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| Hate Crime Legislation: What to do, what to do? Name: Sarah Halt Date: 2005-11-21 20:59:27 Link to this Comment: 17128 |
-The Human Rights Campaign Website
If it's true that sex is on the American public's mind, then it's likely that laws about sex are as well. One such hot topic issue is the question of whether to expand hate crime legislation to include gays and lesbians. Current federal law (Title 18 U.S.C. §245) only mentions crimes motivated by race, religion, or national origin, and expanding this legislation would be a unique gesture as it would attempt to protect people based on who they have sex with. In her essay, "Thinking Sex," Gayle Rubin says, "Sex is always political. But there are also historical periods in which sexuality is more sharply contested and more overtly politicized. In such periods, the domain of erotic life is, in effect, renegotiated." I argue that we live in such a period. In September this year, the House of Representatives passed the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act (the LLEHCPA), an act that wishes to expand our current hate crime legislation to protect gays, lesbians, and transgendered people. According to the Human Rights Campaign website, this was the third such attempt by the House in the last decade to pass such a law (and the Senate vetoed the other attempts). Critics are now saying, as they did in the past, that it is all but impossible to decide what constitutes a hate crime. As the article "Thinking More Clearly About Hate-Motivated Crimes" says, "The problem with interpreting 'official' estimates is that the term hate motivated is not clearly defined" (Perry, 2003 50). Others insist that all crimes are hate crimes, so what difference does it make? The purpose of this paper is to lay out the arguments for and against hate crime legislation. Gayle Rubin's "Thinking Sex" will be used as a model as this paper presents sex laws along side the historical context of America's views on sex. This paper will try to show that in our current period of political polarization, hate crime legislation is needed now more than ever.
Before continuing down this path, it is necessary to lay out our existing hate crime legislation and why the LLEHCPA is both unique and important. Scholars, such as James Jacob, say that the move for expanded hate crime legislation began in the '80s because of the civil rights movement: "The long-term impetus for the 1980's hate crime legislation undoubtedly is the American Civil Rights movement that, since World War II, has pressed forward the interests and aspirations of one "minority group" after another" (Kelly 152). In 1990, the Hate Crime Statistics Act was passed, and this act marked the first time our government made a conscious effort to collect accurate information about hate crimes nationwide. This act does not say anything about how to decide if someone is guilty of a hate crime or how to punish someone who is. It is important because it attempts to record hate crimes – essentially, this act shows that the government is making a statement that it is interested in hate crime study.
In 1994, two new pieces of legislation were passed. The first, the Violence Against Women Act, protected women against crimes motivated by gender. This act was declared unconstitutional in 1999. Also passed in '94 was the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act, an act which outlined how to prosecute persons who committed crimes motivated by the "the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation" of their victim (Jenness 44). However, this act is not as progressive as it sounds: it only covers crimes that are committed on federal property. As of today, individual states have statewide laws regarding hate crimes, but these vary a great deal. The most recent federal hate crime legislation, the LLEHCPA, was passed in the House on September 14, and it's unique because it provides a way for the law to punish those who commit hate crimes (and not just on federal land). Also, this is the first act to include protection for transgendered people.
Upon initial examination, hate crime legislation sounds like a great idea: what can be wrong about protecting people who might ordinarily be attacked simply for being born a certain way (i.e. because of their national, ethnic, sexual, etc. identity)? But, as it is with life, things aren't that simple. While it would be easy to categorize those who counter hate crime legislation as bigots or proponents of hate, this would be a grievous and dangerous error. Many of those who are against hate crime legislation take the stance they do because this legislation makes for a very slippery slope.
In hate crime legislation, subjectivity is the greatest problem, as it is impossible to know what goes on in the perpetrator's mind. Courts will have to ask, was hate for the victim's nationality, religion, sexual orientation, etc. the only motivation for the crime? How do we distinguish between actions that are hate crimes and actions that are protected under the First Amendment? Is it only a hate crime if the victim is a member of a minority group? What other factors play into hate crime laws? James Jacobs points out that sometimes the law may simply be dealing with juveniles who want to make trouble, and use racial slurs or graffiti as a medium for troublemaking. Their acts may be deplorable, but hardly the mark of hate crimes (Jacobs 156). Also, what constitutes a hate crime – does it have to be violence against a person, or does vandalism count? And if a crime is determined to be a clear-cut hate crime, why should a man be punished for killing a gay man more than if he had killed his friend in a fit of anger? After all, both of these crimes would result from hate. What makes one worse?
There is no easy answer to these questions. In an ideal world, hate crime legislation would protect those who feel afraid for their safety just because they exist as a member of a certain community: gay, religious, political, or whatever. But this is not an ideal world, and to a student studying sex and gender, one problem outshines all others when it comes to hate crime legislation: to make this proposed legislation a reality, it becomes necessary to use a ever-dreaded and always distrusted label.
In order for hate crime legislation to become a reality, it would be necessary to call people by words that can be said to define them: gay, black, lesbian, Muslim, Arab, etc. In regard to the recent LLEHCPA, it becomes necessary to define transgendered people. Using labels is never easy - we progressive Changers Of The World fear labels. We don't want to play on the same terms as those who use labels as instruments of oppression. Didn't Foucault say that when we put our desires into words, we allow for others to police our desires?
But here is how it stands: current federal hate crime legislation already protects people against crimes motivated by race, religion, and national origin. The LLEHCPA proposes to expand current legislation to protect gays, lesbians, and transgendered people, but many people think the Senate will veto this act, just as they vetoed past attempts to expand hate crime laws. This is unfair. Why should the government refuse to protect for sexuality, but embrace protecting for race, religion, and national origin? Should we therefore abolish all hate crime legislation in order to be entirely fair? I think not. I argue that hate crime legislation is not as important for the punishment or the laws it creates, but for the ideological statement it makes.
If the government were to embrace hate crime legislation that protects gays, lesbians, and transgendered people, this will not stop a lunatic from attacking a lesbian couple who is walking down the street. Hatred will not evaporate because a law is passed. But the gesture of good faith that the government would be making is what's important. Right now in 2005, our government is cozying up with right wing Evangelicals, some of whom blame liberal Boston for pedophiles(*1) or feminists for 9/11(*2). Hate crime legislation would be a signal by the government that it wished to move away from polarizing, hateful rhetoric and embrace all of its citizens, including gays, lesbians and transgendered individuals. Hate crime legislation would be a proclamation that the government will no longer ignore 10% - if that's the current statistic – of its population.
In a perfect world, we would have no need for hate crime legislation, just as we would have no need for labels. But I want to argue that it is not that hate crime legislation makes labels obligatory – it is the other way around. The existence of labels allows – no, makes it necessary – for us to have hate crime legislation. We do not live in a perfect world. But we are not playing into the hands of those who will use labels as instruments of oppression by expanding hate crime legislation. (We have to tell Foucault to be quiet for a minute). The voices of several thousand people crying out against labels will not change the world for one very important reason: history.
Gayle Rubin says that "Western cultures [such as ours] generally consider sex to be a dangerous, destructive, negative force" (Rubin 13). With this in mind, it's no wonder that laws that speak to people about who they have sex with are so controversial. "Sex is presumed guilty until proven innocent. Virtually all erotic behavior is considered bad unless a specific reason to exempt it has been established" (Rubin 14). Rubin backs this information up with information about Victorian and religious ideals of sex which have made sex the enemy, the force that must be contained through laws and religious canons. She shows a hierarchy in which monogamous heterosexual marriages are the top and "bar dykes" and "promiscuous gay men" are barely above the lowest ring, the "transsexuals, transvestites, fetishists, sadomasochists, sex workers ... and those who eroticism transgresses generational boundaries" (Rubin 14-15). With this sort of hierarchy, it's no wonder that an attempt to federally protect people who engage in "base" sexual activity has been met with such resistance.
In October 2002, Gwen Araujo was tortured and murdered by friends who discovered that she was born biologically male.(*3) In August 1995, Tyra Hunter was seriously injured in a car accident, but when an emergency medical services officer discovered that she was biologically male, he ceased trying to revive her.(*4) The Human Rights Campaign has page after page of statistics of hate crimes committed against LGBTQ people within just the last decade. Rubin says, "Most people find it difficult to grasp that whatever they like to do sexually will be thoroughly repulsive to someone else, and that whatever repels them sexually will be the most treasured delight to someone, somewhere" (Rubin 19). This is the climate we live in – a climate of intolerance and fear of the "Other" sexual act. And while this is the climate, hate crime legislation is a necessity. We need the government to step up to the plate and say that it will protect its own citizens, so that the next time a Araujo, a Hunter, a Sheperd, a Teena – and the lists go on – might be saved.
(*1)On George Stephanopoulos' "This Week," Senator Rick Santorum said it was no surprise that Boston, "a seat of academic, political and cultural liberalism in America," was suffering from the priest/pedophile scandal. Read more at [http://thinkprogress.org/santorum-this-week/].
(*2)On Pat Robertson's "700 Club," Rev. Jerry Falwell blamed "the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians ... the ACLU" for 9/11. Robertson said he agreed. More can be read at [http://www.actupny.org/YELL/falwell.html].
(*3)The perpetrators in this crime, with whom Araujo had occasionally had sex, told the police that they had experienced gay panic when they found out Araujo was biologically born a male. More can be read at [http://www.365gay.com/newscon05/09/091605araujo.htm].
(*4)This officer also made anti-gay slurs (heard by the crowd) over Hunter's injured body. She died in the hospital that evening. More can be read at [http://www.glaa.org/archive/1998/margiehunter1211.shtml].
"Crimes of Hate, Conspiracy of Silence: Torture and Ill-Treatment Based on Sexual Identity." New York: Amnesty International Publications, 2001.
Jacobs, James B. "The Emergence and Implications of American Hate Crime Jurisprudence." Hate Crime: The Global Politics of Polarization. Eds. Robert J. Kelly and Jess Maghan. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998.
Levin, Jack and Gordana Rabrenovic. Why We Hate. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2004.
Gerstenfeld, Phyllis B. Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls, and Controversies. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2004.
Gerstenfeld, Phyllis B. and Diana R. Grant, eds. Crimes of Hate: Selected Readings. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2004.
"Hate Crimes." Human Rights Campaign. 20 November 2005. [http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Hate_Crimes1]
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Jenness, Valerie, and Ryken Grattet. Making Hate a Crime: From Social Movement to Law Enforcement. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2001.
Perry, Barbara, ed. Hate and Bias Crimes: A Reader. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Perry, Barbara. In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. New York: Routledge, 2001.
Rubin, Gail. "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality." American Feminist Thought at Century's End: A Reader. Ed. Linda S. Kauffman. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993. 3-64.
| Gender and Sexualities Paper #3 Name: Kelsey Date: 2005-11-22 20:24:37 Link to this Comment: 17149 |
"Because sexuality is a nexus of the relationship between genders, much of the oppression of women is borne by , mediated through, and consulted within sexuality...There have been two strains of feminist thought on the subject. One tendency has criticized the restrictions on women's sexual behavior and denounced the high costs imposed on women for being sexually active. This tradition of feminist sexual thought has called for a sexual liberation that would work for women as well as for men, The second tendency has considered sexual liberalization to be inherently a mere extension of male privilege. This tradition resonates with conservative, anti-sexual discourse." (Rubin, 35-36)
This "anti-sex" feminism that Rubin describes labels the sex industry to be male oriented and controlled, and thus, rendering the female a submissively sexualized object. I agree with Rubin that a woman's sexuality and sexual freedom are intrinsically linked, and therefore, argue that some women who actively participate in a sex industry must be acknowledged as a legitimate construct to contemporary feminism. In this essay I am only referring only to women who willingly participate within this industry, not women, particularly those of third-world nations, who are forced into the commerce through poverty, intimidation, or human trafficking. It is from a completely objective standpoint that I argue while it is women who are commercializing their bodies for the pleasure of men, it is also these women who are reaping the economical benefits while retaining control in self-marketing; and thus, commercialized sex must be considered a new medium for a feminist dialogue concerning female power.
The ideology of "power" within heterosexual gender relations persists throughout the discourse of both feminist scholarship and social representation. Many feminists including Carol Plateman sincerely believe that prostitution is a form of male domination. In her opinion, the fact that men are able to purchase sexual access to a female's body is evidence to the maintenance of their public and private power:
"When women's bodies are on sale as commodities in the capitalist market, the terms of the original contract (which is about men's civil power) cannot be forgiven; the law of male sex-right is publicly affirmed, and men gain public acknowledgement as women's sex masters" (Plateman, p.208)
This statement is not only contradictory to feminist criticisms of capitalist theory; it is also patronising to women and their sexuality. She argues that masculinity and femininity are sexual identities which are only confirmed in sex, and more specifically, heterosexual activity:
"It is then in heterosexual intercourse that men create and maintain their sense of themselves as men and as women's masters" (Platemen, p. 215).
By stating that heterosexual sex is a male prerogative, Plateman is denying the existence of sexual pleasure for women, and therefore, categorizes them as non-sexual beings that are incapable of enjoying the sexual activity. Also, by speaking of prostitution in a capitalist rhetoric where men are the "powerful" consumers and women are the "weak" suppliers, Platemen ignores the theory of supply and demand. Economics teaches us that the greater a product is in demand, the greater power its supplier contains over the consumer market. It is the prostitute who sets the price of the commodity, manipulates the output of its product, and retains control over how their "goods" are to be handled and negotiated. Also, in defining sex workers as strictly female and the customer male, Platemen genders this act in a controversial fashion. Men also have a history of prostitution to both male and female clients; and thus, she denies their sex when claiming that prostitutes are an entirely female gendered occupation. By stating that sex work is a heterosexual act that defines male control, Platemen ignores the power that the female prostitute retains over this exchange, and also dismisses the existence of homosexuality in the sex industry. By refusing women sexual pleasure and male prostitutes' gender identity, Plateman narrows her argument to a representational stereotype that is simply inaccurate.
Since the 1860s, feminists have initiated numerous campaigns against the institution of commercialized sex and prostitutes. However, these protests result in contradictions that negotiate both the sincerity and integrity of these feminist motives. For example, feminist leaders such as Josephine Butler in Britain and Rose Scott in New South Wales argued for the legalization of prostitution because the past laws only served to "punish the women and not the male clients" (Sullivan, p. 255). They maintained that the State was committing an act of violence by profiting off of women's wages while also preventing them from obtaining safer working environments. Yet, on the other hand, many first wave feminists lobbied for harsher laws and penalties for the prostitutes themselves. Believing that if they could abolish protection all together, these protesters worked to protect women from sexual exploitation and limit male sexual power (Sullivan, p.256). However, the only protection these women were offering was for the male clientele and State support. By seeking to define the prostitute as the "other" who is morally deviant and corrupt, these feminists were actually creating a stereotype division that impeded on all women's sexuality.
Anne Summers, an Australian feminist during the 1970s argues:
"The dichotomy between female prostitutes and non-prostitute women is a form of social control of female sexuality which makes the support of prostitutes by other women a matter of self-interest rather than moral imperative. This process of defining women as strictly asexual "good" women and sexually active "bad women" takes away a women's right to be a sexually active and moral person" (Sullivan, p. 259)
Summers believed the only resolution to this social classification was for feminists and "good" women to identify themselves with the "bad" women by claiming allegiance with prostitutes, prisoners, and lesbians. Although I agree with Summers in that this division between moral women and immoral prostitutes must be abolished, it is illogical for heterosexual women to claim lesbianism or for housewives to state they are sex workers in order to achieve this goal. In claiming these fraudulent identities, women are stating that lesbianism and prostitution are socially acceptable only if you believe that you are one. Instead, these feminist leaders should work to educate that all women are sexual beings and therefore entitled to sexual freedom regardless of their occupation or sexual orientation. Whether they wish to reserve their sexuality for only the female sex or sell their bodies for profit, the fact is, every woman contains a right to their own bodies, and any move to take away this freedom is itself an act of politicized anti-feminism.
I have argued that it is indeed plausible for prostitution to be a pleasurable and sometimes an emotionally liberating occupation. However, like all careers, these women experience both highs and lows in dealing with customers, co-workers, and the industry itself. Yet, many people fail to acknowledge this type of work as an actual "job," instead; prostitution is viewed as defining the female worker's complete social identity. Roberta Perkins tries to explain this social mentality in her work Being a Prostitute:
"Prostitution is denied occupational status because it deals primarily with sexual matters out of what is regarded as the proper context, love or marriage, and is therefore seen as perverse, and because it is assumed to be a predominantly female participation, it stands little chance of ever gaining prestige under a patriarchal mode of society. The denial of prostitution as a form of work is the deepest insult of all to most women working as prostitutes" (Perkins, p. 216)
Judging female prostitutes as sexually submissive and dominated is a limiting fictionalized viewpoint; however, to state that these women always perversely enjoy the act of sex with a male client, and therefore are not "working," is equally false. Regardless as to whether or not these women enjoy their profession, prostitution is no less a type of manual labour than factory work or carpentry.
My argument is centred on disproving the popular theory that female prostitution is strictly related to exclusive phallic pleasure where women are made victims to male sexuality. In female heterosexual prostitution, it is possible for women who willingly engage in commercial sex to view themselves as exerting feminine power. Although some feminists view prostitute women as the powerless victims of male sexual demands, and female prostitution as perpetuating this notion of phallic dominance over women, I sincerely argue this type of ideology to be the ultimate form of misogyny. Here, women are classified as asexual beings that hold no control over their sex acts, nor do they possess any feeling for sexual desire. Men who seek sex are identified as sexual predators who desire control over women through heterosexual sex acts. It is plausible for commercial sex to be a complete role reversal where women are in the position of power and men are made subservient to them.
The discourse of feminist politics has dramatically broadened in the past half century. No longer a strictly "women's" movement, contemporary feminism has grown to include studies on all types of gender and sexuality constructions; and thus, feminism is no longer a study of women, but that of various genders. Although I fully support this delineation from pro-women to pro-sexuality, I do believe the image of the heterosexual woman is becoming inadvertently both forgotten and ignored. What began as a campaign to liberate the 1950's housewife is now working against her. Ironically, the new emergence of feminism is increasingly becoming anti-feminist since being "feminine" is no longer a valued image for a modern woman. If being a feminist today still includes a "pro-women" ideology, then it is imperative that we include all types of women and sexualities in our discourse, not just those who are made obvious binary oppositions to men and patriarchal institutions. Regardless of our personal moral and/or religious foundations, we as the new "modern" feminists must learn to critically analyse and deconstruct all categories of women in seeking to expand a feminist dialogue and create a more complete academic study of gender and sexualities.
Bibliography
Perkins, Roberta. "Female Prostitution" in Sex and Sex Workers in Australia.
Perkins, Roberta. Being a Prostitute: Prostitute Women and Prostitute Men. North Sydney, NSW: George Allen and Unwin Publishers Ltd, 1985.
Platemen, Carol. "A Patriarchal Discourse on Sex" in Feminist Studies Review, Vol. XIII, January 1983.
Rubin, Gayle. "Thinking Sex:Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality." in Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality. Ed. Vance, Carol. Pandora: London, 1992.
Sullivan, Barbara. "Feminism and Female Prostitution" in Sex and Sex Workers in Australia.
Summers, A. Dammed Whores and God's Police: The Colonization of Women in Australia. Ringwood: Penguin, 1975.
| To All "Feminists" Out There: [Please] Shhh! Name: Patricia F Date: 2005-11-22 23:13:12 Link to this Comment: 17151 |
I suggest a call for silence—a silencing of the cacophony that is too many quarreling women's voices. Simone de Beauvoir speaks of this need to "start fresh" and discard the quarrels since they are speaking about ideas that are useless to the fundamental steps toward independence for women. She says, "If we are to gain understanding, we must get out of these ruts; we must discard the vague notion of superiority, inferiority, equality which have hitherto corrupted every discussion of the subject and start afresh." (pp. 686) My quest for this new found "silence" connects me back to this idea of William Coleridge's "pleasure-dome" that I feel is an interesting idea in the realm of resisting the present discourse.
Similar to de Beauvoir, I want to discard the fighting against language, and rather utilize the language as an act of self-control. In my mind, "start afresh" is implemented through entering into this "pleasure-dome". Coleridge's lines, "Could I revive within me/ Her symphony and song,/To such a deep delight 'twould win me,/That with music loud and long, I would build that dome in air,/That sunny dome ! those caves of ice !" (ln. 42-47) are playing with the notion of one's own ability to find that language and subsequently take it upon themselves to create this pleasure-dome. I think that using language to claim one's identity is similar to the ideas of de Beauvoir as well. She feels as though women can not define themselves without reference to men. She says, "Man can think of himself without woman. She cannot think of herself without man...She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not her with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other." (pp. 676) It is important that we free ourselves from these confines of relating ourselves to and against men, and rather focus on a way in which female identity can be formed in a new way—an entity free from the differentiation of men.
This breaking out of the confines of the relegated role of the "Other" for women is exactly what the "pleasure-dome" represents. It is a place where identity is formed from one's own accord. I think that the pleasure-dome that I speak of is created in Beauvoir's mind as well. She feels that if little girls were brought up with the same demands, severity, rewards as their brothers were, this damaging 'castration complex' would be modified. This modification of the castration process is a way of allowing for little girls to completely form their identity. The "pleasure-dome" idea is a resistance to the discourse because the discourse is imbued with notions of what women are supposed to be. Similar to this modification of the castration complex, the pleasure-dome allows for a creation of one's identity that is entirely of one's own accord. There is choice involved—women's choice as to how to claim herself. Simone feels that this modification of the castration complex would allow the girl to view the world as androgynous rather than masculine! She says that if this castration/Oedipal complex was modified, than the girl's love for her father would be, "tinged with a will to emulation and not a feeling of powerlessness; she would not be oriented toward passivity. Authorized to test her powers in work and sports, competing actively with boys, she should not find the absence of the penis...enough to give rise to an inferiority complex...she would not take her fate for granted; she would be interested in what she was doing, she would throw herself without reserve into undertakings." (pp. 699)
The link that I find extremely important is what I think needs to be realized is between individual pleasure and language. The present discourse prevents us from our own pleasure, and therefore there needs to be some sort of change. This blatant blocking of pleasure is demonstrated by Moraga in her essay "The Breakdown of the Bicultural Mind" as she struggles with being labeled as something in ways that are based on this assumed sisterhood—this assumption that womanhood equates some sort of common ground for everyone in that category. She does not want to be owned by the outside—even if it is other women. She says, "Do not call me 'sister.' I am not yours." (pp. 237) . Moraga is comfortable with only a personal declaration of one's own identity. That claiming of one's own identity is what I am speaking about with the pleasure-dome. If one is able to claim one's own identity through her own language, then she is able to control it.
Not only does Moraga resonate with my own ideology, but I feel as though there is a fundamental connection between Moraga with Simone de Beauvoir as well. Moraga says, "And our liberation won't happen by some man leading the way and parting the Red Sea for us. We are the Red Sea, we women." (pp. 232) which is very in line with Beauvoir's notion to "start afresh" and break free of the confines of being define solely in reference to men. Moraga speaks of women's "lack of definitive shade and shape" and I think that is fundamental for Beauvoir as well. Beauvoir begins with asking the question, "What is a woman?" as a means to exhibit that men would never feel the need to ask that question because men do not think of presenting themselves of a certain sex. For men, there has always been this understanding of what they are so much so that it is already a part of the discourse therefore an explication of such would just be redundant. Man inherently encompasses the positive as well as the neutral as indicated by the common use of the word "man" to designate human beings in general, and therefore relegates woman to the only spot open on the spectrum—the negative. That being said, Beauvoir feels that women rely on men to dictate their existence. She says that women lack concrete means for organizing themselves and, as a result, that they have been always been man's dependent. This non-identity that women have adopted in relation to men is referenced to by Moraga when she says, "...we speak in a wordless code to each other. We are without nationality in the deepest sense..." (pp. 234).
The intersections of Beauvoir and Moraga only help to strengthen this idea of the pleasure-dome. There seems to be this ambiguity as well as determined relegation for what women should be. The identity of women is this paradoxical idea: they are without any true identity since they are created in reference to men, but at the same time they are identified as being confined to this negative and very limited realm of human. Moraga and Beauvoir both suggest, however, this kind of re-claiming of one's identity which is what the pleasure-dome actually is. Moraga claims that she is brown and her brother is white because she said that they had to choose who they are. My fundamental stance about being a woman is that one needs to make a claim about her identity. The passivity with which has been assumed to be a part of womanhood can not affect our claiming. Moraga says, "I think this is why I have always hated the terms "biracial" and "bisexual". They are passive terms, without political bite. They don't choose. They don't make a decision. They are a declaration not of identity, but of biology, of sexual practice. They say nothing about where one really stands. (236) Beauvoir also speaks of this by saying that women need to break free of the confines of being defined in relation to men. Beauvoir's recipe for independence insofar as it exists in this world for women is "to refuse to confine her to the relations she bears to man, not to deny them to her; let her have her independent existence and she will continue none the less to exist for him also: mutually recognizing each other as subject, each will yet remain for the other an other." (704) According to Beauvoir, Woman needs to be her own definer and, by doing so, will exist both as a Subject as well as an Other.
Pleasure-domes do not exist, but couldn't they? I think that a factor that has made me trust less in this idea of the pleasure-dome is the current debate surrounding prostitution and pornography. A very specific facet of the political action regarding these issues is FACT: Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force. Members of FACT say, "Even pornography which is problematic for women can be experienced as affirming of women's desires and of women's equality....Pornography can be psychic assault—but for women, as for men, it can also be a source of erotic pleasure...A woman who enjoys pornography, even if that means enjoying a rape fantasy is, in a sense, a rebel." As for what this woman is actually rebelling, they say, "...an aspect of her sexuality that has been defined as a male preserve." In this way, women are claiming their identity as "feminist" and subsequently deriving this notion of feminist power by being defined by something that women have been forced to be defined by as a way to assert their freedom. What does that do for the overall ideology of feminism? If the pleasure-dome is built upon this utilization of the present discourse as a way of resisting the discourse, what happens to the dome when people are now utilizing the forced roles as a way of resisting being forced into those roles. Does the dome come crumbling down? I don't know.
Works Cited
de Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. 1949; rpt. The Feminist Papers. 672-705.
MacKinnon, Catharine. Women's Lives: Men's Laws. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2005.
Moraga, Cherrie. "The Breakdown of the Bicultural Mind." Names We Call Home: Autobiography on Racial Identity. Ed. Becky Thompson and Sangeeta Tyagi. New York: Routledge, 1996. 230-239.
| PhDs of Families Name: anna mazza Date: 2005-11-23 08:38:56 Link to this Comment: 17154 |
PhDs or Families?
"The first thing senior counselors will ask you is, 'What are your plans for grad-school?' it's the most annoying thing ever" said one senior. She went on to say, "I remember in French class, we were all going around the room using the new vocabulary to say what we were going to do after graduation...this one girl said she was going to be a stay-at-home mom...there was a collective gasp that went through the room".
Does Bryn Mawr set us up, as students, to value our possible PhDs more than our future families? And if so, where do these pressures come from or originate from? It is quite possible that it is Bryn Mawr's history that squeezes us into this routine where we cheer on the academics and loose sight of the domestics. Our traditions, our past and present heads of school, our honor code, all of these facets of Bryn-Mawr-life highlight our "need" for PhDs before families. Prospective families may very well be optional to the Bryn Mawr graduate, but here, a PhD is not held in quite the same regard.
The first major tradition we encounter as new, timid freshwomen is Lantern Night. We rehearse, arrive in costume, sing and stand superstitiously in perfect rows, impatiently awaiting our very own lanterns – the very symbol of our acceptance into the "club". All three-hundred-plus lanterns arrive behind their owners, glowing with life. When the festivities within the Cloisters have ended, some flames are already out. For those students whose lanterns still burn – either brightly or dimly – there may be a sensation of anticipation as we sit and watch. Whichever lantern dies out first indicates that its owner will be the first to get married. The last lantern "standing" indicates that its owner will be the first to obtain her PhD. No one hopes for her lantern to blow out first. We all sit, waiting and watching, hoping that ours lasts the longest – while trying to remember it's only a silly tradition. Being someone whose lantern went out first amongst my group of friends, I knew it was not a good thing. Upperclasswomen laughed, pitied me, and shook their heads jokingly commenting on "what a waste – marriage". It is instilled from the very traditions that we practice that wanting a family as our main goal is nothing to brag about. We are supposed to stay in school as long as possible: be fierce, scholarly, and single.
Apparently, being single is a tradition even the majority of our presidents try to uphold. Not all succeed, but it is 2005 and as of now, our president, Nancy J. Vickers, is single. She received her bachelor's degree from Mount Holyoke in 1967 and then both her master's and doctorate in philosophy degrees from Yale University in 1971 and 1976, respectively. She was a determined scholar and avid learner – a true Bryn Mawr woman at heart. Vickers represents Bryn Mawr College and she is a woman who went "all the way" in her schooling and has remained single to this day. She is clearly a believer in single-sex education, supporting the founding principles of Bryn Mawr: to have an institution where young women would be able to study like men.
M. Carey Thomas was the second president in Bryn Mawr College history. In 1901 she was recorded saying in her article "Should the Higher Education of Women Differ from That of Men?"
"Women while in college ought to have the broadest possible education. This college education should be the same as men's, not only because there is but one best education, but because men's and women's effectiveness and happiness and the welfare of the generation to come after them will be vastly increased if their college education has given them the same intellectual training and the same scholarly and moral ideals."
M. Carey Thomas, who was a ferocious fighter against suggestions that a woman's mind was "as unlike [a man's] as their bodies," sparked a controversy of her own when she was reported to have said, "Only our failures wed." The important work of caring for homes and children, work that Vickers adds is still "disproportionately assigned to women", should not be undervalued because of the academic world. However, women should not have to forego marriage and motherhood in order to succeed in academia. Thomas apparently later corrected her statement by saying, "Our failures only wed" meaning that when a woman graduates from Bryn Mawr and does nothing more than mother, she is a failure. One sophomore commented, "Afterwards you are supposed to do something with what you have been given [here at Bryn Marw]...I think there is a pressure to not just be a Sally Homemaker but a Sally Homemaker and more". So now the expectation is to graduate and either a) get a PhD and remain single in the "man's academic world" or, b) get a PhD and marry, maintain a family, care for them, and simultaneously remain in the "man's academic world". Does Bryn Mawr allow women (both students and professors) to view family-life as a viable option?
In a rather unofficial way, I have been asking women (students) here how they feel about attending Bryn Mawr and if they feel there are pressures. One girl thought hard about where the pressures of Bryn Mawr were coming from – because she definitely felt pressures – and concluded that it was the long-standing, academic reputation that added so much pressure. "Maybe the academic expectations...since [Bryn Mawr expects] so much of us academically, and that it's that notion of 'we know you have it in you, just do it'...that if we were to do anything different, anything less – anything having to do with housewifery – it would be unacceptable".
So perhaps the history of Bryn Mawr never stays firmly behind us (or, another way of looking at it is that the history is both behind us and what pushes us). Perhaps it is then better to say, "Perhaps the history of Bryn Mawr never stays firmly buried behind us". M. Carey Thomas' presence still inhabits this campus. This is evident because Vickers is still, as recently as March 2005, dealing with Thomas' comments regarding graduates getting "wed".
Conceivably it is what Bryn Mawr stands for within each of us (its students) that drives or pushes us to want our PhDs or value them over our want for families. We are confronted with society's ever-present, daily view that a housewife is nothing more than a "typical woman" – we might even go so far as to make assumptions about her intelligence or perseverance because she deals with babies and band aids instead of doctors and surgical tape. I certainly feel that as Bryn Mawr women, we "should" be fighting to get out of the mold that is "housewife", and strive to be the specialty that is "doctor" but I do not believe grad school to be the only road to take.
The truth is: we came to Bryn Mawr for a reason. Right now, in a sense, school is like having a full-time job. When asked where she thought the pressures for the PhD were coming from, one young woman remarked, "I think it's all the hype about Bryn Mawr. I think we make the stress ourselves". With the institution of an honor code, we instill within ourselves the need to strive and succeed – it is a personal competition in which anxieties internally run high.
These thoughts make me circle back in thinking that it is the history of Bryn Mawr, the foundation of this institution, which acts as the leading specter here on campus. We are haunted by our history which then jumps in the driver's seat in order to "better" guide our determination; determination which is resolute – to obtain PhDs post-graduation rather than husbands, wives or babies.
| The Eternal Gap: A Myth Name: Lindsay Up Date: 2005-11-23 12:27:45 Link to this Comment: 17156 |
"To write. An act that will not only "realize" the decensored relation of woman to her sexuality...it will tear her away from the superegoized structure in which she has always occupied the place reserved for the guilty."
For Hélène Cixous and other psychoanalytic thinkers, language is the gap-filler of the separation between mother and child. This is the very rift that brings about the superego, the "conscience" where the voices of my biological mother and grandmothers reproach and direct. In thinking back through my feminist foremother, however, it is not the superego that is at work—rather, she brings me to consciousness--
"The equivoice that affects you, fills your breast with an urge to come to language and launches your force; the rhythm that laughs you...that part of you that leaves a space between yourself and urges you to inscribe in language your woman's style."
--and I hail her logic of resistance into my conscious, where the language of my mothers and myself is always subject to revision.
WHY GRANDMA NEVER TELLS WAR STORIES
For most of history, academia was strictly male territory; this point everyone cedes to painful reality. A lot of battles have been fought and won in the past century-and-a-half to give women equal footing on educational terrain. We can now read the post-traumatic stress of this lengthy conflict in the words of scholars who assert that educational frontiers for women mean that boys are left on the margins at school. One such critic, Christina Hoff Sommers, writes in The War Against Boys that
In 1996 there were 8.4 million women but only 6.7 million men enrolled in college...Girl partisans offer ingenious, self-serving arguments for why the higher enrollment of women in college should not count as an advantage for women...Someone should have noticed that the boys were lagging behind. The college gap was a genuine and dangerous trend. But at just the time the girls were surpassing the boys in this critical way, the gender activists...chose to announce the "short-changed-girl" crisis. For the next several years, the gender gap in college enrollment continued to widen, but the attention of the American public and government was focused on the nation's "underserved girls." (31)
According to Sommers, girls are now beating boys at their own game. There are statistical facts that prove the young men in the American educational system today do face obstacles: they are more likely to be diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, to be distracted from their schoolwork by drugs and crime, to commit suicide (Sommers 26). These facts certainly warrant the attention of parents, teachers, and educational authorities. In no way, however, do they warrant the dissemination of blame onto their girl counterparts, or onto the feminists whose agenda is furthering women's education. Sommers criticizes such activists for the fact that
Boys are resented, being seen as both the unfairly privileged gender and as obstacles on the path to gender justice for girls. There is an understandable dialectic: the more girls are portrayed as diminished, the more boys are regarded as needing to be taken down a notch and reduced in importance. (23)
This argument is logical—and perhaps many teachers do share the sentiment that Sommers is condemning—which leads one to wonder why she would advocate and even express with her own words a simple reversal of this undesirable situation. For Sommers, it seems that boys and girls remain historically equidistant on a seesaw that might be teetering, for the first time, to a male disadvantage.
THE GAP AND THE FEAR OF CASTRATION: O HOW WE CLING TO THAT EMPTY SPACE
The view that we are stuck in a closed economy where the success of one sex is the other's failure is rooted in our adherence to the gender gap itself. Do not mistake the gap for a "no-man's land": it is positively charged with writing which Cixous characterizes as having "been run by a libidinal and cultural—hence political, typically masculine—economy." (2042) Using Freud's concept of the libidinal economy characterizes writing as a fetish: a prop to assuage male castration anxiety in the wake of maternal separation. Feminist theorists have made it clear that a masculine language would repress the expression of women. Perhaps by its very nature, dependence on such a system also constrains men.
Sexual opposition, which has always worked for man's profit to the point of reducing writing, too, to his laws, is only a historico-cultural limit...Now it happens that at present, for historico-cultural reasons, it is women who are opening up to and benefiting from this vatic bisexuality which doesn't annul differences but stirs them up, pursues them, increases their number. In a certain way, "woman is bisexual"; man—it's a secret to no one—being poised to keep glorious phallic monosexuality in view. By virtue of affirming the primacy of the phallus and of bringing it into play, phallocratic ideology has claimed more than one victim. (Cixous 2046-7)
Can we read the present maladies of boys in education as a result of their resistance to relinquish fetishized language? Perhaps Sommers is correct in that boys in general are resented, seen as limiting agents to the academic success of girls. This is the "big man" issue; the blame for a masculine system of oppression is transferred to men in general. I think if we tried to locate the actual men and boys, we would find many of them trapped under the same rock as women and girls.
DISPARITY: NOT ALWAYS A BAD THING
In response to reading her sons' castration anxiety, Sommers strongly recommends single-sex education for boys as the best way to interest boys in topics of study without "risking their masculinity." (174) She condemns the tendency of American educators and gender activists to advance single-sex women's institutions while calling their male counterparts "discriminatory." I would posit that an all-male school under today's educational system is discriminatory, not against women but to its own students. This is due to the common assumption, which Sommers clearly falls prey to, of a single masculinity. What about the boys who would prefer not to be in an environment that strives to create a uniform, heterosexual ideal of man?
You can't talk about a female sexuality, uniform, homogenous, classifiable into codes—any more than you can talk about one unconscious resembling another. Women's imaginary is inexhaustible, like music, painting, writing: their stream of phantasms is incredible. (Cixous 2040)
Cixous is meditating on Lacan's notion that each individual interprets the world outside his or her body in a unique way. All-female schools are contiguous with this expression that highlights not the gender gap, but the gap between each individual woman. Meanwhile, single-sex male institutions under today's educational regime, inherently phallocentric, are not likely to celebrate much variance among their students. This type of education would foster competition which has been seen to motivate boys, but offering it as the solution denies the possibility of any real difference between men.
"In one another we will never be lacking"
So let us stop stressing The Gap and start talking about lots of them. The gender gap is paralyzing; our differences foster change and progress. Multiplicity is exciting, diversity is exciting. These things can help us move forward while reminding us that we do not all need to do it in the same way.
We need to be cautious about limiting the opportunities and ideals we give to children based on sex. I think that boys, like girls, should have the option of single-sex education without being criticized for marginalizing women. The more options we provide for young men and women, the better. Wherever we choose to learn or to live, whatever are reasons, we are not there because we are exactly the same as everyone else. We are there to see the empty spaces, where we end and where there is everything to discover.
Works Cited:
Cixous, Helene. "The Laugh of the Medusa." In Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.
Sommers, Christina Hoff. "The War Against Boys." New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.
| Cutting off your Nose to Spite your Face Name: Kat Corbin Date: 2005-11-23 15:57:09 Link to this Comment: 17157 |
Anti-sex feminists claim their movement does not necessarily stand against sexuality per se, but rather against the current language and politics of heterosexual encounters. From this perspective, women must resist not only the sexual advances of men but also their own desires and attempt to recreate desire into something for which there is not currently a name. Women cannot use sex as a way to dismantle men from their state of dominance because sex is inherently a large part of male supremacy. Anti-sex feminists argue not solely against acts that benefit men, but also against the language that men created and use to control society. Dworkin notes that "w[omen] have no freedom and no extravagance in the questions we ask or the interpretations we can make...our bodies speak their language. Our minds think in it. The men are inside us through and through". This indicates that women are intrinsically, and unwillingly, tied to men despite differences in lifestyle choices, types of relationships, types of sex, consent, or geography. The tendency to restrict female sexual activity is not a new idea, nor is the idea of withholding sex as punishment. Wendy Chapkis identifies the main problem with this argument by saying "male power is constantly reaffirmed even as it is denounced. In this way, anti-sex and romanticist feminist rhetoric tends to reproduce the very ideology it intends to destabilize." By withholding sex, it is made into something forbidden, something that women should exercise control over. In fact, it becomes the only thing women can exercise control over, except for the tiny little detail of biological sexual urges that exist in women as well. Enter the antithesis: sex-positive feminism.
Sex-positive feminism was created in the early 1980s as a response to both the anti-sex movement and what was seen as the patriarchal control over sexuality. Gayle Rubin notes that "this tradition of feminist sexual thought has called for a sexual liberation that would work for women as well as for men". The sex-positive movement maintains that women should not have to restrain themselves from sex because men will be gaining pleasure from it. Instead, there should be an effort toward mutual pleasure between the partners, something that is overlooked in the anti-sex movement. When women withhold sex as punishment, it is true that they are gaining control of their bodies. However, what happens when they are finally worn down by men and they "give it up"? That control is gone and women are right back where we started: with men inside us and without any power over our bodies. The overarching theme of the anti-sex/anti-pornography feminist movement is that men are "inside" women and since women are supposed to be pure and good, allowing a man to be in you is equivalent to giving him total and complete power over you. So what happens if, dare I say it, a woman actually enjoys sex because underneath everything else, she is a human being with biologically ordained desires? It seems that withholding the potential for incredible pleasure just to make sure someone else doesn't get any is like cutting off your nose to spite your face. Female pleasure is constantly overlooked in the anti-sex movement because, even if a consenting adult female in a monogamous unmarried relationship enters into a sex act with her loving male partner, he still has complete control over her and no woman can feel good as long as she isn't in control of her body. If every woman withheld sex because it was the only way she could maintain control over her body, either the human species would cease to exist or there would be an inordinate amount of rape in the world. Furthermore, if the only way women can maintain control of their selves is through sex, what is the point of feminist movements that don't uphold a definitive statement about sex?
Society has always considered sex the "original sin". This belief has been reinforced by almost every aspect of society: the church, conservatives, the family, and of course, anti-sex feminists. However, awareness of modern variation in type and amount of sexual activity have caused society to "rank" what is more acceptable. In Thinking Sex, Gayle Rubin describes a diagram of the "sex hierarchy". This hierarchy contains two circles, the inner containing more acceptable types of sex, including procreative, married, heterosexual and "vanilla". The outer circle is reserved for types of sex deemed "bad, abnormal and damned" such as non-procreative, unmarried, homosexual and "with manufactured objects". As is audible from these minimalist lists, society as a whole deems the majority of sexual encounters as negative. The feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s wanted to create a sexual liberation for women. Ironically, the anti-sex followers who call themselves feminists are going directly against the original foundations of the feminist movement. By advocating a withholding of one's body for pleasure, the anti-sex movement is playing right along with conservatives who legislate anti-abortion laws; both groups indirectly disenfranchise women's control over their own bodies. Somewhere in this mass of "sex is bad" propaganda, a mix-up has occurred pertaining to the ultimate goal. If the goal of anti-sex feminism is to help women regain control over their selves by withholding sex, and then in turn, not knowing the full extent of their own bodies, then it appears a conundrum has developed. How are women supposed to know how to control their bodies when they don't actually know their bodies?
According to anti-sex feminists, heterosexual sex acts that involve penetration, no matter what the situation, give total control to the man and none to the woman. However, there are many other types of sex than heterosexual and penetrating. There are sex acts that don't involve vaginal penetration and there a sex acts that are not heterosexual. Interestingly enough, there are more laws concerning sex acts between consenting partners that vary from traditional vanilla than there are for child molesters. For as long as civilized society has existed, people have been experimenting in some way with sex, whether it is through oral-genital contact, the use of manufactured objects, multiple-partner sex, gay and lesbian sex or S&M. The breakdown occurs when people don't acknowledge that what works for them often disgusts others. Sex conflicts arise mostly due to "moral panics", defined as "the "political moment" of sex, in which diffuse attitudes are channeled into political action and from there into social change". This is when that fine line between personal morals and national/state law is crossed all too quickly concerning sex most likely because "legislators are loath to be soft on vice". However, who gets to decide what is "right" when it comes to sex? Sex-positive feminists hold that sexuality is political and it will always be political, thus withholding sex until further notice will only further the oppression that women have been trying to break free from for decades. Argues Rubin, "sexual liberation has been and continues to be a feminist goal...[but] the fact remains that feminist thought about sex is profoundly polarized" leaving too much open ground for feminist and male chauvinist bias. Women are not equal in the current world, nor are they inferior which displays the incredible discrepancy of language for where women truly stand and what they should do to attain equality and respect. Withholding sex is not the answer, because it denies female pleasure, reinforces male dominance and prevents the continuation of the human species. However, if there are some women who buy into the anti-sex ideal and some who do not, this stark division only serves to aggravate the situation. Not only does it not accomplish anything pertaining to what is the best course of action for women, but it also retains the position of supreme sexual power for men. Rubin, as a sex-positive feminist, seems to think that "it is time to recognize the political dimensions of erotic life" presumably because acknowledging the underlying issue will display some answers concerning how women are to proceed in a world bombarding them with contradictory statements about an innate biological act.
| Either/Or: Discourse of "Trans-" Name: Amy Philli Date: 2005-11-23 16:30:59 Link to this Comment: 17158 |
In my own ignorance, I originally posited the position that "transsexuals who conform to their new gender's stereotypical roles working within the discourse, rather than working against it. Even though they do not conform to their biological sex's gender, they do conform to one of the two genders, thus upholding the dichotomy" (My introduction). After delving into Trans Liberation by Leslie Feinberg, I'm beginning to understand that there is much more to the discourse of trans than such a simple picture. To put the question of transsexuality as a matter of either opposition to or cooperation with the status quo denies the reality of transsexuals as people who just want to be how they feel. Yes, transsexuality messes with the status quo by flipping biological sex and gender on its head and it can reinforce gender roles by transsexuals imitating the archetype of "woman" and "man". However, we cannot get so involved in discourse theory forget to let reality inform that theory.
Now I'd like to go back to some of the questions and pose some more to try to figure out how to shape my thinking about trans issues. First of all, I'd like to discuss the words themselves, because discourse is dependant on language. Transgender and transsexual; half of these two words are the same, and we hope that that makes them similar. Unfortunately it is not that simple. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines the prefix "trans-" as: "1 : on or to the other side of : across : beyond 2 a : beyond (a specified chemical element) in the periodic table 3 : through 4 : so or such as to change or transfer." I believe that different people use the different definitions of "trans-" to understand the meanings of transsexuals and transgenderists in different ways. One colloquial meaning of "trans-" in transsexual is the fourth definition: "so or such as to change or transfer." In this we see transsexuality merely as a switch from one sex to another. But if we consider the possibility of the other definitions, especially the first "on or to the other side of : across : beyond." Could that mean that transsexuals are beyond sex? Does this place them outside the discourse of sex? And then the question that begs to be asked is can we use these definitions in the same way for transgenderism? Do the largely contested definitions of sex and gender preclude this comparison?
Bornstein defines gender as "categorization. Anything that categorizes people is gender, whether it's appearance or mannerisms, biology or psychology, hormones, roles, genitals, whatever...so where does that leave sex? Sex is fucking" (My Gender Workbook, p 26). Califia argues that Bornstein's approach to biological sex is extreme, as she "dismisses the physiological and genetic realities that really do divide most of the human race into two very different groups of people" (Sex Changes, 247). Califia does not believe that biology holds no relevance as Bornstein does, but rather that biology is not destiny. I myself cannot deny the compelling evidence that demonstrates differences between males and females, but am starting to see biological sex as more of a social construction closer to Bornstein's theory than Califia's. If we set the discourse of gender, why would we not also set the discourse of sex?
So do we use different definitions of "trans-" for "transsexual" and "transgender?" Colloquially, I observe that "transsexual" is more of "transfer" and "transgender" is more "beyond." Do these attached meanings have significance regarding the nature of sex and gender? To the mainstream, both are seen as firm, but in theory, gender is possibly more malleable than sex. Even though we no longer hold biology as destiny, we still see it as more definite. We are either male or female, end of story. Well, obviously it isn't the end of the story otherwise this paper wouldn't exist. Still, we can see biological sex as a certainty, because of only two possible expressions. Obviously this evaluation leaves out intersexuals, but if we allow ourselves to see them as exceptions, we can ignore them (I say this tongue in cheek). It's as if for transsexuals we see them jumping from the male pool to the female pool (or vice versa) without being able to be out of the water. Gender on the other hand has many expressions. There are many ways nowadays to be a man or a woman, and still be within the bounds of masculinity and femininity. Therefore, it would make sense for a person to be able to float around in gender and even get out of the pool without having to jump into another one.
I think that much of the problem of sex versus gender lies in linking the concepts of man to male and woman to female and the values assigned to them. It is beyond the scope of this paper to definitively decide what gender and sex really are, but we need to figure out some sort of definition to move forward with the discussion. To simply say that sex is biological and gender is cultural is to ignore the implications that culture has on biology and that sex has on gender and vice versa, but let us use these definitions with the understanding of their limitations.
So how do we know if someone is transsexual or transgender? The three feminist foremothers that I'm drawing from all have different views on what they are. Feinberg states right off in her book that "I'm not at odds with the fact that I was born female-bodied. Nor do I identify as an intermediate sex" (Trans Liberation, p 1). Ze (yes, ze prefers gender-neutral pronouns) goes on to explain that ze identifies as a masculine female, but also acknowledges that while this is "incendiary" it is not complex enough to fit hir (9). Bornstein says she is "what's called a transsexual person" but goes on to explain that she lives her life as something other than a man or woman (Gender Workbook, 9). Califia had at one point considered transitional surgery, but decided to embrace as much as possible her female body while at the same time as expressing a masculine gender and does not consider herself transsexual (Sex Changes, 5-6).
How do these people fit into our definitions of transsexual? If I were to have guessed, I would not have come up with the answers that they have provided for me. The point of this is that really, it is every individual's understanding of what these terms mean and how she/he/ze/etc do or do not apply to her/him/hir/etc. If we leave it up to the individual, it is scary for the rest of us, because we often have this compulsion to make sense of a person's sex and gender in a quick and simple manner. Feinberg is often asked to clarify what hir sex and gender is. Ze posits that "it seems as though everyone who questions the totality of who we are – whether they despise us or admire us – thinks that an answer to the question 'Are you a man or a woman?' will illuminate our identities" (Trans Liberation, 69). However, ze finds the answer more complex than just one word. The question is all about the asker, rather than the asked. It is uncomfortable for us to not know, but I think that we need to get used to the unsettling feeling of not knowing, because trans people have to deal with the discomfort of our uncertainty all the time.
Now that we (sort of) have an idea of what sex, gender, trans-, transsexual and transgender mean, let's figure out how they work within the discourse of queer studies. I had originally posited as stated above that transsexuals actually work within the discourse of gender and therefore hold up the dichotomy of man and woman. I realize now that this statement is full of value judgments. Feinberg states that ze's "heard the academic argument that transgender is a revolutionary tactic in the struggle against the patriarch, but that transsexual men and women uphold the oppressive either-or categories of man and woman" (Trans Liberation, 117). When I read this passage my own words echoed in my head and my cheeks stung with embarrassment for doing just what Feinberg says is not cool. Ze questions the validity of this argument also in that while transgenderists challenge the woman/man binary, transsexuals challenge birth sex assignments (117). By saying that transgenderists are more valuable than transsexuals in deconstructing the discourse, we place a greater value on the fluidity of gender than sex. Feinberg goes on to argue that this is not true and being transsexual or transgender "is not a tactic; these are our lives we are fighting for" (117). In this we really need to separate the effect people have on discourse from the people themselves. Transsexuals and transgenderists are shaped by the discourse (and would not exist in the same way without it) and they alter the discourse, but they themselves are not necessarily setting out to do so. Activists like Feinberg, Califia and Bornstein are working to alter the discourse on sex and gender, but they are just three people in a diverse group, many of whom are just living their lives. Their existence alters the discourse and we should not criticize their gender expression based on politics. Feinberg argues that transsexuals have a right to live as men or women just as non-transsexuals do.
Where does this all leave us in our understanding of trans? To be honest, I don't know. Though the personal is political, we can't forget about the person. Transsexuality and transgenderism is still complicated, and will be, but this is because the discourse of sex and gender is complicated. When we talk about sex and gender and try to establish what that means, it's confusing enough, but when we try to go past the established boundaries in the land of "trans-," we find ourselves on very shaky ground. Trans originates from the established discourse of sex and gender, but it goes above and beyond that, true to its name. Feinberg strives in hir book to expand the discourse to include trans on the inside rather than its outside status. Bornstein wants to do away with the discourse of gender all together. Califia wants to work within the discourse to disassociate sex from gender. I think all these goals are admirable, if not all practical, but perhaps we should look to the Chinese proverb that Feinberg quotes: "The person who says it cannot be done should not interrupt the person doing it" (Trans Liberation, 61). I personally prefer Feinberg's inclusion of trans into the discourse. We can create a space within the discourse for more possibilities than just male or female and woman or man and thereby allow more people to live their lives as they see fit.
Bibliography
Bornstein, Kate. my gender workbook. Routledge: New York, 1998.
Califia, Pat. Sex Changes: The Politics of Transgenderism. Cleis Press: San Francisco, 1997.
Feinberg, Les. Trans Liberation: beyond pink or blue. Beacon Press: Boston, 1998.
| Being Hurt is Not a Given: A Feminist's Perspectiv Name: Talya Gate Date: 2005-11-23 16:44:53 Link to this Comment: 17159 |
This paper was written by a student not a professional, it is exploratory. There are many resources available for victims including a number of which offer anonymity. If you or someone you know is being hurt, physically or emotionally, please use the resources available offered by qualified professionals.
Victims are referred to as females or children in this paper because the overwhelming majority of victims are women or children. This statistical evidence is not an attempt to diminish the reality and importance of men who face domestic violence.
Paper:
Short of murder, slavery is arguably the ultimate violence against another human being. Sojourner Truth (1797-1883), an abolitionist and feminist, repeatedly expressed her dismay at the inequality she faced because of her skin color and her gender. After she was freed, she focused on the need for abolition. In her mind, abolition could lead to equality between the sexes. Without the end of slavery, women would not be able to establish their equality. Unfortunately, while the end of slavery may have been a prerequisite for establishing equality between the sexes it did not by itself lead to equality.
Feminism is a contemporary response to inequality and violence against women. I hate the word feminist. No, I hate the assumptions many people make when they hear or use the word feminist. I don't frequently label myself a "feminist" because I don't know how the people that I am speaking to will interpret my declaration. If someone, however, asks me if I'm a feminist I say yes and offer my definition and explanation of feminism. Feminism is the belief that men and women should have equal opportunities. All people, including men, can be feminists; in fact, it is especially important for men to be feminists because they offer their support for women through their actions as well as gives the men the freedom to be themselves and to benefit from equal partnerships. Feminists, in general, are advocates and have the power to invoke change.
Bringing rape and violence to the forefront is crucial: women and children worldwide face violence at startlingly high rates. Women can't gain equality as long as it is acceptable for people to use violence to keep them unequal.
"Brought rape, feminism, sexuality, and wymyn surviving hard shit into the mainstream..." (description of Western Feminist Kathleen Hanna) is the description that I was given for myself when I took the "Which Western Feminist Icon Are You?" I believe that this description should be a given rather than an anomaly for a feminist.
According to a binder given out to confidential advocate trainees the following is the most widely accepted, basic, and general view of domestic violence.
"Domestic Violence is a pattern of behavior used by one person to maintain power and control over another. Physical battering is not the only form of abuse. Emotional and sexual abuse, including insults, intimidation, threats and forced sex are also part of an abusive relationship. Domestic violence occurs between people in relationships, such as current or former husbands and wives; boyfriends and girlfriends; gay and lesbian partners; the elderly and their caretakers; parents, children, and/or relatives; sex workers and pimps/clients, as well as victims of stalking or trafficking. Although anyone may be a victim, the majority are women and their children."
There are other definitions that describe the details of the basic categories of abuse: economic, sexual, physical, emotional, and verbal abuse; as well as isolation, threats, friendships, and surveillance.
Every 9 seconds, a woman is battered in the US. Domestic violence is the primary cause of injury to women: 1 out of 3 women will be hurt at some point throughout her life, physically or sexually, by a husband or boyfriend. These statistics often seem too high to believe; they also seem difficult to believe because men are frequently not included in a description of domestic violence. Based on police records women are 7-14 times more likely to report suffering severe physical assaults from an intimate partner. All victims of abuse need to feel free to report their situation and need to have the option of facing the world without the fear that goes along with abuse.
The fight against domestic violence began in 1968 when The Women's History Library was founded to bring issues of equality to the surface. In 1973, the first battered women's shelter in the US opened in St. Paul, Minnesota. It began as an office space where women in danger would sleep when they needed a safe space. By the next year they had raised enough money to open a 5 bedroom shelter. Not only was Nebraska the first state to abolish the marital-rape exemption in 1976 but Battered Wives by Del Martin was published identifying sexism as the cause of violence against women. In 1977 the first counseling program for batters was developed at the request of the women working in shelters. The US commission on Civil Rights sponsored the Consultation on Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy in 1978. This was where The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (NCADV) was formally named, however it began through the work and dedication of feminists around the country. On October 17, 1981, the NCADV declared a National Day of Unity on behalf of battered women. This day of unity became a month of unity in 1987: October is Domestic Violence Awareness Month. In 1994, the US Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act as part of the federal Crime Bill. In 1998, all exemptions from rape prosecution for husbands/cohabitants/dates were repealed in Delaware. Feminists have continued the fight against domestic violence through the creation of hotlines, therapy, and shelters.
Violence against women should never be ignored or dismissed, no matter how small or minor the act may seem. Bringing rape and other forms of violence to a level of awareness should be at the top of a feminist's priorities however, it is not the only way to approach the utopian world where women will be treated as equals. Other ways involve fighting more directly for women's rights within the workplace, economy, reproduction, etc. The work of feminists will lead to a world where children will not be afraid and women will be able to walk down a dark alley wearing a mini skirt without fear.
In the world of psychology and domestic violence, Sharon Lamb is one of the most influential and outspoken women; as a feminist she speaks of issues facing women, focusing on violence, in today's world. She bases her knowledge and information on her background as a psychologist and the resources that accompany that profession. She wrote a book titled The Trouble with Blame: Victims, Perpetrators, and Responsibility that discusses violence from multiple perspectives of those involved. She attempts to answer the question that most victims ask themselves: "What is it about me that makes men do this to me?" (Lamb, pg.55) as well as discuss the most common reasons given by the perpetrator for the act of violence.
Part of what makes Lamb unique is her view of victimization and blame. "It happens to everyone. It was my fault" is the most common comment in response to violence. This belief is also part of the reason that so few cases of domestic violence are actually reported to authorities and is part of the reason that is so difficult for women to gain the courage to leave those who are perpetrators of violence. The standard answer in response to the self-blame is "No. It does not happen to everyone and it was not your fault." Lamb, however, has considered the possibility that perhaps a little self-blame is not bad if it helps the victim maintain the belief that there is order in the world and that she has at least some control over her life.
"But a number of authors from the field of social psychology speak of schemas and cognitions too, and describe victims' self-blaming as a way of maintaining beliefs that the world is a just and meaningful place, and that they have control over their own lives. From the 'just world' perspective of the victim, it would be easier to see oneself as blameworthy than to give up the more important belief that the world is a fair place and that people get what they deserve in life" (Lamb, pg.30).
Simply being a person in this random world is also a scary thought, and the idea of free will is very grounding suggesting that we like to feel that we have control in our lives and that we will not be a victim when we are around people; Lamb calls this "blameworthy."
Reclaiming the idea of blame offers victims of abuse a level of control over their lives which they otherwise wouldn't have leading to the empowerment of women despite the hardships faced. Violence is not going to end until there is the clear understanding that abuse is not permissible. I agree with Lamb and respect her for doing what she can to ameliorate the feeling of self-blame without blocking the option of being blameworthy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Commonwealth Fund, May 1999.
Family Violence Prevention Fund, 1994.
Herstory Exhibit at the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence's 8th National Conference, 1998.
Lamb, Sharon. The Trouble With Blame: Victims, Perpetrators, and Responsibility. Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1996.
National Institute of Justice Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Nov 1998.
National Institute if Justice, Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look, NIJ Research Report, National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice, January 1996.
The Riley Center, Volunteer Handbook. San Francisco, CA.
Sojourner Truth. 1851-1871. Lift Every Voice: African American Oratory, 1787-1900. Ed. Foner, Philip S. & Branham, Robert James. Tuscaloosa, The University of Alabama Press, 1998.
Which Western Feminist Icon Are You? Quizilla LLC. February 01, 2004.
http://quizilla.com/users/belladonnalin/quizzes/Which%20Western%20feminist%20icon%20are%20you%3F/.
| The Empire of Images: Discourses of Female Sexuali Name: Amy Pennin Date: 2005-11-23 22:26:26 Link to this Comment: 17160 |
As women, many of my peers and I grew up unaware of our own 'misfortune.' Perhaps for this reason, the dominant discourse of female empowerment as espoused by my generation is most often characterized by disinterest rather than passion. Like Simone de Beauvoir wrote in 1949, my peers seem to believe that "we are no longer like our partisan elders; by and large we have won the game" (Beauvoir 687). Ironically, it is Beauvoir's very theory which this essay utilizes to prove the need for a revival of feminist resistance amongst the women of my generation, and which makes her one of my feminist foremothers.
Unfortunately, it is not Beauvoir's theory but her message of political passivity which we were raised to accept. Growing up, girls have little reason to distrust her message. We hear and see it constantly, in one perverted form or another, gracing the packaging of every product made with little girls in mind. Susan Bordo, another of my feminist foremothers, utilizes one example from Susan Lamb's book on young girls' sexuality to describe the pedagogical effect of this element of the "empire of images" into which my generation was born serfs. Her quote from Lamb's work perfectly describes the feminist message of female freedom as it has evolved into a marketing slogan for little girls' dress-up games: "(these girls are) 'silly and adorable, sexy and marvelous all at once' she tells us, as they 'celebrate their objectification,' 'playing out male fantasies...but without risk'" (Bordo 6). From childhood, then, women of my generation have been taught that their ability to 'celebrate their objectification' through the 'playing out (of) male fantasies' is concrete evidence of their freedom. As young women grow into adolescence and adulthood, graduating through Seventeen to Cosmopolitan, the message stays the same: the sexualized woman is a liberated woman.
On the surface, this argument seems fairly logical, and is thus all too easy to swallow. Women today do not face the sexual repression which was protested by feminists of the fifties and sixties; "by and large," haven't we won the game?
The answer, of course, is no. Just as Beauvoir's theories lacked political impetus as a result of her belief that feminism was a historical topic to be reflected back upon rather than a living movement to be joined, women of my generation have failed to take feminist political action because they are unaware that such action might be necessary. It is the purpose of this essay, therefore, to reveal the dominant discourse of female sexuality as previously described for what it really is: a limiting discourse which constructs all possible female forms of sexuality and beauty within the confines of the male gaze. After all, why should little girls celebrate male fantasy and their own objectification when they could be subjectively playing amidst their own female fantasies? The "Empire of Images" described by Bordo must, I argue, be understood as an empire constructed within the social frameworks of male as Subject and female as Object theorized by Beauvoir. Images in popular media can thus be revealed as reinforcing woman's status as the Other while forcing her to interpret her body, and thus define her sexuality and her understandings of beauty, solely in relation to male desire. By establishing a narrow set of sexualities and forms of beauty acceptable to the male gaze, this discourse precludes any options for female pleasure and self-interpretation which fall outside the boundaries of the male fantasy.
The dominating and inescapable nature of this discourse as it functions in the lives of women is described by Susan Bordo as an "Empire of Images." As Bordo argues, the "empire" in which we now live functions as a pervasive "perceptual pedagogy" which teaches everyone, women in particular, how to interpret their bodies (1). Bordo describes the twenty-year-olds she encounters in her audiences at lectures on her work in the same way I would describe myself as a member of that group:
I simply catch the eyes of the 20-year-olds in the audience. They know. They understand that you can be as cynical as you want about the ads -- and many of them are -- and still feel powerless to resist their messages. They are aware that virtually every advertisement, every magazine cover, has been digitally modified and that very little of what they see is "real." That doesn't stop them from hating their own bodies for failing to live up to computer-generated standards... Generations raised in the empire of images are both vulnerable and savvy (4).
Young women are largely forced to function within this discourse of images because they are provided few alternative portrayals of beauty and female sexuality, many of which seem to preclude heterosexuality. Furthermore, the discourse which identifies 'normal' standards for female beauty and sexuality is, as previously noted, enmeshed in the dominant discourse of female empowerment, for the empowered woman is equated with the sexualized female. Young women are thus simultaneously told that they are free from oppression because of the public nature of female sexuality, and that this 'freeing' sexuality must conform to the narrow standards of male fantasy as constructed by consumer capitalism.
Beauvoir's theory of gender frameworks as elaborated in The Second Sex can help us to why it is male fantasy which defines standards of female sexuality and beauty and thus why I have posed the dominance of this discourse of images as a specifically feminist problem. Beauvoir asserts that the woman—"a free and autonomous being like all human creatures—nevertheless finds herself living in a world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other" (688). Beauvoir argues that, in the relationship of 'the two sexes,' man is the Subject, while woman is the Other:
Man can think of himself without woman. She cannot think of herself without man...she appears essentially to the male as a sexual being...She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential (676).
If woman is primarily defined in society by her difference from and relationship to man, then definitions of her sexuality and standards of her beauty will necessarily be created in relation to man and his desire. Further, if the female is relegated to the role of Object by the male Subject, images of her will inevitably reflect the viewpoint of the male. The woman, deluged by popular images of the female as created by a media which assumes the role of the male in assessing its object, will learn to view her body critically through that male gaze. Once young women learn to view the female body through the male perspective, they will continue to reproduce that problematic perspective in their own understandings and representations of themselves and other women.
When applied to Bordo's concept of the "Empire of Images," Beauvoir's theory makes it clear that the dominant discourse of female sexuality as constructed by the popular media is a male-focused discourse, despite its reproduction by both women and men. As a result of this male focus, the dominant discourse of female sexuality does not function as a domain of female freedom, despite popular assertions to the contrary. Instead, this discourse actually provides very few options to women who seek to understand themselves as sexual beings within it. The current dominant discourse surrounding female sexuality limits the language with which women can construct and describe their sexualities and prevents them from fully realizing their individual potentials for pleasure as they might define them apart from their relationship to male desire.
The Empire of Images cannot be ignored—it teaches us how to interpret our bodies—and it is built according to Beauvoir's framework of man as Subject and woman as Object. Standards of female beauty and sexuality are defined ever within the male gaze, through which men view women and women view themselves. The sexualized woman as portrayed in the dominant discourse is thus not so much a liberated woman as she is a woman with a limited set of tools for constructing her sexuality. The expansion of this discourse and the subsequent proliferation of the vocabulary with which women can define themselves as sexual beings require that women recognize the limiting nature of their popularly defined sexual 'freedom.' Women must recognize the male-focused nature of their received definitions of female sexuality. Only then can feminist resistance to this discourse facilitate the creation of alternative options for female sexuality and beauty and thus expand opportunities for female sexual pleasure.
| Imagined Space Name: Orah Minde Date: 2005-11-26 13:35:53 Link to this Comment: 17165 |
To live within discourse, is to exist as an image of discourse. Lauretis suggests that to inhabit "the space-off" is to refuse to be contained in the representational language of discourse. This "space-off" effects ideology by maintaining a proximity to it, but simultaneously refuses to be controlled within it. Lauretis suggests, "a movement from the space represented by/in a representation, by/in a discourse, by/in a sex-gender system, to the space not represented yet implied (unseen) in them" (Lauretis, 26). In this way, Lauretis does not contradict Foucault's notion that the nature of discourse is not something from which one can escape. "The space-off" is defined according to its relation to the space from which it is "off:" the marginal space, however, is marginal because its refusal to be contained within ideological representation.
Lauretis writes of the need to "walk out of the male-centered frame of reference in which gender and sexuality are (re)produced by the discourse of male sexuality" (Lauretis, 17). Female sexuality is articulated through the discourse of male sexuality. In order for female sexuality to free itself from the restriction as that which is only in relation to men, women must inhabit the "space-off" of the discourse of male sexuality. Through the habitation of space that is in reference to- but not contained by- the representations of the gender ideology, subjects change ideology. By allowing themselves to be coherent to the ideology, but not contained within its language, those that inhabit the "space-off" compel the ideology to refocus its gaze beyond the space that it contains.
Although, according to Lauretis' model, the subject may be initially produced by the discourse as a representation, her action as a representation reforms the discourse through which she came into being. Although one's existence may always be in relation to ideology, one's ability to fill the space of contact (between the discourse-space and "off-space") with tension signifies the malleable quality of discourse. Ideology, similarly, consists only of the repetitions of its initial presentation. Ideology, therefore, exists only as the sum of these representations. In this way, both the subject and the ideology are in constant evolution around the space of their contact.
In the introduction to The Psychic Life of Power, Butler similarly writes of the malleable quality of ideology formation. She writes,
The subject is compelled to repeat the norms by which it is produced, but that repetition establishes a domain of risk, for if one fails to reinstate that norm 'in the right way,' one becomes subject to further sanction, one feels the prevailing conditions of existence threatened (Butler, 28).
The inevitable failure of the reproduction yields something that is marked into being by its failure to be a perfect mimicry. The subject is that which can never be fully integrated into ideology. The subject, therefore, is always other to ideology and inhabits this marginal space despite efforts to fully translate itself into discourse language. While Butler characterizes this space outside the prescription of ideology as "haunted by an inassimilable remainder, a melancholia that marks the limited of subjectivation" (Butler, 29), it is through the inability to move from the periphery of ideology that the subject defines the inside space of the ideology. While Lauretis' model describes a subject that seeks to inhabit marginal space, Butler's subject is propelled by the desire to escape this semi-outside.
The nature of Butler's subject is, therefore, that which unwillingly reforms ideology. While the earlier works of Michel Foucault focus on the formation of the subject by discourse, in an interview entitled Sexual Choice, Sexual Act included in the Ethics; Subjectivity and Truth, Foucault focuses on the subject's ability to change discourse. He says,
There is no question that a society without restrictions is inconceivable, but I can only repeat myself in saying that these restrictions have to be within the reach of those affected by them so that they at least have the possibility of altering them (Foucault, 148).
While the subject does not inhabit the space from where the restrictions are generated, Foucault, here, insists that he does have the potential to influence this space. In this way, through the passive role of being that which is "affected" by ideology, the subject holds "the possibility of altering" that through which he comes into being.
Butler, contrarily, intensifies the subject's role in relation to ideology by stating that the subject does not merely hold "the possibility of altering" (my emphasis), but rather, is that which alters. Foucault's subject, rather, must choose to participate in the act of influencing ideology. Since the subject is produced by discourse, according to Foucault, he will inhabit the internal space of discourse, unless he is expelled to the margins or chooses to move there. To be internal to a discourse is to be a passive agent with the potential to alter the affect of ideology upon itself.
Similar to Lauretis' image of the "space-off" as the space external to- but always in relation to- discourse, Foucault talks in the same interview about the inextricable bind that ties to subject to culture. The subject is that which is restrained by culture; and culture is that which restrains the subject. The flux of influence to which Foucault refers in the previous quotation, speaks of a change in the dynamic of power between the two components. Lauretis does not imagine in The Technology of Gender a culture that holds subject so tightly within itself that it disallows all movement into marginal space. Foucault, however, fears such a culture. He says,
The important question here, it seems to me, is not whether a culture without restraints is possible or even desirable but whether the system of constraints in which a society functions leaves individuals the liberty to transform the system. Obviously, constraints of any kind are going to be intolerable to certain segments of society (Foucault, 147).
The image of a discourse that dominates the subject to the point at which the subject is absolutely passive, harkens back to Foucault's earlier works that seem to ignore the potential activity of the subject: focusing, rather, on its passive role.
According to Foucault, the constraint-dynamic between culture and its subjects inevitably creates unsatisfied subjects. The question of whether there can be a culture whose subjects are all fully satisfied and, therefore, unrestrained within the culture, is foolish. The most dangerous culture, Foucault says, is the one in which there is no resistance: not because the culture has stopped restraining its subjects, but rather, because the subjects have stopped exercising their potential for activity. While release from restraint is unrealistic, Foucault suggests a movement against culture- a resistance to culture- as the best method of easing the burden of this influence. While culture is that which constrains its subjects- that which seeks to pacify that which it creates- any activity of the subject resists culture.
In Ethics, Foucault emphasizes the importance of the subject to refuse to be absolutely passive. While the subject is always subject to- in relation to- its culture, Foucault speaks of the potential for action as something that must be maintained. Foucault's subject is, therefore, that which must choose to be active. Butler's subject, contrarily, is that which is doomed to a moving existence in its constant repeated attempts to become passive. For Foucault, when a subject stops regarding culture as that which constrains, it looses its potential for activity. A subject must regard itself as constrained in order to come into action. Once the subject regards itself as such, it must continually choose to move into marginal space.
In contrast to Foucault, Butler accounts for the nature for the subject as that which embodies contrary movements. For Butler, subject comes into being by failing to be the intent of culture. The impulsive movement of the subject is to reform itself: to remedy the failure that produced it. Butler emphasizes, like Foucault, the self-reflexive action of the subject. While the self-reflection of Foucault's subject is the ability of the subject to regard itself as that which is constrained by culture, the self-reflection of Butler's subject is the subject's acknowledgement of itself as that which fails. Butler writes,
Freud and Nietzsche ... both account for the fabrication of conscience as the effect of an internalized prohibition ... whether the doubling back upon itself is performed by primary longings, desire, or drives, it produces in each instance a psychic habit of self-beratement, one that is consolidated over time as conscience" (Butler, 22).
The nature of the "self-beratement," however, is not coded into the nature of the subject. The subject realizes itself, through self-reflection, as that which fails to be the image of ideology. The subject may, however, in so realizing, decide to move from that image instead of toward it. While the failure to be the image of ideology may incline a subject to attempt to be ideology, the same failure may incline another subject to move farther from that image. While every act of Butler's subject is an act of "self-beratement" the direction in which this beratement is directed differs according to subject. Butler's notion of "self-beratement" is merely the realization of the self as a failure. Consequent action after this realization is not inscribed into the subject. Butler's subject, therefore, like Foucault's, is one that chooses.
When subjects choose the direction in which they move, ideology, according to Foucault, Butler and Lauretis, is changed. This turning away from discourse yields a new vision: the landscape of the "off-space." Foucault speaks in the quoted interview of, "The prospect that gays will create as yet unforeseen kinds of relationships" (Foucault, 153). The "off-space" is space that has yet to be seen. The subject's pleasure is released when he turns his gaze to space-imagined.
Butler, Judith The Psychic Life of Power; Theories in Subjection Stanford University Press Stanford, California, 1997
De Lauretis, Teresa Technologies of Gender; Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction Indianna University Press Bloomington, 1987
Foucault, Michel Ethics; Subjectivity and Truth ed. Paul Rabinow trans. Robert Hurley and others The New Press New York, 1994
| Missing Voices, Missing Wombs: Reproductive Techn Name: Samantha M Date: 2005-11-27 09:26:43 Link to this Comment: 17169 |
Reproductive technologies is the current label for all forms of "current and anticipated uses of technology in human reproduction." These technologies have progressed rapidly since scientists and researchers began manipulating DNA and delving into genetic engineering. As represented in high profile news stories of famous actors for instance, they are often used to help infertile couples conceive children through in-vitro fertilization, which is the process by which an egg and sperm is fertilized in a lab and the resulting embryo is implanted in the woman. Today, the term reproductive technologies encompasses the various forms of biotechnological procedures that allow women to produce children who might not otherwise be able to. These technologies range from in-vitro fertilization to pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, a procedure that uses genetic testing on the embryo to find genetic illnesses. Currently, these technologies are costly and are only available to certain people, namely, privileged, white, heterosexual and most times married women. Using a third wave feminist framework, in particular the influence of Audre Lorde, this paper will discuss the lack of availability and use of reproductive technologies in women of color communities. Several areas will be highlighted, such as, the lack of consideration for the real needs of women from diverse backgrounds with regard to these technologies; the issue of invisibility from promotion of such technologies, and a discussion of reasons women of color give for not using reproductive technologies.
Most users of these technologies are white, privileged and heterosexual. In an essay titled, "Race and the New Reproduction," Dorothy E. Roberts argues that "because of financial barriers, cultural preferences, and professional manipulation, the new methods of reproduction are used almost exclusively by white people." She wants us to consider these technologies as more "conforming than liberating" in that they reinforce a heteronormative ideal, one that idealizes the nuclear family. She reminds us "[f]eminists have powerfully demonstrated that the new reproduction enforces traditional patriarchal roles that privilege men's genetic desires and objectify women's procreative capacity." In addition, she points out, these technologies help reinforce a "racial hierarchy" in America because technology such as IVF are inaccessible to Black people. She provides extant examples of this when describing how the media first talked about IVF such as when the first IVF child was born and was displayed on the talk show Donahue. To Roberts, this display, of the perfect child—white, blond-haired and blue-eyed—reinforced for Blacks that IVF was not something they should or could use.
Roberts asks us to consider the historical and social implications of reproductive technologies on Black people and other "marginalized" communities. While she does not negate the usefulness of these technologies for many (such as infertile women, and lesbians) she asks that those promoting these technologies make them available to a wider audience. This is necessary for those who really need them and suggests that policymakers consider, "What does it mean that we live in a country in which white women disproportionately use expensive technologies to enable them to bear children, while Black women disproportionately undergo surgery that prevents them from being able to bear any?" As Roberts suggests, reproductive technologies and how they are marketed and used, present a dichotomy of interests. On one hand, white women are encouraged to use this technology to help in procreation, while Black women are forced to endure surgery that renders them infertile.
Many communities of color are suspicious of scientific pursuits because of the history of abuse perpetrated on these communities in the name of science and medicine. For example, in the United States we have a history of using poor people of color for experimentation. An example of this was the 40 year study of Black men with syphilis from Tuskeegee, Alabama, or the forced sterilization of Puerto Rican women during the initial push for industrialization of the island of Puerto Rico by the American government.
Women around the globe have also insisted on challenging how and what new reproductive technologies are manufactured and to whom. The Association of Women's Rights in Development, an organization committed to informing and mobilizing women around the world on women's rights, has written in detail about facing the challenges of new reproductive technologies. They pose the following questions: "How are NRT's [New Reproductive Technologies] tested, marketed, promoted?" "Are we becoming more accustomed to turning to techno-fixes for other problems?" and "[W]ho makes decisions about the creation and control of NRT's?"
AWID provides a historical context by which women of color/third world women have been mistreated by the medical establishment. They have been used as research subjects for these NRT's often without consent or concern for the well-being of these women. AWID is not only concerned that these technologies come about at the expense of third world women's lives but the larger issue of the commodification of women's bodies and reproductive capabilities. They also stress as Roberts did that "fundamental ideologies seek to impose an ideal of the family or of women that limits reproductive rights and autonomy." Also, they remind us that most NRT's are developed with a "Western-based model" which means that it is men in medicine that are designing new ways to "control women's bodies" , in essence, reproduction. AWID wants women around the world not to blindly accept NRT's and implore us to question how these technologies affect our lives.
Reproductive technologies can be both beneficial and harmful to women. This paper discussed issues of accessibility, invisibility, and the mistreatment of women of color in the medical establishment to highlight reasons why all women need to take a stronger stance and control of the way new reproductive technologies are marketed and developed. Further research is needed on the effects of reproductive technologies on women of color and third world women and further analysis of the needs of these women with regard to what technologies are most useful for women in these communities.
Works Cited:
Association for Women's Rights in Development. "Facing the Challenges of New Reproductive Technologies." facts and issues No. 8, June 2004.
Roberts, Dorothy E.. "Race and the New Reproduction." Rpt. Moral Issues in Global Perspectives. Christine Koggel, Ed. Broadview Press: 1999
The Tuskeegee Timeline from the Center for Disease Control Website http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/tuskegee/time.htm . Accessed 11/23/2005
Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia. http://www.wikipedia.org Accessed 11/23/2005
Women in World History Website, George Mason University http://chnm.gmu.edu/wwh/lessons/lesson16/lesson16.php?s=0 Accessed 11/23/2005
| paper 3 Name: alex heilb Date: 2005-11-28 11:51:24 Link to this Comment: 17183 |
At the root of this issue is the concept of choice. In 1972, a step toward furthering women's autonomy was made with the Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade. Yet since this ruling, further legislature has once again limited a woman's choices when it comes to her body. And girls under the age of eighteen have even less autonomy—when does a female become a "woman" and get to become the boss of her body?
Abstinence-only sex education removes further choices from teenage sex. This conservative education suggests that teenagers do not have the choice to have sex, though the fact of current American life is that about 2/3 of boys and ½ of girls in the US are sexually active by age 18 (Rescorla). Clearly sex education in public schools is inadequate—abstinence only sex-ed is not sex education at all, for it does not educate children about sex; rather, it preaches to them about remaining abstinent until marriage, a sermon half of the teenage girls in this country disregard. Rather than educate young girls about various types of birth control and how or where they can access these resources, public sex education courses are ignoring the issue of teenage sex, hoping it will go away.
This sends a message to teenage girls—and not the message that they should abstain from sex. Rather, this non-discussion of safe sex and sexuality further stigmatizes sex for girls, which can cause them to be shamed by their desire to know more about aspects of sex. These girls are then less likely to ask their parents questions or seek advice from other knowledgeable sources under the pretext that such questions are inappropriate. These same girls then engage in sexual activity without being properly educated about ways to protect themselves, and can end up pregnant or infected with an STD.
Margaret Sanger, a pioneer in birth control education, began speaking out for the need to educate women about birth control options in 1918, long before oral contraceptives had been developed. She saw birth control as a way to maintain lifestyles. That is, giving a sexually active couple the choice to have a baby or not helped them to continue on the path they had set for themselves. In the early 1900's, women who had babies out of wedlock were shut away or cast out (which is still the result for some unwed mothers in certain situations these days), and Sanger knew many of these women. She spoke of a pair of sisters, one of whom became pregnant and had the baby. She was then thrown out of her house and forced to work as a servant for families who mistreated her and her child to the point that the infant died. The other sister also became pregnant, but was sent away to have an abortion, which affected her psychologically but allowed her to continue on in her society. Sanger said, "our laws force women into celibacy on the one hand, or abortion on the other," and she felt that neither option was the best option.
Currently, 21 states allow all minors to get birth control without informing their parents. Another 11 states allow "most" minors to do so (Planned Parenthood). This ensures that teens who seek out protection can receive it without their parents knowing they are sexually active (surely it is not the fear of most young women that their parents know they are using contraceptives, but that they are sexually active in the first place). But teens who choose to use prescription birth control without the knowledge of their parents are faced with the challenge of paying for it without the assistance of their parents.
Yet even if there is an open relationship between parents and their daughters, paying for birth control can be a challenge. The current Anthem insurance policy my family has does not cover oral contraceptives like Ortho-tricyclen unless they are being used as an acne treatment, which seems rather illogical. Even more illogical is that this insurance plan covers Viagra. So even beyond public policy, private programs are not seeking to facilitate the acquisition of birth control by young women. What would Margaret Sanger say about this? She argues in her paper "Morality and Birth Control," published in 1918, that birth control education and access has been "tenaciously withheld from...working women," who have not been able to share in the "greater happiness, greater freedom, greater prosperity and...harmony" that upper class women using birth control methods had found. Clearly, birth control has not been equally accessible to everyone since the invention of the pessary, the first form of birth control for women.
So with birth control hard to learn about and even harder to gain access to, what's a girl to do? Planned Parenthood estimates that 34% of teenagers in the US become pregnant by the age of twenty. Currently, 34 states require a minor to have the involvement and permission of at least one parent before that minor can receive an abortion. This can dissuade girls from seeking an abortion, or a legal one, due to the fear of what their parents will do when they find out. Legislature like this does nothing to protect teenage girls who may be better off receiving an abortion without their parents' knowledge. In the most extreme case, should a child who was raped by her father then be forced to ask him whether or not she can abort the fetus? A study by Planned Parenthood suggests that, while most teens do in fact involve their parents in the decision, those that don't come from families with histories of violence. These teens fear their parents' violent reactions were they to learn of an unplanned pregnancy. Other teens worry they'll be kicked out of the house. Teenagers choosing not to involve their parents in the process are not, however, forced to make the decision all on their own. Most of them spoke about it with their boyfriends, a trusted adult, or a "professional," assumably a counselor or social worker.
In Missouri, no matter the patient's age, a twenty four hour waiting period is required between a doctor's consultation with the patient and the procedure. This time is supposedly used to ensure that the patient is making an informed consent before going through with the abortion. If the doctor does not follow guidelines set down by the government, he can be fined, or even serve jail time. The problem with this is that the guidelines for ensuring informed consent of the patient are so vague that many doctors do not understand them and could break the law without even realizing it. Missouri approved this piece of legislature using precedence from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which approved the 24 hour waiting period for women in Pennsylvania back in 1992. Some would argue legislature like this is not a threat to women's autonomy, because it merely delays the abortion by one day. However, the fact that the government can now dictate when a woman can have an abortion is a small step towards many anti-choice lobbyists' goal of illegalizing abortion.
Even more worrisome than the idea of a 24 hour waiting period is the idea that perhaps men should have a say in whether or not their sexual partners can receive abortions. Many websites such as www.menforchoice.com talk of men being unsatisfied with their partner's decision about abortion. Most cases suggest that these men wish they could convince their partners to have an abortion so that the man will not get stuck paying eighteen years of child support on a child they never wanted to begin with. However, a few men wish they could prevent their partners from having an abortion such a battle happened in Pennsylvania in 2002, when a father-to-be got an injunction against his girlfriend's abortion. The injunction was lifted days later under the precedence of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, a 1976 case that led to the invalidation of a Missouri law that required a woman to have written spousal consent before she could have an abortion (Lithwick, 1). Men in this situation seem to have forgotten that there is more to being pregnant than just becoming a mother. The nine month gestation period is something that, quite simply, some women do not want to go through just because their partners say so. You cannot "legally force women to bear children against their will (Lithwick, 2)," just as you cannot legally force them to have an abortion because you don't feel like paying child support.
So, there are many difficulties when it comes to sex in the US. It is difficult to find birth control and learn how to use it. It is difficult to receive an abortion, and may become even more so. The one thing that seems not so difficult is getting pregnant when you weren't planning on it. And why all this trouble? Inadequate sex education practices for young people. As Jocelyn Elders, former US Surgeon General, says, "Vows of abstinence break more easily than latex condoms." So why is the Bush administration trying to push through this $500 million plan that will essentially deny teenagers access to information needed to make responsible decisions about sex? Perhaps it is their Puritan concern with the overall level of national morality. But on that note, Margaret Sanger argues, "knowledge of birth control is essentially moral."
Sources Used
Elders, Jocelyn. Interview by Priscilla Pardini in 2002 for Rethinking Schools.
Lithwick, Dahlia. "Dad's Sad, Mad: Too Bad." Slate 7 August 2002: 1-3. Accessed 19 November 2005
New York University. The Margaret Sanger Papers Project. 2005. [internet] accessed 19 November 2005:
Planned Parenthood. Planned Parenthood Federation of America. 2005 [internet] accessed 19 November 2005:
Rescorla, Leslie. Introduction to Psychology. Lecture heard November 2005, Bryn Mawr College.
Singer, Alan. "Preaching Ain't Teaching: Sex Education and America's New Puritans."
Sternberg, Steve. "Sex Education Stirs Controversy." USA Today July 10 2002: 1-3. Accessed 10 November 2005
Rethinking Schools Online 2003: 1-3. Accessed 10 November 2005
| Gayle Rubin and Claudia Card: The politics of sex, Name: Elle Stacy Date: 2005-11-30 03:08:55 Link to this Comment: 17223 |
The United States lives and breaths sex. It calls out from every billboard, every T.V. commercial; from teen magazines to toothpaste ads. Sex is everywhere. Or should we say, sexual expression is everywhere. The actual act of sex itself is considered by most of America as dirty, and sinful if performed outside of a state sanctioned heterosexual marriage. For a married couple to engage in the act of procreation is allowed, and if not linked to closely with the erotic act itself, even considered beautiful. Sex between unmarried individuals that do not meet the traditional relationship model, be they significantly older or younger than one another, not "opposite" genders, be there money exchanged, or the forms of sex "non-traditional", and it is considered obscene, dirty, and deviant. So where and when is it that this stigma against sex came from? and what have it's effects been on American society?
There are two feminists that I see as the foremothers to my own political feminist theory. Gayle Rubin speaks of the history and influence of the U.S. anti-sex federal laws from the beginning of the 19th century through the 1980's on relationships and societies. I take from her my understanding of a sex-negative history that stems from relgious, victorian morality, and fear of emerging systems of eroticism. Claudia Card speaks of the effect of sex-negative politics on marriage, and in turn, motherhood. She speaks to the oppression women face in hetrosexual marriage, and uses its flaws as a backdrop for discussing the absurdity of arguing for homosexual marriage. Her arguments are the reality of a history of sex-negative politics that Rubin speaks of.
The History
The Comstock Act of 1873, named for Anthony Comstock, made it a federal crime to make, advertise, sell, possess, send through the mail, or import books or pictures deemed obscene (Rubin p.7). It also banned contraceptive or abortive drugs, devices, and information about them. Most states passed their own anti-obscenity laws at this time. In 1910 The Mann Act, also known as the White Slave Act went on to criminalize prostitution. The 1940s through the 1970s brought homosexual witch-hunts, the grouping of deviant sexualities and eroticism with child molestation, pornography and communism (Rubin p.7). Notably, these actions were not simply about enforcing a religious ideology. They came as a response to the emerging modern erotic system. They came as a response to the flux of pornography, out gay and lesbians in the workforce, and the expansion of the commercial sex industry. The 1950s were an especially good example of formative yet repressed times for sexuality: homosexual literature was flourishing, and gay rights organizations were forming, along side a right-wing sexual counter-offensive (Rubin, p. 44). The notion that sex is bad for the young was chiseled into extensive social and legal structures at this time, right along side the criminalizing of gay men as the stereotypical child molester (Rubin, p. 5). To date, the lack of sex education in schools, as well as rising rates of teen pregnancy are an example of the current reality of these histories.
Safe Sex
The Institution of Marriage
While Card's main focus is on the fatuity of fighting for homosexual marriage, she debunks the structure and validity of state sanctioned marriage in the process. As she sees it, the institution of marriage is so flawed that it should not be reproduced or ameliorated by anyone:
"Family,"...comes from the Latin familia, meaning "household,", which in turn came from famulus, which...mean[s] "servant." The ancient Roman paterfamilias was the head of a household of servants and slaves, including his wife or wives, concubines, and children. He had the power of life and death over them. The ability of contemporary male heads of households to get away with battering, incest, and murder suggests to many feminists that the family has not evolved into anything acceptable yet. (Card, p.358)
Card understands marriage as a relationship to which the State is an essential third party, in which a history of modern patriarchies have been mandatory for and oppressive to women. As she points out, there are relatively few things necessary in obtaining a marriage license; one need only be of the correct age and gender. No recognition is given to the dangers of legally sanctioning the access of one person to the person and life of another without evidence of relevant knowledge of those doing the licencing. There is no test, or course one must take, or mandatary background check as a legal safeguard to a potentially abusive marriage. Central to the idea of marriage, historically, has been intimate access to one's spouses activities, belongings, person, histories, physical access to each other's residences, and financial status (Card, p. 364). The legal rights of marriage to each other's persons, property, and lives is something Card sees as endangering the lives of women, opening up possibilities for torture, rape, battery, stalking, mayhem, or murder by the other spouse.
Motherhood
Sexuality is broken down in the United States into two categories the insiders: those who are allowed to carefully experience sex within the right rules, and the outsiders: all other forms of sexuality. Sex may happen in state sanctified, heterosexual, same-generational, monogamous marriage, but what does that sex look like for women? Procreative sex is legitimate as it creates a family unit, however, beyond this, the "mother" is no longer a sexual being. This harkens back to Rubin's discussion of knowlege of sex as harmful to children, which gained ground in the 1950s. If sex is bad for children, then the "mother", the "caregiver", must therefore be the anti-sex. This striped a woman of her sexual expression, and the last space for an accepted sexual space for women generally.
Card also challenges the assumption that parental responsibility should be concentrated in one or two people, given the liklyhood for all rearing responsibility to fall on the mother. She also discusses the possible negaive effects of concentrated parental responsibility as having too much "power of a child's happiness and unhappiness in their hands for nearly two decades" (Card, P. 368).
What neither of my feminist foremothers discuss is the connection between monogamous heterosexual marriage, and sex work. I see these two institutions as intrinsically related, and inherent in one another. Claudia Card speaks of the negative effects on marriage for women, and in leaving out its counterpart, lead me to think about the reverse effect of marriage on men. I see the traditional form of monogamous, heterosexual marriage as unlikely to meet the needs of either of the two parties. It is for that reason that sex work is so important. I see sex workers as the invisible glue that holds many marriages together. The mother must be a non-sexual figure, yet the father is permitted to be sexual and supposedly holds an innate drive to inseminate. Weather it be filling sexual needs that "mother's" as moral figures cannot give their husbands in the limiting structure of traditional marriage and motherhood, or the need for an immoral "other" to allow the sanctity of a space deemed morally holy, sex workers are a vital counter-part to the traditional structure of marriage as it exists in the United States, and must be used when discussing marriage from a feminist perspective.
Card, Claudia, Against Marriage and Motherhood, Moral Issues in Global Perspective, edited by Christine Koggel, Canada 1999.
Rubin, Gayle, Thinking Sex, American Feminist Thought at Century's End: A Reader, Edited by Linda Kauffman
| Shepherd Name: Flora Date: 2005-11-30 13:07:02 Link to this Comment: 17232 |
"After calling every local clinic, hospital and doctors office that was open on Sundays, I was amazed by their reaction and refusal to supply emergency contraceptive. Apparently, being responsible enough to immediately follow up after my birth control failed, is taboo in this small town!" –anonymous letter to www.getthepill.com
"I would not touch the pill where abortion is a significant mechanism. The big conflict is that some people don't recognize there is a second person in a pregnancy. I have to look out for both of them." – Pharmacist Karen Brauer, President, Pharmacists for Life International
"...because a pharmacist does not know a patient's history on the basis of a given prescription, judgements regarding the acceptability of a prescription may be medically inappropriate. To a woman with Eisenmenger's syndrome, for example, pregnancy may mean death." –Julie Cantor, J.D. and Ken Baum M.D. J.D., New England Journal of Medicine
Emergency Contraception is the wedge issue in women's reproductive rights at this time. And we don't have the science to prove it is not an aborticant. Unlike RU-486 or surgical abortion, there is no exact scientific explanation of how the pill works. The US Food and Drug Administration explains:
Plan B works like other birth control pills to prevent pregnancy. Plan B acts primarily by stopping the release of an egg from the ovary (ovulation). It may prevent the union of sperm and egg (fertilization). If fertilization does occur, Plan B may prevent a fertilized egg from attaching to the womb (implantation). If a fertilized egg is implanted prior to taking Plan B, Plan B will not work.
This definition causes problems. Since the pill may prevent implantation, Pro-lifers can still claim that the pill is an aborticant. The primary mechanism of the drug is to stop ovulation and only 40% of women trying to conceive without using birth control become pregnant (gain implanted embryos). Therefore, the percentage of women who take Plan B and manage to ovulate, get the egg fertilized and then get implantation thwarted not by natural methods but through the drug will be slim.
Without irrefutable proof that Plan B is not an aborticant, how else can its proponents argue for it? Many argue that Plan B is just a back up contraceptive method, encouraging a natural process in a woman's body. It is safe, and studies consistently show that it prevents unplanned pregnancy. Plan B must be taken within 72 hours after intercourse and is most effective 12-24 hours after. At this stage of development, the embryo is at most a hundred cells, barely visible to the naked eye and incapable of survival without a womb. However, if you believe that life begins at conception, then this distinction won't help.
Even legalizing over the counter dispensation of the drug will not solve the issue, although it may make the drug available in a few more places. If pharmacies as big as Wal-Mart can refuse to dispense it, what's to say that supermarkets and gas stations won't follow suit? Cashiers can claim civil rights just as much as pharmacists do and have less of a medical obligation to help patients. And the government cannot force these employees to work again their morals. As Lawyer Cantor and Dr. Baum wrote "Although we believe that the most ethical course is to treat patients compassionately—that is, to stock emergency contraception and fill prescriptions for it—the totality of the arguments makes us stop short of advocating a legal duty to do so as a first resort." (New England Journal of Medicine)
The biggest issue in emergency contraception is not a fetus' right to live or women's control of her body. The biggest issue is punishing sexual intercourse. If the emergency contraception concerns were purely in objection to the minimal chance that it may work as an aborticant, then the government and even the Catholic Church would not make exceptions for victims of rape or incest, because all abortions would be equally evil, regardless of the manner of conception.
The language of emergency contraception opponents is one of crime and punishment, victims and perpetrators, virgins and sluts. Louisiana State Representative Woody Jenkins said it best in 1995 "...He argued that it [the clause legalizing abortions only for rape victims] was unnecessary since a rape victim could go to a hospital within a few days of the crime to get a pill or injection that would prevent pregnancy. He stipulated, however, that he didn't support the use of such morning-after pills in cases other than rape." (William Saletan is Jenkins, brackets mine) Here, emergency contraception can only be given to the victims. The "cases other than rape" do not deserve the luxury of emergency contraception, since they commited the crime of sex.
Even liberal author Naomi Wolf parallels Jenkins' remarks "Once, I made the choice to take a morning- after pill. If what was going on in my mind had been mostly about the well-being of the possible baby, that pill would never have been swallowed...I was not so unlike those young louts who father children and run from the specter of responsibility." Here Wolf, having had irresponsible sex, does not deserve to take the drug for the sake of the embryo that could not yet be more than one hundred cells. She later discusses her emergency contraception as a "sin" that must be atoned for. So, rape makes emergency contraception ok and consensual sex makes emergency contraception as sin? So it's a stifling anti-sex, pro-children society. Add those contradictions to those who equate abortion with murder and emergency contraception gets complicated very fast. With so much moralizing mixed up in real life decisions, what's an activist to do?
Enter Harrison Hickman, a man who did not call himself a feminist, but spent most of his political career working for their cause as a pollster. Hickman was and is the definition of a pragmatist. He manipulated voters any way he could to swing them to his side, at times using racist and even misogynist themes to promote abortion and women's rights legislation. His methods were very effective. He would never hesitate to compromise. How would a man like Hickman approach the emergency contraception issue?
As a strong-willed feminist, My knee jerk reaction is to force pharmacists to do their job, but as Cantor and Baum already stated, the legality of that is questionable. The solution that Hickman would probably approve of is a two part strategy using economic pressures on pharmacies and government restrictions on pharmacists. The government could force pharmacies to choose between dispensing either both oral and emergency contraceptives or neither. Market demand will probably force them to stock both. Then, working under what is commonly called a referral clause, pharmacists or cashiers (if the drug is made available over the counter) who do not wish to dispense emergency contraceptives must notify their boss in writing and refer patients to other pharmacies or other sources to obtain the drug. This solution is not perfect. However, Hickman would argue that the end result is best. Pharmacists who refuse to help their patients will be breaking the law and Pharmacies that refuse to stock EC will be losing money. Those are some crimes and punishments that I can agree with.
2/22/2004 "Testimonials." www.getthepill.com/about/testimonials.htm
Cantor, Julie and Ken Baum. "The Limits of Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists
Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?" The New England Journal of Medicine. 351;19 pp2008-2012
Food and Drug Administration. "FDA's Decision Regarding Plan B: Questions and Answers." Department of Health and Human Services.
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/planB/planBQandA.htm
"Pharmacist Promotes Freedom of Conscience" University of Cincinnati Horizons Online. August 2005. http://www.magazine.uc.edu/0805/quest4.htm
Saletan, William. Bearing Right: How Conservatives won the abortion war. University of
CA Press. Berkeley and Los Angelas, CA:2003
Wolf, Naomi. "Rethinking Pro-Choice Rhetoric: Our Bodies Our Souls." The New Republic. October 16, 1995
| Inhabiting Hallways Name: Orah Minde Date: 2005-12-16 06:17:41 Link to this Comment: 17429 |
Bachelard identifies the imagination as the agent that enables a subject to split itself from discourse. The imagination, he writes, "separates us from the past as well as from reality." The mind, therefore, fills not only with images stored in the memory, but also, with images of this unreal place. The imagination is "the power of reproducing images stored in the memory under the suggestion of associated images or of recombining former experiences to create new images" (The Random House Dictionary, 436). The image of discourse is the material of the imagination. The imagination is the reformer of image. In the imaginative mind, real images combine with unreal images to create images that suggest both the real and the unreal. While discourse does not have first-hand access to the unreal, through these images discourse may see itself dressed in unreal clothes. By creating these middle-images, the imagination coaxes the real and the unreal to inhabit spaces that reference each other.
In Three Guineas, Virginia Woolf demonstrates how the imagination can be used to create a space that directly influences discourse space. This set of essays responds to the prompting of a middle aged lawyer who asks Woolf, "How in your opinion are we to prevent war" (Woolf, 3)? The asker, it may be assumed, hopes to implement Woolf's suggestion into the present societal structure. Woolf, however, asserts that war is not a product of specific actions within the structure, but is, rather, the result of the nature of the structure itself. She concludes her essay saying,
We can best help you to prevent war not by repeating your words and following your methods but by finding new words and creating new methods. We can best help you to prevent war not by joining your society but by remaining outside your society but in co-operation with its aim (Woolf, 143).
Woolf suggests that the reformation of the patriarchal structure that produces war must occur in the middle-space that exists between the patriarchal discourse and those who refuse to fully inhabit this space. Woolf asserts that women must inhabit a space distinct from that of the patriarchal structure. If, however, there is no commerce between this new space and the dominant discourse space, than the new space, unreferenced to the understood language, becomes unreal. By maintaining reference to the dominant space, those that inhabit this space-off are recognized as in reference to (but not within) patriarchal discourse. Their habitation is, therefore, a critique of the patriarchy: a mixing of patriarchal images with off-images to create middle-images.
Teresa De Lauretis similarly concludes The Technology of Gender with a suggestion that a subject has the agency to change the ideology of gender when she moves between the space contained by the gender-discourse and "the space-off, the elsewhere, of those discourses" (Lauretis, 26). The space-off is defined according to its relation to the space from which it is off: the marginal space, however, is marginal because its refusal to be contained within ideological representation. In these terms, Woolf suggests that the space-off of the patriarchal structure is a space inhabited by women. Lauretis suggests that to inhabit the space-off is to refuse to be contained in the representational language of discourse. Space-off reforms ideology by maintaining a proximity to it, but simultaneously refuses to be controlled within it. Woolf is hesitant to respond to a letter generated by the patriarchy in fear that her response will be reappropriated into and perpetuate the patriarchy.
The patriarchal structure space that Woolf focuses her reformative self-detachment is the space of the college. Woolf suggests the formation of a women's college. While the image of the college is generated by the patriarchy, Woolf's reproduction of the college does not strive to repeat the patriachy's model in perfect form. Woolf, rather, emphasizes the differences in her model of reproduction. Woolf, rather, reinterprets the college-image in her reproduction. Judith Butler also writes in the introduction to The Psychic Life of Power of the differences between the reproduction and the original image.
The subject is compelled to repeat the norms by which it is produced, but that repetition establishes a domain of risk, for if one fails to reinstate that norm 'in the right way,' one becomes subject to further sanction, one feels the prevailing conditions of existence threatened (Butler, 28).
While Butler's subject inevitably inhabits the off-space of discourse, Woolf believes in the subject as an willing agent of change. The subject is, according to Butler, that which changes discourse. Woolf, contrarily asserts, that the subject is discourse until she chooses not to be. Women must choose to attend women's colleges. While Butler's subject is born outside of discourse, Woolf's subject is born into discourse. Woolf's demand that women choose to disengage from the interior space of their birth asks women to inhabit the off-space. Woolf's subject, therefore, chooses to inhabit the space that Butler's subject is born into.
Despite these differences in their conceptions of the original agency of the subject, Woolf and Butler both write of the subject's inexact replication of discourse as the means through which discourse is reformed. According to Butler, the subject realizes itself, through self-reflection, as that which fails to be the image of ideology. The subject may, in so realizing, decide to move from that image instead of toward it. While the failure to be the image of ideology may incline a subject to attempt to be ideology, the same failure may incline another subject to move farther from that image. This movement from the image is, in Woolf's terms, the movement from an education generated by the patriarchy. While every act of Butler's subject is an act of "self-beratement," the direction in which this beratement is directed differs according to subject. Butler's notion of "self-beratement" is merely the realization of the self as a failure. Consequent action after this realization is not inscribed into the subject. Butler's subject, therefore, is one that chooses.
While the action toward ideology follows a prepaved path, the subject who willingly perpetuates her own failure moves into unmarked space. The movement from ideology requires a knowledge of discourse-images that have been stored in the memory and images from the unreal. The subject, therefore, must place herself in a space where she may view the unreal space exterior to discourse. She must move to the edge of discourse and peer out. Unreal images mix with memory images. Reality dresses in the unreal. The mind of the gazer is filled with paradox. The imagination perpetuates the paradox, disallowing the subject from planting her feet. The imagination fuels her constant movement from discourse.
Woolf imagines a space that is not contained by physical boundaries, but rather, by the inclusion and exclusion of categories that refer to the physical. Woolf, therefore, imagines the metaphysical space of the women's college in attempt to reference the metaphysical space of patriarchal society. She works with the language of categories, (rather than that of individuals) to reform the categories that form the patriarchal discourse space. Woolf produces Three Guineas from the middle-space of metaphysical imaginings. If the imagination, however, is to be used as the tool of resistance, images must come to refer to individual bodies. The image of the women's college remains in a sphere just above that of the physical. Woolf leaves the task of theory-implementation to others.
While Woolf reinhabits the metaphysical space of categories, one may move into physical space that references the metaphysical, but is, rather, shaped by language that directly references the physical. The move from the metaphysical imagination to the political imagination is marked by a move from the language of metaphysical categories to a language of space formed by physical walls. In order for Woolf's language to become political, the college to which she refers must speak not to a category, but rather, to an plot of land. We may use our imaginations to propel Woolf's theory from the outside realm back into the physical by imagining a plot of classroom space.
One may picture a classroom that revolves around a table. Though the classroom is empty right now, one may imagine students sitting around this table. Open, underlined and highlighted books inhabit the surface of the table that is set in the middle of the classroom surrounded by chairs. Behind the chairs that are set around the table there are chairs against the walls, on the periphery of the room. This classroom is sandwiched between an upstairs and a downstairs. One may refer to this gourmet lunch as English House.
The house image, according to Bachelard, "would appear to have become a topography of our intimate being" (Bachelard, xxxii). Intimacy implies proximity. In order to acquire intimacy in uncontained space movement must be intentional. Rooms, however, force inhabitants into proximity. The inhabitants, therefore, are forced into an intimacy that was not necessarily the goal of their movement into the room. There are many possible reactions to the intimacy imposed by the room. There are also many possible forms of intimacy that different rooms provide. We will, here, regard the intimacy as imposed by the walls of the classroom that revolves around a table on the main-floor of the Bryn Mawr College English House.
Rooms function in different ways. Secret rooms create a space for the solitary individual to inhabit. Individual bedrooms, too, may create a similarly private space. While the name of the bedroom signifies the function of the room to be in reference to the bed, one may perform activities in this room that do not reference the bed. These activities, therefore, take on a secretive quality because they do not utilize the space as dictated by that to which the category refers. The name of the room, therefore, tells of the prescribed action that the room contains. The presence of walls blocks the view of those who inhabit the hallway-space outside of the room. The walls, therefore, disallow the hallway-inhabitors from determining if the actions that occur within the room are the prescribed actions or reinscriptions of the room space.
Bedrooms are usually found on the upper levels of houses. Upper levels are more divided: creating more alternatives of intimate configurations. The inhabitants of the house move from room to room. The different functions of the rooms change the individuals that inhabit them. A woman moving about the upper level of her house, from bedroom to bedroom, shifts her role according to the room she inhabits. She is a mother tucking her son into bed. She leaves her son's bedroom, walks down the hallway and enters the bedroom she shares with her spouse. She is a wife getting into bed.
Similarly, the way in which individuals use the rooms change the functions of the rooms. If we examine the main floor of English House we may imagine that it was once used as a space for social gatherings. This room was once the kitchen where cooks and maids prepared feasts. Now, however, it holds people sitting around tables without food, but books. In the past people who entered this room were identified as maids, or overseers of food preparation. Now, upon entering English House, these people are identified as a part of the Bryn Mawr College community. They pass through a hallway and enter into this classroom. They are now students. The walls impose a static identity into people.
The walls also affect identity indirectly. Not only do the classroom walls directly assign certain people to the student category and others to the professor category, but the relations as defined by the walls also determine identities. If one is aware of the direct affect the walls will have upon the self, one may not be aware of the affect another inhabitant of the room may have on the self. The walls impose an intimacy between the self and an unknown other. Indirectly, therefore, walls bring one to a realization of the self in relation to this other.
Walls, too, may be regarded as imposing static identities: upon entering into the determined space of the classroom one may find identities to be determined. The stasis of walls, however, may also be regarded as allowing a freedom of movement within. The raw material of the imagination is limited: new material does not exist. The material that exists, however, is not bounded to a store of forms: new forms do exist. The possibilities of reformation are endless. Contained material has the endless capacity for contortion.
While the possibility for contortion is present in the classroom, the hallway is the space where contortion occurs. Upon leaving her son's bedroom and entering the bedroom she shares with her husband, the woman goes through a transformative passage. The bedroom walls contract her: forcing her to heiracharize her interior space: pushing one identity to the forefront. When she leaves the bedroom space she is released from the pressure of bedroom walls. In the hallway she reforms herself.
When classroom walls are seen as imposing a stasis into an individual, identities held in the hallway are forgotten. The function of the walls of the hallway allows an intimacy that does not depend on static identity. The identity of the hallway-dweller, rather, is an unspecified compilation of all identities that this subject may embody. While the room is the place of contracted identity, the hallway is the place of movement. Identity flows from room to room through the channel of the hallway.
In "'Shuddering Without End': Class as Dinner Party" Anne Dalke and Abby Reed imagine the classroom as a space that does not forefront a single identity. While traditional classroom walls pressure certain identities into the background, Dalke and Reed imagine a classroom without a concept of performance that demands the hierarchy as imposed by the spotlight. Dalke uses Elin Diamond's image of the classroom after the required performance: "though at some point the performance will end, what is suggested is shuddering without end: permanent catharsis" (Dalke, 90). Release from the repression as imposed by the classroom walls does not imply a move from the contained to the uncontained. The move from the classroom, rather, signifies a release from hierarchical form. The classroom pressures the individual to present herself in ordered layers: student, woman, daughter, sister, friend, etc. The move to the hallway does not release one from these identities, but rather, allows one to contort the form of these relations within identity.
| Attempts at Realizing Pleasure Through Resisting D Name: Patricia F Date: 2005-12-16 12:23:40 Link to this Comment: 17436 |
CONTENTS:
PATRICIA FLAHERTY, ORAH MINDER, AMY PENNINGTON and AMY PHILLIPS
Introduction..........................................................................................I
AMY PHILLIPS
Either/Or and Both/Neither: A Discourse of "Trans"..................................1
AMY PENNINGTON
Sex Kittens and Re-Invigorating Feminism..............................................11
PATRICIA FLAHERTY
Learning to Find the G-Spot in Discourse with the Help of Disabled Women....21
ORAH MINDER
Inhabiting Hallways........................................................................31
I. Introduction
We are all trying to figure out how to realize individual pleasure. Since the present discourse seems to be that which blocks us from our pleasure, resistance is the key to the realization of this pleasure. We are all challenging the current limits of languages of words and images. We are all implementing the tool of imagination as an attempt for political action. We're taking what the discourse has given us, and creating a new space with the current existing materials. Each of our papers deals with different forms of resistance to the present discourse.
Amy Phillips is thinking about resistance to the discourse of sex and gender. In the present discourse, gender is in a binary system of man and woman and sex of male and female. These binaries are problematic for everyone, because no one really fits perfectly. Thus, people exist within the discourse of gender, while at the same time resisting it. People whose resistance is extreme are labeled as or take the label of transgendered. Transsexuals exist within the discourse of sex because they are positioning themselves against it but at the same time are resisting it by adapting the rules to fit their needs. When transsexuals conform to the gender of their new sex, they are in some ways upholding the dichotomy even as they resist it. Some transsexuals remain within the gender discourse rather than rejecting it by adhering to gender roles, but others reject this as well. Transgendered people, some of whom identify as genderqueer or a third gender, position themselves in opposition to the established discourse of gender and are working towards a redefinition of gender.
Transgenderism still remains in the discourse of gender by positioning against it, however, in the gendered world we live in, it may be impossible to hold discourse without the context of gender.
Phillips is also exploring the ways in which transsexuality and transgenderism are created and exist within a sociological framework. If sex and gender can be understood as a social construction, then so too can transsexuality and transgenderism. Without a strict binary, perhaps what we know of as transsexuality and transgenderism would possibly exist, but we would not see it as such. Without the rules, we wouldn't see people as breaking them. The existence of a gender and sex binary inherently creates a space for opposition to this binary, found in trans. Sociology of deviance theory suggests that "Trans" serves a function to define sex and gender. By establishing what is not acceptable with regards to sex and gender, what is acceptable is established. Transsexuality is still medicalized and seen as a psychological disorder. Transsexuality's medicalization is a form of social control, which allows it to be subjected to moral constraints in the name of science. In these ways, we can see how social structures create and shape the discourse for transsexuality and transgenderism. Phillips is thinking about the developing language of the transsexual and transgendered as a reforming, a reorganization, of the discourse language to form a new resistance-language.
Amy Pennington, similarly to Phillips, is also invested in the limitations of the current discourse but specifically in dealing with how the current language affects the creation of the image of the sexual woman. She sees a move from the second wave feminists who actively refuse the given male-created language of female heterosexuality. Now, however, the resistance seems to be against the initial movement of resistance: there seems to be a move to comply with the dominant discourse: a spreading of the given language and a refusal to imagine the possibility of other languages of sexuality. The only language through which one can articulate her sexuality is the language that men use to form female sexuality. This limits one to the sexual experiences that can be articulated through this language. By refusing to expand the language, this new wave of feminists is limiting its own possibilities of pleasure to a language that is controlled by men. The demanded pleasure is, therefore, only in relation to men because the language is created only in relation to men.
Patricia, contrarily, is writing about how the utilization of the given language can be an expression of control: by using the language one disallows another from controlling her. While Phillips is suggesting a reformation of the language as an act of control, Patricia is suggesting the utilization of the language as the act of control. Through incorporating Coleridge's poem "Kubla Khan", she is presenting an image of a "pleasure-dome" which allows people to use language as a means to control by claiming themselves as something through the current discourse as a means of resisting the outside gaze placing names upon people. Coleridge's lines, "Could I revive within me/ Her symphony and song,/To such a deep delight 'twould win me,/That with music loud and long, I would build that dome in air,/That sunny dome ! those caves of ice !" (ln. 42-47) are especially poignant and relevant. They are playing with the notion of one's own ability to find that language and subsequently take it upon themselves to create this pleasure-dome. She is using the example of specific women within the feminist-disabilities culture to exemplify their construction of this "pleasure-dome" as a model for other women. This idea of taking hold of one's own self through language resonates with Moraga ideology as well. Moraga, however, differentiates between being called something that sets her apart from others like "trash" or "dyke", and being called something that assumes she is someone else's; she will not accept being called "sister" unless she does it herself. She wants identity to be declared, but only in a way that allows for her own personal declaration. Moraga says in her essay The Breakdown of the Bicultural Mind, "But people can't read your mind, they read your color, they read your womanhood, they read the women you're with. They read your walk and talk. And then the privileges begin to wane and the choices become more limited, more evident." (pp. 236) Patricia stipulates that by claiming and controlling one's identity through language will not necessarily prevent being called other names, but the outside name calling will not affect one's identity since it has already been claimed. We must claim something about ourselves rather than allow, even incidentally, ourselves to be claimed by the gaze of others—the power and control lies within this claiming of oneself through language.
In the first draft of this paper Orah realized the agency inherent to three different conceptions of the subject in discourse. As a bridge into the political Orah uses Virginia Woolf's concept of the subject as one who must choose to use this agency. Movement from discourse must be imaginative. Discourse provides images that fill the memory. Outside of discourse unreal images float. The resistant subject cannot leave discourse in order to retrieve these images, but she can move to the margins of discourse and gaze outward. In her mind these new images mingle with those of the memory. This is the space of Woolf's Three Guineas. In this work, Woolf imagines the metaphysical space of the women's college. Woolf, however, does not carry these imaginings onto solid political ground. This is where Orah comes in! Orah takes Woolf's theory that resides in the realm of category and brings it into the walled classroom. Using Gaston Bachelard she meditates on the physical space of the classroom with specific emphasis on the function of walls. Walls impose people into relations of intimacy intimacy. Orah goes on to compare the walls of rooms and those of hallways. While certain rooms require certain identities to be centerstaged, hallways are the places in which identities shift. Hallways are the dressing rooms where one prepares a face to meet other faces. While the one who emerges from the dressingroom into the classroom is costumed to perform, Orah suggests a convergence in the hallway. Hallways are places of intimacy without the requirement of stratifying identity.
In our papers, we are all suggesting alternate ways to resist the discourse which is actively preventing access to our pleasure. Although different suggestions as to how the resistance should be implemented, there is an overriding acknowledgement that change in the discourse is a necessary means to an end; an end where the pleasure can be realized and negotiated.
| Corrected Final Introduction to Books Name: Amy Pennin Date: 2005-12-16 14:16:22 Link to this Comment: 17441 |
Attempts at Realizing Pleasure through Resisting Discourse
CONTENTS:
PATRICIA FLAHERTY, ORAH MINDER, AMY PENNINGTON and AMY PHILLIPS
Introduction..........................................................................................I
AMY PHILLIPS
Either/Or and Both/Neither: A Discourse of "Trans"..................................1
AMY PENNINGTON
The Empire of Images: Discourses of Female Sexuality and a Call for Resistance............................................................................................11
PATRICIA FLAHERTY
Learning to Find the G-Spot in Discourse with the Help of Disabled Women....21
ORAH MINDER
Inhabiting Hallways........................................................................31
I. Introduction
We are all trying to figure out how to realize individual pleasure. Since the present discourse seems to be that which blocks us from our pleasure, resistance is the key to the realization of this pleasure. We are all challenging the current limits of languages of words and images. We are all implementing the tool of imagination as an attempt for political action. We're taking what the discourse has given us, and creating a new space with the current existing materials. Each of our papers deals with different forms of resistance to the present discourse.
Amy Phillips is thinking about resistance to the discourse of sex and gender. In the present discourse, gender is in a binary system of man and woman and sex of male and female. These binaries are problematic for everyone, because no one really fits perfectly. Thus, people exist within the discourse of gender, while at the same time resisting it. People whose resistance is extreme are labeled as or take the label of transgendered. Transsexuals exist within the discourse of sex because they are positioning themselves against it but at the same time are resisting it by adapting the rules to fit their needs. When transsexuals conform to the gender of their new sex, they are in some ways upholding the dichotomy even as they resist it. Some transsexuals remain within the gender discourse rather than rejecting it by adhering to gender roles, but others reject this as well. Transgendered people, some of whom identify as genderqueer or a third gender, position themselves in opposition to the established discourse of gender and are working towards a redefinition of gender.
Transgenderism still remains in the discourse of gender by positioning against it, however, in the gendered world we live in, it may be impossible to hold discourse without the context of gender.
Phillips is also exploring the ways in which transsexuality and transgenderism are created and exist within a sociological framework. If sex and gender can be understood as a social construction, then so too can transsexuality and transgenderism. Without a strict binary, perhaps what we know of as transsexuality and transgenderism would possibly exist, but we would not see it as such. Without the rules, we wouldn't see people as breaking them. The existence of a gender and sex binary inherently creates a space for opposition to this binary, found in trans. Sociology of deviance theory suggests that "Trans" serves a function to define sex and gender. By establishing what is not acceptable with regards to sex and gender, what is acceptable is established. Transsexuality is still medicalized and seen as a psychological disorder. Transsexuality's medicalization is a form of social control, which allows it to be subjected to moral constraints in the name of science. In these ways, we can see how social structures create and shape the discourse for transsexuality and transgenderism. Phillips is thinking about the developing language of the transsexual and transgendered as a reforming, a reorganization, of the discourse language to form a new resistance-language.
Amy Pennington, similarly to Phillips, is also invested in the limitations of the current discourse but specifically in dealing with how the current language affects the creation of the image of the sexual woman. She sees a move from the second wave feminists who actively refuse the given male-created language of female heterosexuality. Now, women seem to be repelled and discouraged from participation in anything similar to the initial movement of resistance. Within the images produced by popular media, there seems to be a move to comply with the dominant discourse, a spreading of the given language and a lack of imagination as to the possibility of other languages of sexuality. Women are told that popular acceptance of the dominant language is evidence of the progress made by the feminist movement; popular discourse asserts that the sexualized woman is the liberated woman. Yet, the only language through which one can articulate her sexuality is the language that is created entirely in relation to and from the perspective of male desire. This limits one to the sexual experiences that can be articulated through this language which describes the male gaze. The insidious use of this language both within and alongside assertions of the 'new' female empowerment makes it more difficult to resist, because it obscures the sexist and disempowering nature of the language itself. By failing to resist this problematic language, a new generation of women is limiting its own possibilities of pleasure to a language that is controlled by the male gaze. A new imagination of female sexualities as seen through alternative lenses must be created in order to combat this dominating discourse.
Patricia, contrarily, is writing about how the utilization of the given language can be an expression of control: by using the language one disallows another from controlling her. While Phillips is suggesting a reformation of the language as an act of control, Patricia is suggesting the utilization of the language as the act of control. Through incorporating Coleridge's poem "Kubla Khan", she is presenting an image of a "pleasure-dome" which allows people to use language as a means to control by claiming themselves as something through the current discourse as a means of resisting the outside gaze placing names upon people. Coleridge's lines, "Could I revive within me/ Her symphony and song,/To such a deep delight 'twould win me,/That with music loud and long, I would build that dome in air,/That sunny dome ! those caves of ice !" (ln. 42-47) are especially poignant and relevant. They are playing with the notion of one's own ability to find that language and subsequently take it upon themselves to create this pleasure-dome. She is using the example of specific women within the feminist-disabilities culture to exemplify their construction of this "pleasure-dome" as a model for other women. This idea of taking hold of one's own self through language resonates with Moraga ideology as well. Moraga, however, differentiates between being called something that sets her apart from others like "trash" or "dyke", and being called something that assumes she is someone else's; she will not accept being called "sister" unless she does it herself. She wants identity to be declared, but only in a way that allows for her own personal declaration. Moraga says in her essay The Breakdown of the Bicultural Mind, "But people can't read your mind, they read your color, they read your womanhood, they read the women you're with. They read your walk and talk. And then the privileges begin to wane and the choices become more limited, more evident." (pp. 236) Patricia stipulates that by claiming and controlling one's identity through language will not necessarily prevent being called other names, but the outside name calling will not affect one's identity since it has already been claimed. We must claim something about ourselves rather than allow, even incidentally, ourselves to be claimed by the gaze of others—the power and control lies within this claiming of oneself through language.
In the first draft of this paper Orah realized the agency inherent to three different conceptions of the subject in discourse. As a bridge into the political Orah uses Virginia Woolf's concept of the subject as one who must choose to use this agency. Movement from discourse must be imaginative. Discourse provides images that fill the memory. Outside of discourse unreal images float. The resistant subject cannot leave discourse in order to retrieve these images, but she can move to the margins of discourse and gaze outward. In her mind these new images mingle with those of the memory. This is the space of Woolf's Three Guineas. In this work, Woolf imagines the metaphysical space of the women's college. Woolf, however, does not carry these imaginings onto solid political ground. This is where Orah comes in! Orah takes Woolf's theory that resides in the realm of category and brings it into the walled classroom. Using Gaston Bachelard she meditates on the physical space of the classroom with specific emphasis on the function of walls. Walls impose people into relations of intimacy. Orah goes on to compare the walls of rooms and those of hallways. While certain rooms require certain identities to be centerstaged, hallways are the places in which identities shift. Hallways are the dressing rooms where one prepares a face to meet other faces. While the one who emerges from the dressingroom into the classroom is costumed to perform, Orah suggests a convergence in the hallway. Hallways are places of intimacy without the requirement of stratifying identity.
In our papers, we are all suggesting alternate ways to resist the discourse which is actively preventing access to our pleasure. Although different suggestions as to how the resistance should be implemented, there is an overriding acknowledgement that change in the discourse is a necessary means to an end; an end where the pleasure can be realized and negotiated.
| The Empire of Images: Discourses of Female Sexuali Name: Amy Pennin Date: 2005-12-16 16:43:50 Link to this Comment: 17442 |
As women, many of my peers and I grew up unaware of our own 'misfortune.' Perhaps for this reason, the dominant discourse of female empowerment as espoused by my generation is most often characterized by disinterest rather than passion. Like Simone de Beauvoir wrote in 1949, my peers seem to believe that "we are no longer like our partisan elders; by and large we have won the game" (Beauvoir 687). Ironically, it is de Beauvoir's very theory which this essay utilizes to prove the need for a revival of feminist resistance amongst the women of my generation, and which makes her one of my feminist foremothers.
Unfortunately, it is not de Beauvoir's theory but her message of political passivity which we were raised to accept. Growing up, girls have little reason to distrust her message. We hear and see it constantly, in one perverted form or another, gracing the packaging of every product made with little girls in mind. Susan Bordo, another of my feminist foremothers, utilizes one example from Susan Lamb's book on young girls' sexuality to describe the pedagogical effect of this element of the "empire of images" into which my generation was born serfs. Her quote from Lamb's work perfectly describes the feminist message of female freedom as it has evolved into a marketing slogan for little girls' dress-up games: "(these girls are) 'silly and adorable, sexy and marvelous all at once' she tells us, as they 'celebrate their objectification,' 'playing out male fantasies...but without risk'" (Empire 6). From childhood, then, women of my generation have been taught that their ability to 'celebrate their objectification' through the 'playing out (of) male fantasies' is concrete evidence of their freedom. When they move from performances of beauty involving dress-up costumes to performances of rebellion involving smoking, they likely consume with their cigarettes the slogan of the Virginia Slims company: "You've come a long way, baby" (Hunger 12). Messages of this sort, which use the successes of the feminist movement as a guise to obscure the more deeply sexist messages of their advertising—the slender models featured in these ads in no way embody a female freedom from male definitions of beauty—abound in entertainment media aimed at young women. As young women grow into adolescence and adulthood, graduating through Seventeen to Cosmopolitan, the message stays the same: the sexualized woman is a liberated woman.
On the surface, this argument seems fairly logical, and is thus all too easy to swallow. Women today do not face the sexual repression which was protested by feminists of the fifties and sixties; "by and large," haven't we won the game?
The answer, of course, is no. Just as Beauvoir's theories lacked political impetus as a result of her belief that feminism was a historical topic to be reflected back upon rather than a living movement to be joined, women of my generation have failed to take feminist political action because they are unaware that such action might be necessary. It is the purpose of this essay, therefore, to reveal the dominant discourse of female sexuality as previously described for what it really is: a limiting discourse which constructs all possible female forms of sexuality and beauty within the confines of the male gaze. After all, why should little girls celebrate male fantasy and their own objectification when they could be subjectively playing amidst alternative female fantasies? The "Empire of Images" described by Bordo must, I argue, be understood as an empire constructed within the social frameworks of male as Subject and female as Object theorized by Beauvoir. Images in popular media can thus be revealed as reinforcing woman's status as the Other while forcing her to interpret her body, and thus define her sexuality and her understandings of beauty, solely in relation to male desire. By establishing a narrow set of sexualities and forms of beauty acceptable to the male gaze, this discourse precludes any options for female pleasure and self-interpretation which fall outside the boundaries of the male fantasy.
The dominating and inescapable nature of this discourse as it functions in the lives of women is described by Bordo as an "Empire of Images." As Bordo argues, the "empire" in which we now live functions as a pervasive "perceptual pedagogy" which teaches everyone, women in particular, how to interpret their bodies (1). Bordo describes the twenty-year-olds she encounters in her audiences at lectures on her work in the same way I would describe myself as a member of that group:
I simply catch the eyes of the 20-year-olds in the audience. They know. They understand that you can be as cynical as you want about the ads -- and many of them are -- and still feel powerless to resist their messages. They are aware that virtually every advertisement, every magazine cover, has been digitally modified and that very little of what they see is "real." That doesn't stop them from hating their own bodies for failing to live up to computer-generated standards... Generations raised in the empire of images are both vulnerable and savvy (4).
Young women are largely forced to function within this discourse of images because they are provided few alternative portrayals of beauty and female sexuality, and the few which do exist often seem to preclude heterosexuality. Furthermore, the discourse which identifies 'normal' standards for female beauty and sexuality is, as previously noted, enmeshed in the dominant discourse of female empowerment, for the empowered woman is equated with the sexualized female. Young women are thus simultaneously told that they are free from oppression because of the public nature of female sexuality, and that this 'freeing' sexuality must conform to the narrow standards of male fantasy as constructed by consumer capitalism.
The power of this dual message to obscure the problematic politics which underlie such representations of women is exemplified by Bordo in her critical analysis of a discussion concerning female beauty and advertising which occurred on a Phil Donahue talk show. The topic of the show addressed whether or not a certain television advertisement for colored contacts, whose slogan was "Get brown eyes a second look (by making them blue)" should be considered racist. Surprisingly, women of color and white women in the audience argued that "there was nothing 'wrong' with the ad, and everything 'wrong' with any inclinations to 'make it a political question'" (Material 47). One reader stated casually, "It's fashion, women are never happy with themselves" (47). That there might be politically problematic with the fact that "fashion" encourages women to be constantly unhappy with who they are never seemed to have crossed any of the audiences' minds. Bordo goes on to describe this discourse of the "acceptance of differences" which masks the structures of power which lie behind them as "the postmodern conversation":
All sense of history and all ability (or inclination) to sustain cultural criticism, to make the distinctions and discriminations that would permit such criticisms, have disappeared. Rather, in this conversation, "anything goes"—and any positioned social critique is immediately destabilized (49-50).
This, I believe, is the conversation which is currently preventing young women from recognizing the oppressive nature of the conceptions of beauty and sexuality upon which they are raised from childhood. Just as the seemingly progressive "anything goes" mentality actually functions to mask the regressive racism present in these advertisements, the assertion that the public nature of women's sexuality is evidence of their liberation merely obscures the truly sexist notions upon which this public conception of female sexuality is constructed. Placing emphasis upon the "progress" signified by the new popular acceptability of portraying females as sexual beings, advertisers and others who produce popular media (both consciously and unconsciously) distract from the male-dominated and constricting nature of the portrayals themselves.
Beauvoir's theory of gender frameworks as elaborated in The Second Sex can help us to understand why it is male fantasy which defines standards of female sexuality and beauty, and thus why I have posed the dominance of this discourse of images as a specifically feminist problem. Beauvoir asserts that the woman—"a free and autonomous being like all human creatures—nevertheless finds herself living in a world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other" (688). Beauvoir argues that, in the relationship of 'the two sexes,' man is the Subject, while woman is the Other:
Man can think of himself without woman. She cannot think of herself without man...she appears essentially to the male as a sexual being...She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential (676).
If woman is primarily defined in society by her difference from and relationship to man, then definitions of her sexuality and standards of her beauty will necessarily be created in relation to man and his desire. Further, if the female is relegated to the role of Object by the male Subject, images of her will inevitably reflect the viewpoint of the male. The idea of the male gaze was first articulated by John Berger in his analysis of the structure of popular images of women and men and provides a useful visual model for de Beauvoir's theory. In visual representations, and symbolically in gendered life, Berger claimed that "men act; women appear." Specifically, women appear in the eyes of men; thus, they come to understand that the only correct and politically useful way to "appear" is as the image created by male desire. Women, deluged from an early age by popular images of the female as created by a media which assumes the role of the male in assessing its object, will learn to view her body critically through that male gaze. Once young women learn to view the female body through the male perspective, they will continue to reproduce that problematic perspective in their own understandings and representations of themselves and other women. This subtle process of symbolic violence is evident in all magazines marketed towards young women, but Cosmopolitan (a magazine produce by and large by women) provides the critical reader with a wealth of examples.
The September 2005 issue of Cosmopolitan functions quite well as a demonstrative text for my assertions in this essay. The cover alone is full of assertions of female sexuality as liberation. The cover model for this issue, Scarlett Johansson, gazes out at the reader with a devious look which embodies the "fun, fearless females" which Cosmo encourages its readers to become. An arrow on the cover points inward to the magazine; the text reads "Scarelett Gets Frisky." On the second page of the magazine, we see Scarlett laughing, her jeans in her hands, standing in only her underwear. Were such a photo-spread used as the cover of a men's magazine, it would not be so surprising; the cover would function to entice readers, making them think that perhaps Scarlett might get even "friskier" in other photos (she does not). Why, however, would this image be used on the cover and first page of a magazine for (assumed to be heterosexual) women? These images prove a prime example of the discourse of female sexuality which I have been discussing: firstly, the woman's function is merely to "appear;" she functions to decorate the magazine, as an object which is normatively beautiful and nice to look at. At the same time, however, Scarlett's display of friskiness functions as a message to female readers which asserts that the magazine is progressive, that it portrays women who do 'whatever they want,' and that by association those women who read the magazine are as "fun and fearless" as Scarlett acts. It sells Cosmopolitan magazine, and by extension the magazine's readers as well, as liberated in a way which will appeal to men. The image simultaneously asserts female liberation through sexuality and functions to reinforce normative images of what the liberated woman should be: thin, beautiful, and "fun and fearless" in ways which render them even more attractive to men. Readers of the magazine can, through its consumption, become this liberated woman as well. She is in effect the female fantasy of the uninhibited feminist: a beautiful woman who asserts her 'empowerment' through acts like, well, taking off her pants.
This image alone explains through concrete example how the dominant discourse of liberated woman as sexualized woman functions to obscure female oppression and objectification. The image blatantly mimics the softcore pornography which graces the covers of men's magazines, and yet in doing so sends a message of female empowerment. Because the women who buy these magazines see themselves through the male gaze, they understand the images from a male perspective while being fully cognizant of the thoughts which would likely run through a male's mind when they "accidently" allow the magazine to open to its first page. And a certain brand of empowerment does, in fact, arise from their portrayal of themselves as sexual objects: they gain power of a man's attention.
The majority of the articles advertised on the cover of the magazine purvey that kind of empowerment. With titles like "Guys Uncensored: What He's Really Thinking After Sex" and "50 Ways to be a Better Girlfriend," the magazine sells itself largely as a tool for obtaining the power which is to be had by fulfilling the male fantasy and becoming the perfect sexualized woman. Yet by explicitly implying that such status is important, in part, because of the power it entails—by convincing its audience that the perfectly sexualized woman is also the completely liberated woman—the magazine obscures the fact that the liberation found in such perfection is merely a freedom from the oppression which the magazine's enforcement of that normative perfection creates. Only a woman deeply entrenched in the perspective of the male gaze would interpret the act of a model taking off her pants as a sexy act of defiance. It is a testament to my generation's entrenchment that these magazines virtually flew off the stands.
When applied to Bordo's concept of the "Empire of Images," Beauvoir's theory makes it clear that the dominant discourse of female sexuality as constructed by the popular media is a male-focused discourse, despite its reproduction by both women and men. As a result of this male focus, the dominant discourse of female sexuality does not function as a domain of female freedom, despite popular assertions to the contrary. Instead, this discourse actually provides very few options to women who seek to understand themselves as sexual beings within it. Susan Bordo cites a quotation of Andrea Dworkin which powerfully asserts the limiting nature of this discourse:
"Standards of beauty describe in precise terms the relationship that an individual will have to her own body. They prescribe her motility, spontaneity, posture, gait, the uses to which she can put her body. They define precisely the dimensions of her physical freedom (Anglo 234).
Thus the current dominant discourse surrounding female sexuality limits not only the language with which women can construct and describe their sexualities but also the physical expressions of that sexuality. In this way, the discourse prevents them from fully realizing (both intellectually and physically) their individual potentials for pleasure as they might define them apart from their relationship to male desire. Instead, women are convinced that the only way to achieve power and liberation is to live up to the discourse's impossible standards.
The Empire of Images cannot be ignored—it teaches us how to interpret our bodies—and it is built according to Beauvoir's framework of man as Subject and woman as Object. Standards of female beauty and sexuality are defined ever within the male gaze, through which men view women and women view themselves. The sexualized woman as portrayed in the dominant discourse is thus not so much a liberated woman as she is a woman with a limited set of tools for constructing her sexuality. The expansion of this discourse and the subsequent proliferation of the vocabulary with which women can define themselves as sexual beings require that women recognize the limiting nature of their popularly defined sexual 'freedom.' Women must recognize the male-focused nature of their received definitions of female sexuality; they must begin to recognize their bodies as the sights of political battle. As long as women are unable to recognize the political nature of the images of sexuality and beauty which are marketed to them, they will also be unable to join in this battle. Only with the recognition of the limiting and oppressive nature of these popular definitions of female sexuality, which in turn have become women's own definitions of their sexualities, can feminist resistance to this discourse begin. An important part of this resistance will then necessarily involve the creation of alternative options for female sexuality and beauty through images. This re-imagining would facilitate the expansion of opportunities for female sexual pleasure.
Works Cited
Bordo, Susan. "'Material Girl': The Effacements of Postmodern Culture." Body and Flesh: A Philosophical Reader. Ed. Donn Welton. 1st Ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1998. 45-60.
Bordo, Susan. "Hunger as Ideology." Eating Culture. Ed. Ron Scapp and Brian Seitz. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998. 11-35.
Bordo, Susan. "Anglo-American Feminism, 'Women's Liberation' and the Politics of the Body." Space, Gender, Knowledge. Ed. Linda McDowell and Joanne P. Sharp. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997. 218-231.
Bordo, Susan. The Empire of Images in Our World of Bodies. Chronicle of Higher Education, 0009-5982, December 19, 2003, Vol. 50, Issue 17.
Cosmopolitan. Vol. 239, no. 3 (September 2005).
de Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. 1949; rpt. The Feminist Papers. 672-705.
