The Evolution of Cooperation-Book Review

An explanation of how cooperation as a human characteristic has evolved within societies, is provided by Axelrod in his book The Evolution of Cooperation. It begins with a fundamental model of game theory used in a wide array of fields of study: the prisoner’s dilemma game. The paradigm depicts conditions that might allow for cooperation to take place as a reciprocating value that could benefit both parties, while mutual selfishness would result in no positive outcome. The dilemma is how to make a decision when it is based completely on the assumption of the actions of the counterpart.

 Axelrod applies the same paradigm in a political context during World War I. The “Live-and-let-live” concept was a phenomenon during World War I amongst battalions that were stationed in trenches that faced each other. Surprisingly periods of mutual restraint between both sides occurred, evidently as a result of reciprocal actions.

 

The book explores reasons for why instances like these occur and how they come about. What conditions create grounds for this sort of cooperation? Although Axelrod presents possibilities as to why this sporadically occurred regardless of the efforts of senior military officers who drilled the idea of “kill or get killed” into the minds of army men, explanations such as sharing a common suppertime and enduring harsh weather that hindered seeing abilities to fight, fail to explain the phenomenon beyond the realm of the war. Clearly mutualism occurs everywhere and at all times. This, in particular, was a concept that was initially difficult to incorporate with my familiarity with Natural Selection. How can a construct based on mutual benefits coexist with the continuous struggle of survival of the fittest? If we considered the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of Natural Selection each player would opt to benefit himself, and thus they would both suffer the consequences equally – this is clearly not the case in the war trenches.

 

To explain how cooperation works in these situations, and to analyze the strategy most used in prisoner’s dilemma, Axelrod provides astonishing results from a tournament of “Tit for Tat,” a game based solely on acting upon the other person’s immediate action, while “forgiving” all previous actions. The results showed that if the game is played for a long enough time, the most utilized strategy is that of cooperation which results in reciprocal cooperation. The insinuations of this simple game of strategy in a broader context are that when one initiates “nice” behavior, strategically, a “nice” response comes in return.

 

I immediately questioned this conclusion, since we have all commonly observed the opposite outcome. Take for example infections caused by bacteria. The human body is a cooperative living environment for the several bacterial species that belong to the body’s normal flora, however if the body becomes susceptible in any instance, such as an open wound, the amicable bacteria become pathogenic and cause infection. Where is the cooperative response? Perhaps it can be answered by stressing one important point of the original “Tit for Tat” model: no defect goes without retaliation. The body’s retaliation in the instance of infection is an upgraded immune system. When the bacteria are defeated, the body’s immune system “forgives” the pathogen attack, and the bacterial species still lives in cooperation with the body.

 

My initial questions on the coexistence of cooperation and Natural Selection were answered after completing book. It seems that cooperation is incorporated into Natural Selection, since it benefits each party equally whereas if both parties defect, each suffers equal consequences. After all, the point of Natural Selection is to do what benefits yourself the most. In addition, discussions in class that concerned choice-making provided a jump board for topics discussed extensively in the book.

 

I interpreted the intriguing overlap of this phenomenon in games, society, politics and biology reveals that strategically all living organisms have the ability to be cooperative even in the utmost uncooperative environments. Not only does Axelrod provide compelling evidence for this, but the suggestions are applicable in all time eras and countries. It seems that the motive behind writing this book comes from an opposition toward the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which was occurring at the time that the book was published. Particularly, as a professor of Political Science and Public Policy, his choice of topic as friendly relations, does not come as a surprise at all. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the results of a simple game of strategy as “Tit for Tat” can be applied in the context of current foreign policies.

 

Written in English, the book appears to be intended for an American audience, although translations of the book in different languages could possibly have a positive effect on the entire world. A dedicated practice of the principles listed by Axelrod can create conditions for cooperation and friendly relations worldwide.