Ian, I think you raise some interesting points by bringing
Levinas’s description of pain to our attention. Pain appears to have a dual nature in several
different domains: It is both a physical and emotional reaction, it can induce
aversive or affiliative behavior.I also
agree that pain is a complex experience which transcends our ability to
accurately describe its true nature, in much the same way that our experiences
of seeing a vivid color or smelling our family’s cooking cannot be accurately
conveyed to a third party.
I would
argue that Levinas’s claim that pain exists in an “non-conscious” domain,
however, is misleading.While
rationalization, analysis, and interpretation of our experiences comprise an
aspect of human consciousness, awareness is another key component which is dually
integral to the pain experience. Without
an awareness of pain’s sensation (as indescribable as this may be), it is hard
to argue that a person is experiencing pain. Except in cases of shock, a person does not
lose consciousness during a painful event.In fact, pain appears to insistently capture and sharpen a person’s
attention so that he or she cannot focus on any other environmental signals;
the victim’s conscious perception becomes limited to only the pain itself.I would argue that while this hyper-fixation
of conscious attention limits a person’s choice (i.e., the choices to ignore the
pain or actively fight against the antagonist) and ability to rationalize or
explain what he or she is feeling, it ultimately leads to a hyperconscious, versus non-conscious
perceptual state.
I realize
that my argument may be semantic, according to a psychological (rather than
philosophical) definition of human consciousness.Like you mention in your post, the ideas
involving free agency and self-perspective become diminished by pain; the
sensation is pervasive, immediate, and overwhelming, and in short is difficult
to be placed into a greater perceptual context.It is important to point out, however, that the experience of pain is
not possible without conscious experience.
A response to Levinas
Ian, I think you raise some interesting points by bringing Levinas’s description of pain to our attention. Pain appears to have a dual nature in several different domains: It is both a physical and emotional reaction, it can induce aversive or affiliative behavior. I also agree that pain is a complex experience which transcends our ability to accurately describe its true nature, in much the same way that our experiences of seeing a vivid color or smelling our family’s cooking cannot be accurately conveyed to a third party.
I would argue that Levinas’s claim that pain exists in an “non-conscious” domain, however, is misleading. While rationalization, analysis, and interpretation of our experiences comprise an aspect of human consciousness, awareness is another key component which is dually integral to the pain experience. Without an awareness of pain’s sensation (as indescribable as this may be), it is hard to argue that a person is experiencing pain. Except in cases of shock, a person does not lose consciousness during a painful event. In fact, pain appears to insistently capture and sharpen a person’s attention so that he or she cannot focus on any other environmental signals; the victim’s conscious perception becomes limited to only the pain itself. I would argue that while this hyper-fixation of conscious attention limits a person’s choice (i.e., the choices to ignore the pain or actively fight against the antagonist) and ability to rationalize or explain what he or she is feeling, it ultimately leads to a hyperconscious, versus non-conscious perceptual state.
I realize that my argument may be semantic, according to a psychological (rather than philosophical) definition of human consciousness. Like you mention in your post, the ideas involving free agency and self-perspective become diminished by pain; the sensation is pervasive, immediate, and overwhelming, and in short is difficult to be placed into a greater perceptual context. It is important to point out, however, that the experience of pain is not possible without conscious experience.
~Alex Tuttle
Haverford '08