Response to “Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American History”

Douglas C. Baynton makes the argument that the disabled identity has been used throughout history to argue both for and against the equality of marginalized groups—disability is either assigned to the marginalized, or the marginalized reject the disabled label in order to justify gains on their part.

The example Baynton offered that proved the most helpful in understanding his argument was that of women’s suffrage. While the argument given by those against suffrage was that women were in some way mentally compromised (too much so to exercise good judgement in the voting process), many women fought back by insisting that they were being unfairly categorized with disabled people, that this process in itself was disabling, and that they were not, in reality, disabled (and therefore deserved to vote). Of course, the implication of this argument is that to be disabled is to lack the ability to vote, and that it is a vile category that no one would want to embrace if they were not forced into it. 

I immediately connected this tension with a point I discovered in researching the history of transgender identities in the DSM. In the DSM-IV, transgender identities were represented through the illness of GID (Gender Identity Disorder). This entry in the DSM essentially labeled transgenderism itself a disease—something unnatural that affirmation surgery would “cure.” Getting this surgery would erase the trans identity, because this identity was a diseased one that had been resolved through surgical intervention. In the DSM-V, transgender representation was dramatically improved—now it is referred to as gender dysphoria. Gender dysphoria refers not to the state of identifying as trans, but to the mental anguish produced by it—just like any other form of anxiety or depression (both of which are accepted as mental illnesses or difficulties to be treated). Still, many trans people and activists feel this is not enough. They feel that any hint of their identity being present in the DSM reduces it to something pathological—a disease that is cured.

Eli Clare combats this interpretation. He argues, as someone who identifies as both disabled and trans, that the trans community’s intense distaste toward appearing in the DSM in any capacity is a malicious rejection of the disabled identity. Like the women in the suffrage movement who violently pushed away any association with disability (essentially stating that “real” disabled people had the “real” mental or physical problems), trans activists who fight against any type of inclusion in the DSM are further marginalizing the disabled, by refusing to fall under that identity label.