Mystery of Consciousness

John R. Searle
Mystery of Consciousness
New York Review of Books, 1997

This era is at once the most exciting and the most frustrating for the study of consciousness in my intellectual lifetime: exciting because consciousness has again become respectable, indeed almost central, as a subject of investigation in philosophy, cognitive science, and even neuroscience; frustrating because the whole subject is still plagued with mistakes and errors I thought had long been exposed.

This excitement - and some of the mistakes - are exemplified by the works discussed in this book, which is based on a series of articles that I published in the New York Review of Books between 1995 and 1997. The intervening time, and the larger scope of the book, have allowed me to expand and revise some of the original essays and to try to unify the entire discussion.

from the Preface

Searle's book consists of an introductory and concluding chapter, laying out his own views of the consciousness problem and how to approach it, and an intervening set of chapters in which Searle comments on and criticizes the approaches of others (Crick, Edelman, Penrose, Dennet, Chalmers, Rosenfeld) as represented in recent books by each. The Mystery of Consciousness was used to begin a discussion of consciousness as an area of ongoing research in the Senior Seminar in Neural and Behavioral Sciences during spring semester, 1999. The following are comments on the book by participants in that seminar, with those on the first half of the book appearing first, and comments on the second half following.

 

COMMENTS ON THE FIRST HALF OF SEARLE

Name: A. Forray
Username: aforray
Subject: Response Ch. 1-4
Date: Sat Jan 30 15:39:27 EST 1999
Comments:

In the first chapter, I had mixed opinions about Searle's interpretation of consciousness. I agree with his ideas that mind and body are not two different entities, that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, and that consciousness is a series of qualitative states. I found his denial of "brain processes as causes and consciousness as effects" and his redefinition of causation (non-event causation) so that brain gives way to consciousness, were separated by a very thin line. Searle's view is relative, a matter of semantics. I disagree with his view further in his explanation of why brain and consciousness do not have a cause and effect relationship. He denies the cause and effect idea because he claims it give the brain and consciousness duality, which he tried to eliminate early on (and rightly so), but to me this distinction is a matter of logistics. In refusing to see brain and consciousness in a traditional casual manner, he sets himself up for contradiction. In chapter two he claimed that how neurons operate is the "entire casual basis of our conscious life."

Chapter two was a very interesting chapter, it brought up Crick's argument that brain is behavior (or consciousness). In general I agree with this statement, it is simple and logical following the idea presented earlier by Searle that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. In particular I like how Searle ran through the general mechanism of neuronal firing and then stated that from this rather simple mechanism consciousness arises. This is a highly simplistic view of how the brain is consciousness, yet it is true and something we can grasp. Thinking about how the brain brings all these neuronal firings together and gives rise to consciousness (i.e. the mechanism for the "binding problem") is much more complicated and overwhelming, because of how little we know about it. As Searle puts it, jumping from electrochemistry to feelings is the hardest part of the mind-body problem (p. 28).

My one problem with this chapter was Searle's critique of visual experiences and the real objects these experiences are based on. He refutes Crick's idea that we only see symbolic interpretations or descriptions, and never the real object. He claims we see the real object and do have direct knowledge of the world. I view this issue differently, as a combination of both ideas, not as either or. We see the real object, yet our mental picture is a representation of the object. My experience, retina, lens, cortex, etc., influence how I see real object, to the extent that what I see is my own representation of that object. Although my general picture of the object (my representation) reflects certain properties of the real object- that is why we can all look at a fruit bowl and recognize the orange, almost spherical object as an orange- the details of that object are our own interpretation (e.g. shade, size, etc.). The influence in my perception of the object might lie in the "binding problem." The mechanism via which we bring different stimuli into a "single unified experience of an object" (p. 33) might be what alters out perception of the "real" object.

Chapter three presented Edelman's interesting and logical categorization of sheets of neurons as "maps" (p. 40) and the "reentry" process among maps (p. 41). Edelman's assumption that the brain is equipped by neuronal groups that die out or survive (selectional mechanism) seems possible, but it is unlikely that the brain only develops this way. There must still be some component of learning from experience and the environment (instructional mechanism). For example humans continue to make new neuronal connections throughout their life, wouldn't these be instructional? Edelman also describes a set of criteria necessary for the development of consciousness, learning, memory, etc.. These criteria are essential and sound, yet they are only a piece of the puzzle and not the whole picture. His assumption that "consciousness is an outcome of comparative memory . . . " (p. 47) is lacking the concept of self and a mechanism by which this occurs. His explanation that a concept of self derives from social interaction is not convencing. As Searle said the brain might have all the functional and behavioral features that Edelman talks about without necessarily being conscious (p. 48).

In chapter four I got a bit lost in the mathematical discussions. I did agree with Penrose's idea that brain processes cause consciousness, but that consciousness cannot be simulated by computers (p. 60). There are many physiological factors and processes that affect our brains and therefore consciousness. These factors and processes could never be simulated by a computer. In addition, it also seems like an impossible task to set up the basic network of the billions of neurons in the brain in a computer (at least not at the present time). There is an intrinsic quality of our brains as a living organism that computers will never have.

Ariadna Forray

Name: Noreen Khan
Username: nkhan@brynmawr.edu
Subject: Noreen Khan
Date: Sun Jan 31 15:53:51 EST 1999
Comments:
Searle seems to have a very straightforward approach to everything he talks about. He explains things clearly and I appreciate the way he summarizes everything after talking about several topics. Though the philosophical terminology he uses can get rather confusing, he tries to explain things so basically anybody could understand it. Unfortunately the people he is writing about aren't always that clear with their reasoning and logic, so many of of the arguments seem way above my head.

One of his first arguments is that the definition of consciousness is not as difficult as others seem to think. He gives us a definition he believes is sufficient and moves on. To me that was an extremely important step, since sometimes we get so caught up with defining consciousness that we can't move on and analyze it further. So I give Searle two thumbs up for getting the ball rolling.

Searle is not completely happy with any of the books he talks about. They all seem to have their own flaws and none of them are really conclusive. Searle seems to like the neurophysiological explanations that Francis Crick gives for visual perception and its relationship to consciousness. However he has issues with the philosophical assumptions he makes in his argument. His major qualms with Crick's argument is that he does not fully understand the problem of qualia. He says that qualia, or the "qualitative, private, subjective experience" of the more objective firing patterns of neurons, is not just an aspect consciousness. It is consciousness. This is one of the problems with Gerald Edelman's work which he talks about later. I think this is one of the most important points that he brings up. The distinction between the specific pattern of neuron firing and the experience that one feels due to it, is essential to understanding consciousness. He reiterates this point several times throughout the different chapters.

Gerald Edelman describes the features that make up primary consciousness. This includes reentry mapping, categorization, learning, and distinguishing between self and nonself. Searle's complaint with the book is that it still doesn't explain the big picture of consciousness. How do these smaller features work together to result in consciousness? This can not be clearly stated yet, due to lack of neurobiological information. However I think it is a good start to understanding the larger picture. Consciousness may be too large of a concept for us to comprehend completely, but we may be able to understand the smaller steps and put them altogether.

The last work he talks about is by far the most confusing. It deals with logic excercises that I couldn't follow at all. However, Searle concludes that the book talks more about Godel's Proof and quantum mechanics than consciousness anyway.

Thus far we see some interesting models for studying consciousness. Crick's method involves using one aspect of the neurological functions of the brain to draw parallels to other functions such as consciousness. Edelman tries to break consciousness into smaller part to study it. Though they may not be very conclusive yet, they do have potential to expand.

Name: Luise Pernar
Username: lpernar@brynmawr.edu
Subject: Searle's Book
Date: Sun Jan 31 22:42:24 EST 1999
Comments:
Searle's view of consaciousness as an emergent property of the brain is easily acceptable. A denial of this concept would bring one back to the conscept of 'mind stuff' or the like, as put forth by Descartes. The Chinese Room Arguement which Searle uses to deny the possibility of Strong AI, however, is not as convincing as his description of consciousness as an emergent property of the brain. For instance, were the Chinese Room to operate outside of a vacuum, it may well be possible for it to attach semantics to syntax. As computers, or AI systems, do not operate in vacuums, but rather communicate with other computers and/or their programmers, Strong AI may indeed become a possibility.

Searle's dealing with the work of Crick is rather straightforward and does not require much discussion. Edelman's ideas, however, are a bit different. While the idea of several 'homunculi' is quite appealing adn probbaly correct, the concept of mapping of experiences does not logically bring about consciousness in my eyes. I agree with Searle when he claims that Edelman's work and insight is not sufficient to explain consciousness. If his view were equipped with more of what Crick has to say about how consciousness becomes an emergent property of the brain, it may be more readily understandable.

Penrose's approach to consciousness is definetly interesting, but very theoretical in nature. While Searle tries his best to make Penrose's insight understandable to the reader, it is still very twisted. The bottom line, i.e. that AI in any form is impossible, I find an a wrong conclusion, as Weak AI systems already have been devised; systems that pass the Turing test, at least in constraint situations, have been designed.

Overall the philosophical introduction to consciousness that Searle gives is multi-facetted and interesting. However, the view that the Churchlands hold, i.e that neuronal firing and circuits can ultimately explain all of consciousness should be at the forefront of the consciousness debate now. Afterall, our means of investigation are getting better. Probably Searle will treat this and other views in the next chapters.

Name: Erin Brown
Username: ebrown@brynmawr.edu
Subject: Searle, chaps 1-4
Date: Mon Feb 1 00:02:30 EST 1999
Comments:
I must admit that I began Searle's book with more than a little bit of suspicion bordering on contempt at his philosophical approach to consciouness. It has always seemed to me that philosophy is a tool to fill the spaces which science has left empty, especially in the areas of the brain and behavior. Searle's attempt at the Chinese room arguments, qualia, and categorization vs. experience seemed at first an attempt to force insufficient scientific data surrounding the brain and consciousness into a philosophical paradigm of behavior. However, once my suspicion was consciously and forcibly cast aside, I began to examine some the points that he has summarized from various authors. The questions are valid, and though I still find the answers to be somewhat lacking, they do provide an interesting sounding board for our study on consciousness. In particular, I found Edelman's catagories of primary consciousness and higher order consciousness. Logic, however ill-founded it may be, seems to dictate that not all organisms, or even age groups within an organism, would experience consciousness in the same way. A gerbil's conscious view of the world would be vastly different from that of a human. A human infant's perception of reality is different from that of an adult, and a normally functioning human adult's consciousness would be different than that of a severely mentally deficient adult. Different functions of consciousness give the idea of consciousness more depth and greater functionality. Edelman's paradigm of consciousness also brings important distinction between issues of consciousness into view. He moves beyond the issues that Crick earlier addresses of visual representation and symbolic descriptions of reality into how these visual cues affect experience, memory, and consciousness. Clearly his categorizastions are much more complextensive than any sort of AI system earlier defined in the book. Although Searle criticizes Edelman's lack of clarity or examples, Searle's clarification and added comments provide me with a working model that I can hold in little contempt. I commend Edelman for his model and Searle for his clarification. Name: erin hunter
Username: ehunter@brynmawr.edu
Subject: Searle Chpt.1-4
Date: Mon Feb 1 00:34:13 EST 1999
Comments:
Overall, I liked Searle's book more than i thought i would. i liked that he addressed consciousness as a biological phenomenon. i feel rather stupid, but i had actually never thought to approach consciousness in that manner. thinking of it in biological terms makes it seem much easier to imagine and discuss, being able to use concrete structures to

Searle (and others) often use the computer analogy to discuss consciousness. i agree that there is something innate in humans that allows us to be conscious that does not exist in computers. I guess one reason why i feel this way is one that Searle brought up himself, that "computation" is relative to the observer. (p.15) This suggests that consciousness can exist in different ways for different people. Computers seem less likely to develop consciousness simply becuase they don't have the ability for spontaneous variation that humans have. To me anyway, humans are much less predictable than a computer. I feel like this spontaneousness must somehow tie into consciousness (though i admit, i'm not sure how.)

I disagree with Searle's critic of Crick's idea of perception. Searle believes that he really is seeing an object, whereas Crick believes we see a symbolic interpreation of the object. I have to agree more with Crick, because what we "see" in our brains might not be what is really what we're looking at. Our brain sometimes fills in holes in our visual system, thus part of waht we "see" is our own creation and not what the object really is.

I really liked Edelman's description of the brain maturing in a Darwinian manner. This theory could help explain the spontaneous variation of humans that i mentioned earlier (- our brains adapting in a way specific to the needs of each individual brain, etc.) I also liked Edelman's idea of primary consciousness nad higher-order consciousness, and the incorporation of memory and learning into the development of consciuosness. i think that consciousness does exist on a number of different levels. and i think that it's logical to think that memory and learning would contribute to sonsciousness.

This made me wonder though, at what level does consciousness begin? Penrose seemed to believe that consciousness must be explained at the sub-neuronal level. this intrigued me, becuase i had been thinking that consciuosness must begin at a much higher level, when different systems in the brain were interacting and thus creating a conscious level of functioning. most of the rest of the fourth chapter pretty much lost my interest with all the mathematical discussion. The other thing that grabbed my attention in the chapter was the discussion of mistakes in functioning. This reminded me of Edelman's idea in chapter three that schizophrenia may be due to breakdowns in the reentry mechanisms. how do mistakes and breakdowns in functioning affect consciousness? and if they do have an affect on consciousness, than does that mean that people are living at different levels of consciousness?

Name: Sarah Zimov
Username: szimov@brynmawr.edu
Subject: Searle 1-4
Date: Mon Feb 1 08:59:18 EST 1999
Comments:

My overall impression of the book was that it's hard to agree/disagree with what Searle is finding/saying about the books he's reviewing, without reading the books myself. But if I just take what he's saying about the books as true, then I find myself having many opinions on what is said.

 

The first thing I found interesting about Searle's approach is how he compares consciousness to other biological phenomena such as photosynthesis, digestion, etc. It's clear that he regards consciousness as an action associated with life that has a physical mechanism. However, in the case of conciousness, unlike photosynthesis and digestion, the mechanism is not simple. The second chapter on Crick helped reaffirm my belief that consciousness is an emmergent property of the brain. However, it was interesting to consider the alternatives. 1)Strong AI- Consciousness is a program run on the hardware of the brain 2)Dualism- Brain and Mind are two separate things

 

The third chapter on Edelman clarified more specifically what consciousness could be. Saying its an emergent property of neuronal interaction is fairly vague. Edelman described categorization, memory, learning, self, time and reentry pathways. These are all fairly concrete ideas of what constitiutes conciousness. Personally, I don't think all of these are necessary for consciousness, but clearly some are. I think that consciousness has many different degrees having every property is probably the highest degree,like humans, and having just one or two of these properties is consciousness on a lower degree, such as in fish. I think consciousness could be well analyzed if looked at in degrees. To the question of, What physically makes consciousness? One can answer, what is it physically that makes humans more conscious than that fish. Increased neuronal numbers, increased groupings of neurons, greater interconnectivity.....

 

The fourth chapter was a little to abstract. I don't see how Weak AI can be refuted since computers are obviously able to model systems, including brain systems. What I did find interesting was that he thinks consciousness is better explained with quantum mechanics. I can't say I disagree since that would introduce an element of randomness associated with behavior. But its interesting to see how all along I've been thinking of neurons and conections, but the real mechanism might just be much smaller

 

Name: Neha Navsaria
Username: nnavsari@brynmawr.edu
Subject: Searle Chap 1-4
Date: Mon Feb 1 11:00:00 EST 1999
Comments:
In the first four chapters Searle introduces the idea of consciousness and the problems and ideas already proposed by many other theorists. Searle basically takes their ideas and highlights the new findings and critiques their problems.

In Chapter 1, Searle presents us with a definition of consciousness stating that it is something that "switches on and off" and is "an inner, 1st person, qualitative phenomenon". I was first confused by the idea that it switches on and off, but Searle went on to clarify that within a field of consciouness there are states that range in intensity, which made more sense to me. Another interesting point made in this chapter was the question raised on how far down the phylogenetic scale consciousness extends. This is a very interesting question that I never thought of. It is a tough question to address because what can be used as a measure of consciousness in, for example, insects? It would be interesting to observe what organisms overtime deleveloped consciousness and why they might have developed it while others didn't.

Chapter 2 brings about the ideas of Crick where it is stated that "all of our conscious experiences are explained by the behavior of neurons". This remindined me of a discussion in our class earlier in the year when we were talking about treating psychological disorders with medical treatments or with psychological treatments. Even though the approaches are different, when it comes down to it, both approaches have their final effects at the neuronal level. Searle adds to Crick's important ideas by stating that the neuronal firing isn't the same as the feeling. It is also worth noting that a medical treatment such as a drug bypasses the conscious level and directly affects the neurons while the psychological treatment is performed at the level of consciousness and its neuronal effects are based on how the individual receives it and interprets it. Crick's work also addresses the idea of "binding effects". Searle explains the binding effect as being aware of many different experiences at one time. One wonders if you can really remain conscious of everything around you at once. Individuals have the ability to tune out certain stimuli which is opposite to the binding effect. The best example that I can think of is the "cocktail party effect" where one can tune out other conversations at a party and listen to one that is more interesting to that individual. This is opposite to the additive qualities of the binding efffect and shows that consciousness is selective.

In chapter 3 Searle summarizes the ideas of Edleman. He talks about the mechanisms needed in the brain to attain primary consciousness. A study could be done to observe the consciousness of people who are disrupted in any of these mechanisms such as memory or learning. Edelman also states that the brain does have a selectional mechanism which is a very important idea. The brain only strengthens what is useful and does not use what it does not need. This could explain the selctive properties of the "cocktail party effect". I was kind of disappointed that Searle did not mention the brain structures that Edelman discussed to describe which areas of the brain correlate with the different mechanisms. That would have been interesting to look at.

Chapter 4 was very confusing. Searle was basically discussing Penrose's approach where he used Godel's proof to prove that we are not computers and cannot even be simulated on computers. He also uses the ideas from quantum mechanics to explain consciousness at a neuronal level. It was tough to understand Searle's objections to Penrose's arguments too. One statement that I found interesting was used in the argument against the use of the computer as a metaphor for the mind. Searle states, "These symbols are meaningless until some outside human programmer or user attaches an interpretation to them." I agree with that statement, but I also believe that it can apply to humans as well and not just computers. From the time we are born, humans are taught letters and numbers and the meanings associated with them, if we were not taught this then they too would be meaningless symbols.

Name: Kelly Mack
Username: kmack
Subject: Chinese room
Date: Mon Feb 1 17:36:46 EST 1999
Comments:

Searle brings to the discussion of consciousness some very interesting challenges and questions. One of his most well-known arguments in the Chinese Room, where a person solves problems in Chinese by following a given set of rules. Using this example, he concludes that the theory of Strong AI (Artificial Intelligence) is not possible-that computers cannot attain consciousness. This is because computers operate computationally, in the same way that the Chinese Room problem works by following rules to solve problems. If one looks at the Chinese Room problem head on, in the manner that Searle does, I can see where it is probable that he is correct. However, I disagree with his example and the conclusions that he draws from it.

The first flaw I see in Searle's example is that the Chinese Room problem is a poor example of human consciousness. A person does not translate or solve problems in a language by using rules perfectly. There are a great deal of mistakes which people make, indicating that consciousness is not perfect (at least in humans). If I overlook this first problem to Searle's example, another one comes to the forefront and that is Searle's assumption that the mind is purely computational, including the processes that we understand to be under the label of consciousness.

As much as Searle criticizes other people for the assumptions that they make, he falls into the same trap by basing his argument on computational models of consciousness. By claiming that he already knows the mechanisms which create or allow consciousness to operate, he digs himself a hole. Research has not concluded that our minds/brains are purely computational. In fact, there are some relatively new theories which support a network model in the brain, where links exist and are strengthened and weakened by use. Network theories divide operations more broadly across the brain and de-compartmentalize them to some extent. Fundamentally, if we find that the mind is not entirely operated computationally, then Searle's argument does not hold because his example of how the brain works would not have any bearing on the actual mind or consciousness.

It seems that the more we learn, whether it is through reading, research, or thinking, that we keep having to work around other challenges to conciousness and how it must work. Working with Searle's arguments helps me to clarify what I believe I know about the mind and conciousness.

Name: Jennifer McCallum
Username: jmccallu@brynmawr.edu
Subject: Searle
Date: Mon Feb 1 19:08:03 EST 1999
Comments:
Jennifer McCallum NBS Seminar Feb. 1, 1999

John Searle makes it very clear in the first 4 chapters of the "The Mystery Of Consciousness" that a satisfactory explanation for consciousness has yet to be developed. This message comes across through his review of the work of several other authors. The list of authors includes Crick, Edelman, and Penrose. Essentially, Searle presents how he feels these scientists have contributed to the study of the mind and consciousness, yet always, and I believe rightly so, concludes that the primary question of how consciousness emerges from the brain remains unanswered. However, I do believe that there are several problems with Searle's analysis.

To begin, it is difficult to trust Searle's interpretation and summary of the works he reviews. I believe this to be particularly true in his review of Francis Crick's book. Searle discusses many reasons for finding problems with Crick's work while citing very little from the text itself. Additionally, if my reading is at least half correct, the goal for Searle at the outset appears to be to analyze and summarize what it is currently theorized about consciousness. However, rather than accomplishing this task, at least in the first four chapters, it appears Searle is also trying to prove his philosophical perspective on consciousness. For example, when reviewing Crick's work he points out Crick's philosophical errors. Among these errors are those relating to, as it seems to me, eliminativist vs. reductionist (or folk psychological) theory of mind. It seems to me, Searle could have spent more time presenting Crick's work for its ability to shed some perspective on consciousness rather than dragging the reader through a purely subjective critique of Crick's possiblephilosphical ineptitudes. Further adding to my distrust in Searle's reviews and interpretations, particularly of Crick, was that Searle did not bother to even describe what reductionism vs. eliminativism entailed. Nor did he define or describe how complex and multi-faceted these positions can be or how they relate, if they relate, to how he is interpreting/critiquing the author.

I have recently written a paper in which I critiqued Searle on the following point: Searle proclaims to be seeking answers to questions of the mind by looking within the nervous system, that is by looking at that the neurons. It certainly seems from the current text that he is in keeping with his proclamation. However, and I have been informed that I am in agreement with many others, although Searle claims to be analyzing consciousness from the modern-day materialist perspective, it seems Searle will never believe the nervous system is enough to produce consciousness. For example, Searle argues that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain just as liquidity is an emergent property of H2O molecules. My guess is most people, including myself, would say that this is a reasonable statement. However, aside from what Searle writes, what his analogy may be more consistent with the following: there is something about the water molecules in addition to them being water molecules which results in the emergent property of liquidity. This is a quite different statement. The problem is, no matter how in depth (for example, Edelman's proposal) or how close a person may come to describing the nervous system or how it may be possible for consciousness to "emerge", Searle is not likely to be satisfied with the answer. There seems to be some mysterious other thing in addition to the nervous system that Searle is looking for. I feel that because to most people consciousness is mysterious, and its mechanisms are unknown, this aspect of Searle's perspective can remain undisclosed. This makes it very frustrating to read his analyses.

Finally, Searle is intrigued with the question, as am I, of how neurons, which are quantitative, and seem to have no meaning, or rather, no syntax nor semantics, result in the subjective experiences we call consciousness. However, I am also fascinated with how a flow of electrons or fiber optic systems result in the beautiful color picture I receive on my television. How is it that I just plug two prongs into a wall and suddenly, there it is, The Young and The Restless. How is it that a satellite dish picks up whatever kinds of waves it picks up, and suddenly there is Die Hard II? Not only this, but how is that I can switch to 30 different stations and have a different show on each one, all coming by way of cables and wires? How can invisible, yet quantitative waves, result in something so amazingly different? Certainly there are those who know exactly how this works, I obviously am not one of them. Nevertheless, that these previous examples are possible and exist, I am not very surprised that our own biological system of electrons and waves, etc, can generate something so different as consciousness. I know as much about the latter as I do about the previous, that is nothing, however, just as there really is nothing "mysterious" about receiving a color picture and sound, I don't believe there is anything really "mysterious" about consciousness. We may or may not ever figure out the mechanisms of consciousness, yet, I think its a sure bet that it is a result of the nervous system and not something in addition to the nervous system that makes consciousness possible. I don't trust that Searle really believes this.

 

 

Name: Christina Bokat
Username: cbokat@haverford.edu
Subject: Searle (Part I)
Date: Sun Feb 7 18:53:03 EST 1999
Comments:
Christina Bokat

February 7, 1999

The Mystery of Consciousness (Part I)

One of the questions I had which emerged from my reading of the first half of Searle’s The Mystery of Consciousness concerned his discussion of the relationship between consciousness and brain functioning. Searle states that "we have to abandon dualism"(pg. 6) but my understanding of his arguments outlined in his book does not convince me that he has entirely rejected a dualistic argument.

Searle tries to explain that consciousness is not dualistic through a "non-event" causation explanation. To use his example of the solidity of a table, a table is a solid table because of the molecules it is composed of. The table IS the molecules just as, in my opinion, consciousness is neurobiological processes. As soon as one says that consciousness "emerges" from neuronal activity, they are separating, to a certain degree, mind from body. Searle states that "neuron firings cause the feeling, but they are not the same thing as the feeling" (pg. 30) which is a statement I agree with but do not fully understand. Obviously the qualitative feelings of consciousness are not neuronal firings but at the same time, that is exactly what it is. I feel that Searle is separating the two phenomena when he poses questions like "how… does the brain get us over the hump from electrochemistry to feeling?" (pg. 28) since all it is is electrochemistry.

Edelman’s theory contains many of the same faults. Searle’s summary of his argument seems to indicate that Edelman maintains that the relationship between brain activation and consciousness is a causal relationship (pg. 50). However when Searle states that in order to understand Edelman’s arguments, and his own too I would think, we will need to have a greater understanding of the brain and neural processes, I wholeheartedly agree. I realize that I cannot explain or even hazzard a guess as to how consciousness cannot fully be explained by neuronal activity alone but cannot be a separate entity from it either. My goal in this paper is primarily to question Searle’s explaination that consciousness is an "emergent property" of neural activity without being solely neural activity and his belief that this does not necessitate a dualistic explaination.

Name: Dan Weiser
Username: dweiser@haverford.edu
Subject: Consciousness - Part 1
Date: Sun Feb 7 21:48:12 EST 1999
Comments:

At least at this point, it does not seem too reasonable to think that we are going to reach a full understanding of consciousness. Too many unknowns exist, precluding the possibility of biologically explaining the phenomenon. From the first four chapters of Searle's The Mystery of Consciousness, we can at least start to gain an appreciation for how difficult the challenge is. Scientists, philosophers and other great minds have struggled for centuries, and what we know now is not all that much more than what we knew then.

To have any good communication about consciousness, there first needs to be an understanding of what it is. Searle talks of Crick and the inconclusiveness of being able to define what it means to look at and see something. Similar biological processes are occurring in all of our brains when light from an object hits our retina, yet how we are actually seeing that object could be extremely varied. Two people's notions of the color red may seem the same from the outside, yet how it's analyzed in the brain can be quite different. Perhaps there is too much philosophy wrapped up in this aspect of science. Despite the differences in perception, Edelman's argument is that we can still study the science that underlies it all even if we ignore the small variations between people. Though, what are we actually trying to accomplish by gaining a better understanding of consciousness? The end goal, as I see it, is to understand fully the neurobiological functioning of the brain. To do this, consciousness needs to be understood. Rather, what we call consciousness needs to be understood. And it appears as though this understanding will rest in our study of neurons at a micro-neuronal level - as Penrose might suggest.

I wonder if we are trying to look too hard for something that may not actually be explainable. Some things just need to be accepted at face value, and the more you think about it, the less it makes sense. But, without this kind of questioning, science would not be where it is today. Where should we draw the line though? Do we want to understand every little piece of the brain's functioning in the hopes that one day we can make a truly conscious artificial being? Intriguing, yet what's the point?

The statement 17 principle that Searle discusses on page 64 raises an interesting point: how do we talk about something that is true, yet not provable? Can we just discuss it as is or do we need to dig even further - but to where? Statement 17 and consciousness are not similar examples, yet is it actually possible that a biological function may not be provable? Perhaps if it is not provable, then it is not actually real. And then consciousness is just a title that we give to some type of everyday existence, or thinking, that is happening in our brain.

Regardless, I think we can all agree that consciousness is something that exists. At this point, we cannot simulate it artificially, but that just means that we don't have the technology or understanding as of yet. Let's see where Searle takes us in the next few chapters.

Name: Anne Frederickson
Username: afrederi@haverford.edu
Subject: Searle - First Half
Date: Sun Feb 7 22:32:30 EST 1999
Comments:
Searle spends a great deal of time dealing with the issue of computers and consciousness, specifically, the questionable ability of computers to simulate or produce consciousness. It seems to me that this is improper question to ponder in relation to the how the brain produces consciousness.

Computers are not able to produce consciousness. Searle, himself, shows that computers cannot produce consciousness. He argues that computers are largely glorified computational devices. Computation is dependent on outside interpretation from a conscious being for it to exist. Consciousness is independent of any such interpretation. One is either conscious or it isn’t. It also occurs to me that computers will never simulate consciousness because they will never do so independently. Human consciousness emerges from biological processes regardless of outside input (one could argue that parenting is that outside input). However, computers are made, programmed, and run by humans. A computer will never spontaneously grow or develop consciousness. Humans would have to program such a feature into the hardware of the computer. For this reason, computers are no better than our own knowledge of how the brain might produce consciousness. That is to say, we can only simulate consciousness on a computer based on our current knowledge of the neurology underlying it. Because our knowledge is so incomplete, it seems to me that our time would be better served studying the actual neurology rather than a poor computer model of consciousness. At some point, when our knowledge is more complete, it may help to have a computer model of how different areas of the nervous system interact. However, as noted earlier, this should not be confused with consciousness.

Ever since computers were invented, people have been searching for the correlations between how computers work and our consciousness. Searle attempts to show that such correlations are inappropriate. However, he does not do enough. Computers cannot and should not be confused with consciousness.

Name: Leland Kass
Username: lkass@haverford.edu
Subject:
Date: Sun Feb 7 23:17:49 EST 1999
Comments:
Essay #1 Leland Kass As I’ve been reading the first four chapters about consciousness, I’ve been trying to create my own definition of consciousness separate from but including ideas from what we’ve read. I never thought about a precise definition before, and it is becoming more and more complicated as the chapters continue. At first, I figured consciousness was simply an indication of the brain functioning--some sort of result of an active brain, but obviously there is more involved. We are not just computers with strings of outputs. I have attempted to understand all of the computer analogy in the first and fourth chapter, but I have a hard time thinking of our brains as machines that do little more than computers. Although The New York Times may have reported that new mathematic theorem-proving programs can now do something similar to genuine reasoning, I have no idea what they mean by genuine reasoning. Genuine is not a word I would use to describe a computer function; rather, it is a word I would use to describe a a person who has feeling and consciousness......but what is consciousness? For starters, I began listing what characteristics fall in line with consciousness: awareness, feeling, sense of being, spatial definition. In chapter three, it is said that a brain must have memory (a “special” kind), a system for learning, ability to discriminate the self, system for categorizing events , and a set of reentrant connections between these. Now, I agree with Searle, Crick, Edelman, and Rosenfield that brain processes at the levels of neurons, synapses, and neuronal groups cause consciousness, but what measures consciousness if we can’t define it and we can’t figure out what causes it? How do we know that a sea anemone does or does not have consciousness? I think it is much easier to discriminate at the higher level of animals that consciousness is present, but I can’t figure out where on the ladder of brain complexity does consciousness arise. Amongst the mass of confusion that this book is bringing into my life, I did manage to find a paragraph that rang true with my thoughts and that was the third to last paragraph in chapter 3 which discusses qualia. Edelman states that “no two people will have the same qualia and there is no way that science...can account for these peculiar and specific differences” (49). Searle goes on to say that this is not the true difficulty. He brings in the analogy that no two finger prints are the same, but argues we’ve still managed to obtain a scientific account of skin, and therefore we can still find the science of consciousness. I have a few reactions to this paragraph starting with the idea that no two people will have the same qualia. The fact that we all feel differently, react differently, think differently is what makes each person unique. How do we know that pain has the same value for each person? We don’t. What about animals? This reopens my confusion about where we draw the line of those with and without consciousness. As for discovering the science of consciousness, it is entirely different than the science of skin. Skin is tangible and as far as I can see, consciousness is not. We cannot take a sample of consiousness and examine it under a microscope. We cannot slice it apart and look at its layers. We cannot feel consciousness. But without consciousness we cannot feel......so with full consciousness in the next class, I hope someone can clarify my confusion and help me to understand this mystery of consciousness. Name: Christina George
Username: cgeorge@brynmawr.edu
Subject: Searle chapters 1-4
Date: Mon Feb 8 00:50:09 EST 1999
Comments:
Searle makes strong use of two opposing theories of consciousness to delineate where, indeed, his own view of consciousness lies. The first theory is called Strong AI and refers to Strong Artificial Intelligence. Such a view takes the computer metaphor of the mind too literally, according to Searle. It treats the conscious mind as a running program on the computer, i.e. the brain. Searle, however, supports the view of Weake AI. This view makes use of a computer as a "useful tool in doing simulations of the mind" (9) just as it is useful in simulating other processes such as weather patterns.

Personally, I agree with the author in that taking any model of consciousness too literally will inevitably fall short since an understanding of consciousness is so far from accomplished. However, I also feel that Searle claims to have a far greater understanding of consciousness than is actually so. His use of the Chinese Room arguement seems to be an unnecessary emphasis of the obvious, which is that consciousness contains an element that is extremely subjective and which differs from one individual to the next. Therefore, anyone looking to create a model of consciousness must simply accept the fact that a crucial chunk will be missing until someone discovers what creates the qualitative nature of consciousness. (also referred to as "qualia") It seems that Searle overlooks this chunk to serve his means of developing a definition of consciousness.

Chapter 2 gives Searle's critique of Crick's article explaining consciousness. Basically, Crick asserts that all behavior is to be explained in terms of neurological circuitry. That is to say that the brain is behavior. I agree with Searle in that Crick is wise to admit how little is known about consciousness. i also agree that looking to those elements of neurology that we do have a somewhat thorough knowledge of is a good place to begin in the search for a neurological definition of consciousness.

Chapter 3 speaks of Edelman's view that the brain functions by using "selectional mechanisms." He also claims that higher order consciousness is derived ultimately from the sense of self which seems unclear and unfounded. Searle presented his ideas of allowing differences in personal experiences to exist without having to disclaim a model of consciousness made more sense to me in this chapter. he compared qualia to the idea that each individual has different fingerprints which did not hinder the development of an understanding of skin. In the same way, an understanding of consciousness should be able to develop in the same way.

Chapter 4 is an attempt by Penrose to prove mathematically that computers can not simulate consciousness to a significant degree. It seems that although Searle finds Penrose to be an intelligent individual, his inferences on consciousness are both limited and uninformative. The only amount of information learned is that computers do not seem to hold enough ground in the quest for finding a model of consciousness.

Thus far, the author seems to be taking a reductionist method to defining consciousness. He is taking the ideas of other great thinkers and picking and choosing those elements that he feels add to his own definition of consciousness while trying also to disprove those elements that do not. I feel, however, that the idea of defining consciousness was not so much the goal of this book as determining how to go about beginning to define consciousness. This in itself seems logical but also very circular and unproductive.

Name: Jonathan Ball
Username: jball@haverford.edu
Subject: The Mystery of Consciousness
Date: Mon Feb 8 03:04:08 EST 1999
Comments:

John Searle’s The Mysteries of Consciousness is an interesting examination of the problem of consciousness. My major problem is that despite his claims and critiques of others Searle doesn’t really advance the case of a biological state of consciousness.

In his opening chapter Searle calls for the end of dualism (pg 6), but in the end his philosophy is just another form of dualism. It might not be the classic dualism of Desecrate, but its very similar to one known as property dualism. The best way to explain that philosophy of property dualism is through the example of water. Water can be thought to have the properties both of the water and of the properties of hydrogen and oxygen, both of which are distinct from each other, and argument similar to Searle’s table argument. So by saying that consciousness is a separate property or “emergent property” from the neural properties of the brain Searle is setting up a dualist interpretation of the brain. This is not just philosophical hair splitting, if in fact Searle’s emergent property claim is correct the established laws of neuroscience cannot apply to consciousness, at least in any way currently understandable, so we need a totally new approach to consciousness; which leaves us in same place as dualism. It might be acceptable if Searle left us with some direction or inclination on how to go about solving to problem of emergent properties, a short coming he is quick to point out in others, but he doesn’t; he just reiterates that consciousness somehow a biological process like digestion.

Despite my dissatisfaction with Searle’s in answers to the problem of consciousness, I do concede that his Chinese room thought experiment is one of the most powerful illustrations of the problem of Strong AI. It seems impossible for the man in the Chinese room to gain an semantic understanding of the syntactic manipulations he is performing. Unfortunately, the brain is in the same position as the man in the Chinese room, all it receives is syntactic information in the form of neuronal impulses, but somehow it must gain semantic information. To get around the dilemma created by his own thought experiment Searle talks about emergent properties, or causal powers of the brain, but he offers no solid explanation as to why these properties should arise.

Another problem I have with Searle is that he seems overly conscious of being labeled a dualist and thus tries to stress his belief about the importance of biology. A good example of this comes when he is talking about the problems with Strong AI and concedes that consciousness could possibly be an emergent property from a machine of some sort. After making this concession, he goes on to say that he feels it is likely that only a biological entity could have the necessary conditions for the emergence of consciousness. But he fails to give any real for his faith in the magical causal powers of biology.

Even thought I disagree with Searle in many aspects, I think his work has made some valuable contributions to the study of the problems of consciousness. His chapter in this book as well as the other three we read give a good introduction to complexity of the problems and the attempted solutions of the question of consciousness.

Name: Lauren Hellew
Username: lhellew@haverford.edu
Subject: Searle Chapters 1-4
Date: Mon Feb 8 11:22:20 EST 1999
Comments:
The first several chapters of Searle’s book The Mystery of Consciousness have certainly reinforced my conception that the question of the nature of consciousness and its relation to brain functioning is extraordinarily complex. I believe that a neurobiological explanation of consciousness is possible and, in fact, necessary for a full understanding of the phenomena. However, it is apparent that the development of such an explanation is not an easy task and that we are far from obtaining any definite understanding of consciousness.

Along these lines, one issue concerning the nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain which I have found especially troublesome, yet extremely fascinating, is the debate between eliminative and causal definitions of the phenomena (i.e. can consciousness be said to reduce to, or to be caused by, neural processes?) I find this question especially interesting because there seems to be such a fine line between these two definitions and yet they have very different implications for the understanding of consciousness and the brain. While both claim that consciousness is a biological process and that it can only be explained and understood on the level of the brain, they offer different perspectives on the specific nature of the relationship between consciousness and the brain. While the first position claims that consciousness can be reduced to brain processes and that the concept of consciousness can ultimately be eliminated, the second position suggests that consciousness is caused by brain processes but that it is a phenomena in and of itself which can not be eliminated despite its neurobiological explanation. This distinction is so important because it can mean the difference between claiming that the mind and body are one and the same thing (materialism), and that the mind and the body are two separate entities (dualism).

Searle takes the position that consciousness is a feature of the brain which is caused by lower-level neuronal process. He emphasizes that consciousness can neither be eliminated by its neurobiological explanation, nor can it be thought of as a separate entity from the brain. In this way, he provides “a solution to the traditional mind-body problem, a solution which avoids both dualism and materialism” (8). Such a functionalist perspective provides a nice explanation which I happen to agree with, however, it seemed at times that Searle might have manipulated the ideas of those whose works he reviewed in order to better prove his point. For example, Searle seems confident that Crick’s apparently inconsistent account of eliminative reductionism is merely confused support for causality/functionalism (29-30) and, since I have not read the original account, I have no way of knowing if this is the case.

Another recurrent problem with this account of the relation between the brain and consciousness is that there is as yet no real determination of how “brain processes cause consciousness” or how “consciousness emerges as a function of the brain.” While Crick looks to visual perception and the binding problem and Edelson looks to categorization for explanations, it always comes back to the same question: how do neuronal processes in the brain cause something as complex as consciousness? It will be interesting to see whether the second half of Searle’s book can provide any answers to this question.

Name: Zach
Username: ahetting@haverford.edu
Subject: BABE the talking pig
Date: Mon Feb 8 13:11:18 EST 1999
Comments:
I found the first half of The Mystery of Consciousness to be an entertaining read. In the sense that it made me think about consciousness in a new way and because Searle’s sarcasm and bluntness when dealing with his peers added a little flare to a heavy, and at times, confusing subject.

I felt as though Searle made a strong attempt to explain everything and provide enough background information so that someone with little former knowledge could access what he was saying. But danger lies in the fact that we are depending on him to explain other people’s arguments. It is clear from his writing that we are not getting an objective presentation of the other side, that everything is engineered to sway us in favor of his arguments. But with this in mind it is still very possible to appreciate what Searle has in mind.

The first thing that caught my imagination was Searle’s main point that consciousness is a natural biological activity that arises from the function of our brain. In one sweeping gesture he rejects all previous dualistic theories on the separation of mind and body. While very dismissive of so much other work I found it refreshing to read something so absolute from someone so sure of himself. But I also found it hard to hear, as a self-aware individual, that my consciousness is just a result of the presence of neurons interacting in my brain. I think it’s easy to say as a scientist that consciousness is just the result of the interaction of a large collection of neurons, but as a conscious and aware individual it’s much harder to accept.

Later he attempts to alleviate some of the anxiety that accompanies reducing consciousness to a collection of neurons by addressing the issue of computers and the simulation of consciousness. When I initially read that consciousness is just a natural extension of brain biology I thought about computers and that if they can simulate neurons firing and neural networks than it should only be a matter of time before there is enough computational power to design a conscious machine. But Searle speaks to this in his critiques and says that regardless of how complicated a computer can get, it can never really be conscious. It may seem conscious and have all the indications that it is conscious, but all it is doing is running a program, which is just a collection of symbols that we have given meaning. It has no concept of what it is doing, it’s just manipulating data in a way that it was designed to do. He then goes on to say that because humans can comprehend things that computers can not resolve, then computers can not simulate the human mind. They can simulate a state of consciousness, but they can not actually become conscious. This makes sense, but I don’t feel as if he is addressing consciousness itself as much as drawing lines in the sand. You can obviously draw a line between computers and humans by what they can and can not do, but what about the possibility of humans being a much more complex manifestation of a computer. How are we so different from a computer. What’s wrong with the analogy that our minds are our “hardware” and that our experiences with our environment shape and create our “software”. It seems the real distinction that Searle is trying to make is that computers just do what they are programmed to due by the rules they are given and that that can not lead to consciousness. But we live our lives by the rules that we are given by experience. All of our neurons are firing away doing things that we have no comprehension of, yet Searle is able to say that we have a greater understanding of what we are doing and that is the distinction between humans and machines?

I’ve seen a children’s stuffed animal toy of the pig BABE that was basically a little computer that they can interact and talk with using yes and no buttons(two of the pigs feet). While in a toy store once I proceeded to play with BABE and it asked my about my family, how many siblings I had, how old they were and so forth and so on, then it proceeded to take a nap. I’m 22 years old and it had me enthralled, I can only imagine how real and “conscious” the stuffed BABE would seem to a small child, even though it was obviously a toy in the eyes of an adult. Is it possible that we are more machine-like than we care to admit, or that it is beyond our comprehension at the present moment in time to see ourselves as complex machines. It may be that we, as humans, have to “grow up” and see that

Name: Rachel Kaplan
Username: rkaplan@haverford.edu
Subject: Qualia
Date: Mon Feb 8 14:03:52 EST 1999
Comments:
"Qualia" refers to the uniquely individual, qualitative nature of each conscious state. Many feel that scientific inquiry into this area is futile. In Bright Air, Brilliant Fire," Edelman remarks that because each person experiences the world differently, it is impossible to develop unifying, etiological theories for those experiences (as cited in Searle 1997). Can science find a way to meld higly variable, subjective realities with observable fact? In The Mystery of Consciousness, Searle argues that Edelman is overly focused on detail. Searle states that just because people have different fingerprints does not mean that the skin can not be studied. Likewise, differing qualia or conscious states should not pose a hinderence to the study of consciousness.

Gregory in his Editorial, Peculiar qualia, suggests a role for qualia in evolution and consciousness. He suggests that qualia affect behavior in a way which aids survival. Due to the fact that perception is mainly a top-down process, one which relies on "ancient knowledge" and stored knowledge from past experience, qualia are necessary "to flag the present" (Gregory 1996). Gregory presents the eye-blink reflex as an example of the evolutionarily favorable influence of one particular "quale." Although this reflex was selected for long ago, the response is non-perceptual because it is the real-time, direct response to a stimulus. The distinction between perception and qualia is necessary for healthy functioning vs. a Schizophrenic mindset, for example. It is very important to be able to distinguish the present from "the remembered past" and "anticipated future" (Gregory 1996).

Qualia enable humans to respond innovatively to novel situations. Robots, however, may only follow their given programs. There is no true equivalent to the "error message" in the human brain; although, humans often become frustrated when challenged. Take, for example, a situation where a human and a robot who has been programmed to be able locate all escape routes are trapped in a room with only an impassable door and a 2-way speaker to communicate with the person in charge. The robot would most likely either wander around aimlessly until he runs out of power or until he finds the situation impossible and receives an error message. The human, however, might try to reason with the person on the outside. Even if the robot tried to communicate with the outsider, his pleas would be far less charged than those of the living, breathing, feeling human being. A robot's lack of emotions prevents him from attaching the same kind of importance to different tasks. The human's consciousness allows him to adapt to his new context and perhaps to learn as he goes; whereas the robot is only able to draw from his previously existing code.

The moral is: humans are still better than computers!

Name: Maushumi Mavinkurve
Username: mmavinku@brynmawr.edu
Subject: The Mystery of Consciousness Part I
Date: Mon Feb 8 17:53:07 EST 1999
Comments:

The term "Conscious" or the state of being Conscious cannot have an objective meaning. Searle's common definition of the term consciousness are the states which we experience from waking from "dreamless sleep" to sleeping again. He doesn't understand why defining consciousness is such a difficult task. He quickly skims over the state of being unconscious, when in reality even this hasn't been thoroughly investigated.

Searle discusses the idea of dualism, separating the mental world from the physical world. He doesn't agree with this theory and feels as if the mental state, or consciousness should be thought of as another biological process. Isn't this a blanket statement? Consciousness is a biological process, but I don't feel that consciousness can be equated with the secretion of bile. There is no doubt that the brain plays an integral part in consciousness, in fact it is responsible for the state. But it cannot be equated with other functions of the body because consciousness has a connection with several biological processes. For example if you haven't eatin in a while, your body will give you signals of hunger, and this signal will invade into your conscious state. So in this sense, I feel that consciousness is a biological process, but much more complex than other processes such as those he described.

Another aspect of consciousness which he discussed was the computational model of the mind. He believes this theory, but breaks it down into strong AI and Weak AI. I do not feel as though the mind can be compared to the computer. If no input is given to a computer, then it will remain functionless. The mind on the otherhand doesn't need any input to perform functions.

I feel as though it is very difficult to philosophize about biology, especially an aspect which is so uncharted as consciousness. Searle is trying to minimalize consciousness, but if it can be done, how come most scientists who study it cannot completely define the state? His ideas are quite challenging yet I find him very difficult especially when he uses confusing metaphors (such as the computer). His view would probably be better understood if he explained it in plain terms of the mind.

Name: Melissa Bromwell
Username: mbromwel@brynmawr.edu
Subject: Chapters 1-4
Date: Mon Feb 8 18:18:34 EST 1999
Comments:

First of all, I must admit that I have little faith that the "mystery of consciousness" will ever be completely solved, especially through the approaches Searle discusses in his book; however, despite my belief in dualism, I found the first four chapters of Searle's book fascinating. Consciousness is one of the most important things we as human beings can explore, since it is the key to understanding who we are, both on an individual basis and on a global basis. It is also something that will not be explained by only one discipline, which is what I enjoyed the most about the book. While I do not agree with any of the approaches discussed so far, Searle's integration of these differing ideas into one book presents an important concept: the necessity of a combination of efforts, each very unique in their interests, working to examine the same dilemma.

What bothered me, however, about the chapters is Searle's bias. First of all, he never presented his own personal theory in detail; he stated other authors' theories then pointed out where he feels they were incorrect, without providing the reader with any sense of what he himself really believes. His approach was to take a simplistic understanding of neuroscience, such as what one might find in an introductory psychology or biology text, and twist it around with philosophy into something no more concrete than the theories he condemns, those that assert that consciousness is an unobservable, abstract phenomenon. He presents the reader with no information of his own; he contributes nothing to the existing body of knowledge concerning consciousness, merely regurgitating what others have written, praising or criticizing them, but never offering hard evidence of his own belief.

At the risk of interjecting my less-than-biological personal beliefs into this, I must once again state my belief in dualism. Consciousness, as I think of it, is comprised of the mind and the soul, neither of which I believe can be understood through science, if it can be understood through any current way of thinking and studying. In my opinion, consciousness cannot be comprehended by any of the secular (for lack of a better word) methods Searle has discussed so far, least of all computers. I was pleased by Searle's condemnation of others who believe computer simulations will help us to understand consciousness, but for reasons a bit different than his. Since this enters into areas very much outside the realm of neuroscience, I will refrain from a lengthy discussion, but in short: humans have a mind and a soul; computers do not. Therefore, no machine will ever have the ability to analyze such as we do, to feel physical sensations such as we do, or to feel emotions such as we do. I feel that continuing exploration through electronical methods is not only a waste of time, but also a show of a lack of compassion. One theme that consistently ran through the book was the acquisition of an understanding of consciousness for the sole purpose of its acquisition - nothing more. There was no mention of putting this knowledge, should we ever obtain it, into anything useful. At one point Searle discusses the possible uses this understanding could have, including psychology, as a brief aside. I have a problem with this lack of interest in applications because without psychology, what good is neuroscience? What is the point of studying consciousness if not to apply it to improving the quality of the world? Searle treats the study of consciousness as just one more thing we must learn about so that we can continue to file knowledge away as a kind of trophy of our advances as a society. If indeed scientists and philosophers and psychologists are going to persevere in attempting to understand consciousness, the desire to do so should not come from the prospect of amassing large quantities of knowledge for the sake of having this knowledge, but from the hope of bettering the world.

Name: Adam Alboyadjian
Username: adam@curmudgeon.net
Subject: Defending Searle
Date: Mon Feb 8 19:00:15 EST 1999
Comments: