The modified version of the nervous system arrived at last week, makes me considerably more comfortable with the assertion that the brain is all behavior. Particularly the inclusion of the "little boxes" which do not require external or internal inputs and the idea that no response is itself a response. These two additions or clarifications seem to be much better approximations for the inclusion of personality in the nervous system. Abstractly, I can imagine aspects of a person's personality being seen as one of the no-input-required boxes. However, breaking this box down into its individual neurons still makes me a little uneasy.

Although I am now more willing to acquiesce to the inclusion of personality within the nervous system, I maintain that there is still some part of each person which is separate and distict from it. I called this one's conscience. In this case, the new discription of the nervous system clarifies my original conclusion. Although I can obviously not prove this one way or another, I believe that this conscience can not be ultimately broken down to a neuron. Rather than the conscience being identified as one of the no-imput-required boxes, I would contend that one's conscience is actually an imput to some other box. Where exactly this input comes from, I don't know. This is obviously a very valid question, but it is also one which I do not have a clear opinion on just yet.

Fair enough. Interesting that you connect the idea of personality to boxiness, but that conscience feels different to you. Can you be more specific about why the two are different?