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I'll take a .pdf please.  Sounds like an article I should be aware of, and perhaps others too given the contemporary interest in "embodied knowledge".

"a model of "three bodies""

Or perhaps of one brain, which is the convergence point of all influences on oneself, including one's "self," the "social body," and the "body politic"?

"symptoms can be thought of as useful, something to attend (i.e., pay attention) to rather than to treat."

There's a lot in here, needing I think to be unpacked a bit.  Yes, the idea of "sickness" as a "form of communication" is very much along the lines of "an adaptive response," an ensemble of things of which "symptoms" are only a part, something which in totality may have "meaning" that is lacking in any single part.  Calling attention to this was part of what Laura and I were trying to do by going beyond the "medical model" in Models of Mental Health. 

A problem that arises, one that has come up repeatedly in our discussions, is how does one distinguish between situations where symptoms are part of a larger meaningful "story," and situations where symptoms are ... just symptoms?  And, further, how does one handle symptoms in situations where they may indeed be part of a larger yet-top-be-understood story but are also troublesome in their own right?  My point is not at all to deny the significance of "illness as metaphor" nor the related idea of "culture as disability"; both importantly broaden our reportoire of ways to make sense of aspects of human suffering. They are though  additions to the "medical model" perspective rather than complete replacements for it.  And so we need a way to think about the relative usefulness of the different perspectives in relation to particular cases.  In the example of depression, does one handle it as something to live with/learn from, or try to treat it pharmacologically, by talk therapy, by social action, and in what relation to one another?