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Yep, I too, despite a long-standing interest in Peirce and only recently "happened" onto  the "tychism" aspect of his work.  My current understanding is that Peirce regarded the scientific method as itself inevitably reflecting randomness since "empirical evidence" is always and necessarily a partial and somewhat random selection of relevant observations.  My guess is that, like other pragmatists, Peirce saw "fixed beliefs" not as something that can be justified by the scientific method (or in any other way) but rather as a human state of mind that itself requires explanation.  His "methods" represented a catalogue of ways in which humans might generate a state of fixed belief, not things that "objectively" justify that state.  It would, of course, be well worth looking more into Peirce's thinking along these lines, as well as into how he saw the relation between tychism and "agapasm" (a term that is as obscure to me as tychism was).