and our new box. The “I-function” box suggests that we have an aspect of our brain for conscious experience (and also a part for unconscious experience). So thus, in the case of humans, it seems we can assume the “I-function” box and consciousness are interchangeable. I think many people would argue that the “I-function” box is unique to humans, much like what Dante says in his “hierarchy of being” idea. This hierarchy says that only humans and higher forms have consciousness (and thus have the “I-function” box), while all lower forms operate on instinct if anything at all. I am not so sure that I agree with this. Conscious experiences over time can become somewhat subconscious and this works for both animals and humans. Take the activity of walking for example: when you learn to walk it is a conscious experience to put one foot in front of the other and figure out your balance and all that. But over time (as in now) you don’t really think too much about walking, you just do it. This works similarly for animals. For example: when you throw a ball to a dog. It may take a while for you to teach the dog to go and get the ball and bring it back to you, but over time this becomes a learned behavior where whenever the dog sees a ball (even if it’s not theirs) it knows what it is supposed to do. In both examples there is experiential learning. But over time the input doesn’t need to go through the experience/learning/memory “I-function” box for an output (i.e. a conscious behavior), rather an action can simply go from input to output. These examples were trying to show that both animals and humans may have this “I-function” box but also that there might be some exchange between conscious and unconscious experience, that activities might transition back and forth (e.g. if you were in a car accident you may have to consciously learn to walk again). So I guess my next question would be can a conscious activity truly become an unconscious activity (from the perspective of outputs and inputs)?

We are still looking at connections between structure and function in the brain. We cannot move beyond trying to look for what is it in the brain that gives us conscious and unconscious behavior. Are we at the most basic level with the “I-function” box or are we able to further reduce consciousness down to the neurons themselves. We are looking at objective mechanisms of the cognitive system. One of the best articles I have read on this “I-function” box as related to consciousness is called “The Puzzle of Consciousness” by David J. Chalmers in Scientific American in 2002. This article discusses behavior and looks at how consciousness works both objectively and subjectively. Science is definitely still struggling with understanding the subjective human experience (how is it that we all have “I-function” boxes that operate the same way but with different characteristics), but in my mind we are also struggling with the objective experience (how is experience/learning/memory integrated into our behavior). The New York Times Science Times this week addressed one aspect of this discussion in “How do we see red? Count the Ways” by Natalie Angier. We all experience red but we experience red differently (both as different people and different animals). This indirectly ties back into consciousness, since we all are experiencing the same world but we are experiencing it very differently. Even though we may have similar inputs and we all may have an “I-function” box, something different happens in the output.

I went all over in this post (I had a bit to say!), but the point of the matter is that I think we are making progress in having this “I-function” box and accounting for experience, but I think we need to further define the implications and assumptions that are associated with such a box. Consciousness? Humans only? What about subjective experience? As in every other week thus far, many questions remain.