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Something that has continued to perplex me after yesterday's conversation relates to our identification of an organism that is particularly generative (in an evolutionary sense) as "useful." I don't think that Paul intended to suggest that "generative" is necessarily synonymous with "useful" in the context of evolution, but rather to illustrate that generative organisms are essential to the process of evolution. In other words, if we were to knock out all the simpler organisms (which presumably have a higher generativity than more specialized and thus more limited organisms), then we might see a hole, a time of no generation of new organisms (or varieties of organisms if we're looking at relatively more complex organisms).

That said, I don't know that in the context of evolution we can say that any one organism is more useful than another. If we consider highly complex predators, like lions or tigers or bears (oh my!), even though those organisms might not be generative, they are highly selective in that they are instrumental in weeding out the less fit organisms in the species upon which they prey. Moreover, if we consider something like plankton, an organism that could be considered simple or complex (and therefore debateably generative depending on one's perspective) but not necessarily selective in that it's not directly impacting the selection of more fit organisms, this organism is still important to the evolutionary process. If a variety of plankton arose and thrived because it was better suited to avoid consumption by whales, then it's perhaps likely, too, that a variety of whales might evolve that is better suited to get at that plankton. So this new plankton, then, is useful: while it has a limited potential to generate new species and to select for less fit prey species, it can still be involved in the origin of new varieties of whales. What I think I'm getting at is that utility can go a lot of ways - it can relate to the generation of new species or varieties along a certain line, it can refer to the selective pressures placed on "lower" life forms (i.e. a lion to a gazelle or a whale to plankton), but it can also refer to selective pressures placed on "higher life forms (like the plankton to the whale). It appears, then, that utility is not a concept that can easily be kernalized, or distilled down to an aiton, or essence. If that's the case, is the concept of utility useful in evolution studies?

I'd also like to raise one more question. (N.B.: This is a personal question, so I don't know how comfortable people will feel responding.) I feel a little off-put by the idea that evolution results in the mindless, algorithmic generation of organisms, of which I am presumably one. There really is something cool about the idea that we're the beautiful results of a dice throw, but I can't help feeling that evolution implies that I'm the meaningless result of a meaningless continual process. Does anyone else feel that way? Does this mean that I'm selfish? Or is it that I'm not comfortable with a story that is inconsistent with my long-term observations of my place within my family, friends, and college? Or am I just futiley searching for meaning where there never can be any?